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Abstract of the thesis
The thesis investigates methods of evaluating indexes that measure concepts of 
human values. My understanding of indexes, especially on how they relate to the real 
world and concepts (that are the objectives of the measurement), is influenced by my 
study of literature on models used in economic and in physics.
We learn from this study of models the following:
(1) regularities described in theories do not represent real world phenomena, which 
consist of many different forces acting simultaneously;
(2) but such regularities are true in models, because they describe specific 
conditions under which regularities in nature are displayed;
(3) there are more than one model that can represent the same phenomenon 
depending on which particular aspect of the phenomenon to focus on; and
(4) the success of a model has to be evaluated partly by criteria that are independent 
from theoretical ones.
Since the role indexes play in relation to real world and concepts are similar to the 
role models play in relation to theories, I have applied the above knowledge to 
propose the following three criteria to evaluate successful indexes:
(1) Purpose-dependent criteria: criteria that are based on particular motivations of 
the measurement project;
2
(2) Theory-dependent criteria: criteria that are reflected in the theories that 
expressly or implicitly guide the development of the project of measurement; 
and
(3) Conditions-dependent criteria: criteria that are based on the conditions under 
which the index measures what it is designed to measure.
I apply these three criteria of successful indexes to examine two projects of measuring 
human values, one called the Human Development Index developed by the United 
Nations Development Programme and the other called the Life Satisfaction Indicator 
developed by an officer at the Economic Planning Agency in Japan. Among the 
findings from the examination of those two indexes are that they can be the products 
of a mixture of concerns that include convenience, conventions, practicality, politics 
and consistency with relevant theories, and some of these concerns may conflict with 
each other. Another important finding is that because there are many assumptions 
made and simplifications applied in order to choose a quantitative representation of a 
human value, the application of the measure is limited. I conclude that both in using 
and in evaluating indexes of human values, it is important that we are aware of such 
limitations, so that we can more effectively know both how to avoid misusing the 
indexes and how to improve them over time.
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Chapter one: Models, indexes and the real world
This dissertation is concerned with attempts to quantify ideas about human 
values or well-being primarily through the use of indexes developed for this purpose. 
Many may object to such attempts on moral, practical or metaphysical grounds. They 
may say: it is not ‘right’ to quantify human values or well-being; it is not possible 
with our knowledge to quantify them; or even in principle such values or well-being 
cannot be quantified.
The purpose of this dissertation is not to discuss the status of such objections, 
but to investigate ways to evaluate efforts to quantify concepts that have to do with 
human well-being. My own metaphysical position, which will become clear in the 
dissertation, is that it is not possible to find the index to quantify human values or 
well-being, but we can find various measurement instruments each of which can be 
useful and informative for different purposes for which we require a numerical 
representation of human values. It is the criteria of successful indexes that are relative 
to these different purposes that I propose and defend.
This first chapter consists of three parts. The first part briefly discusses 
different views of successful scientific models in order to find out the ways in which 
these models relate to real world phenomena. I introduce these different views on 
models because despite the differences in their principal purposes, models and 
indexes are similar in the way they relate to the real world. Three works on models I 
use are: Nancy Cartwright’s views on theories, models and phenomena and her 
account of causation as fundamentally involving ‘capacities’ in the world rather than 
‘nomological laws’; Mary Morgan’s account of the range of purposes for satisfactory 
models developed by early econometricians; and Marcel Boumans’ account of the 
integration of different ‘ingredients’ to realise satisfactory models in economics. The
12
second part of the chapter explains why understandings of the relationship between 
models and the real world are not only relevant but also important in examining 
successful indexes. The last part introduces my own account of successful indexes. 
Here, I provide differences and similarities between my account of successful indexes 
and accounts of successful models.
1-1: Accounts of successful models
In her latest book, Nancy Cartwright expresses her views that real world is
much messier and unsystematic than many scientists assume it to be, and that
regularities can only be observed under an artificially shielded environment:
This book supposes that, as appearances suggest, we live in a dappled 
world, a world rich in different things, with different natures, behaving 
in different ways. —  For all we know, most of what occurs in nature 
occurs by hap, subject to no law at all. What happens is more like an 
outcome of negotiation between domains than the logical consequence 
of a system of order. The dappled world is what, for most part, comes 
naturally: regimented behaviour results from good engineering.1
Consistent with the view quoted above, Cartwright rejects the ‘theoretical’ in 
favour of the ‘phenomenological’ approach to scientific investigations, explaining as 
follows:
In modem physics, and I think in other exact sciences as well, 
phenomenological laws are meant to describe, and they often succeed 
reasonably well. But fundamental equations are meant to explain, and 
paradoxically enough the cost of explanatory power is descriptive 
adequacy. Really powerful explanatory laws of the sort found in 
theoretical physics do not state the truth.
Since such explanatory laws do not state truths about the world, models that 
try to link fundamental laws directly to reality are unsuccessful models. Cartwright 
argues instead that
1 Cartwright (1999), p. 1.
13
[t]he route from theory to reality is from theory to model, and then 
from model to phenomenological law. The phenomenological laws are 
indeed true of the objects in reality -  or might be; but the fundamental 
laws are true only of objects in the model.3
According to Cartwright’s account of models, models imitate or represent
forces, causal relationships, or what Cartwright calls ‘capacities’ that we believe exist
in the world. Cartwright explains ‘capacities’ as follows:
The generic causal claims of science are not reports of regularities but 
rather ascriptions of capacities, capacities to make things happen, case 
by case. ‘Aspirins relieve headaches.’ This does not say that aspirins 
always relieve headaches, or always do so if the rest of the world is 
arranged in a particularly felicitous way, or that they relieve headaches 
most of the time, or more often than not. Rather, it says that aspirins 
have the capacity to relieve headaches, a relatively enduring and stable 
capacity that they carry with them from situation to situation; a 
capacity which may if circumstances are right reveal itself by 
producing a regularity, but which is just as surely seen in one good 
single case.4
Cartwright views successful models as representations of such ‘capacities’:
My claim then is that models serve as blueprints for nomological 
machines. There are three separate theses involved in this claim. The 
first is that the general scientific knowledge that we use to construct 
models is not knowledge of laws.5
[Sets of probability and causal laws] need a socio-economic machine 
[which is a type of nomological machine] to generate them. The view 
of course only makes sense if the kind of knowledge that we need to 
understand the operation of a socio-economic machine is not itself 
more knowledge of ‘deeper’ probabilistic and causal laws. And this is 
just the claim I argue: the knowledge we need here is knowledge not 
of laws but of capacities.6
Let me summarise Cartwright’s arguments that are relevant for the purpose of 
my thesis:
2 Cartwright (1983), p. 3.
3 Ibid., p. 4.
4 Cartwright (1989), p. 3.
5 Cartwright (1997), p. 1.
6 Cartwright (forthcoming), p. 7.
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1. Generic causal claims of science are reports not of regularities but of 
capacities that we believe exist in the world.
2. Models link theories (that consist of generic causal claims relating to 
capacities) and real world.
3. Specifically, models serve as blueprints for nomological machines that 
generate regularities described in theories.
If we accept Cartwright’s account, there is no ‘right’ theory for a phenomenon, 
because real world is made up of a combination of forces acting simultaneously, some 
revealing their capacities, some not, while a theory can only focus on a particular set 
of such forces assuming that all of them fully display their capacities. Neither is there 
a ‘right’ model to describe a phenomenon in Cartwright’s account. Any model can be 
successful as long as it provides blueprints for a nomological machine that, if 
followed properly, would generate expected regularities described in a theory. For 
example, in an attempt to represent in a model the reasons for changes in the level of 
unemployment, many different sets of economic and social variables and relationships 
among them can be chosen. The choice depends on one’s different hypotheses about 
the labour market, the behaviours of firms and workers, and the economy in general, 
as well as the level (micro or macro, for example) at which one wants to find a 
relationship between unemployment and other phenomena.
So how do we distinguish successful models from non-successful ones? One 
criterion that derives from Cartwright’s account of models is related to the way we use 
them: that is, models (and theoretical claims they support) are used (to explain a 
phenomenon or to intervene in the world) only when the circumstances resemble the 
blueprints. This is because, according to Cartwright, a successful model represents 
capacities in the world, but because they are capacities, what the model tells us is true
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only when a set of conditions under which a relevant capacity can be actualised are
met in the real world.
But this criterion does not help us to choose among competing models that
explain the same phenomenon. On the latter type of criterion, Cartwright talks about
the role of ‘bridge principles’ in mathematising phenomena in the world so that the
phenomena fit into theory, and she also explains that various purposes for building
models determine the final structure of models. She writes:
In physics it is usual to give alternative theoretical treatments of the 
same phenomenon. We construct different models for different 
purposes, with different equations to describe them.7
Cartwright, therefore, does not focus on the identification and classification of 
factors other than theoretical ones to determine a successful model.8 The accounts of 
successful models by Morgan and Boumans provide broader analyses for this 
purpose.9
Mary Morgan, like Cartwright, views a model as a bridge between an abstract 
theory and observable data. She examines a particular model, therefore, with respect 
to its relationship with both sides of this bridge: the model’s consistency with a 
relevant theory as well as its power to explain empirical data. Morgan argues that 
early econometricians’ focuses were on finding models that could satisfactorily 
explain empirical data, rather than on falsifying or verifying fundamental economic 
theories.10 She finds that models were examined relative to one or more of the 
following purposes for which models are made:
7 Cartwright (1983), p. 11.
8 Ibid.
9 Morgan (1988) and Boumans (1999a).
10 Morgan (1988).
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1. To measure theoretical laws, that is, to satisfy certain theoretical 
requirements.
2. To explain (or describe) the observed data, that is, to fit the observed 
data (statistical or historical).
3. To be useful for policy, that is, to allow the exploration of policy options 
or permit predictions about future values.
4. To explore or develop theory, that is, to expose unsuspected relationships 
or develop the detail of relationships.
5. To verify or reject theory, that is, to be satisfactory or not over a range of 
economic, statistical and other criteria.
Morgan’s study from 1988 points out that early econometricians did not aim at 
finding models to provide the true mathematical representation of a theory, but built
models for a much wider range of purposes consistent with the range of purposes
noted above.
Marcel Boumans’ view of models is slightly different from those of Cartwright 
and Morgan.11 He views models, not as bridges between data and theories, but as 
outcomes of a mixture of ingredients that include data and theory. Examples of such 
‘ingredients’ described in his paper are:
(1) Theoretical notions
(2) Mathematical concepts
(3) Mathematical techniques
(4) Stylised facts
11 Boumans (1999a).
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(5) Empirical data
(6) Policy views
(7) Analogies
(8) Metaphors
Boumans claims that models that are satisfactory are the ones that integrate 
these ingredients in ways that meet certain criteria.12 He provides the following 
examples of such criteria:
1. Satisfaction of theoretical requirements
2. Satisfaction of mathematical requirements
3. Satisfaction of statistical requirements
4. Usefulness for policy
Boumans’ account of satisfactory models thus identifies various concerns 
other than theoretical ones that enter into the process of constructing a model. In his 
account, particular theories or theoretical notions for which we build models are not 
necessarily the dominant concern compared to various other concerns, as long as the 
integration of the range of concerns satisfies one or more of the a priori criteria.
1-2: Models versus indexes
As noted above, according to Morgan, models are made for various purposes,
11one of which is to measure phenomena that are defined in terms of theories. Indexes, 
on the other hand, are developed, at least primarily, to measure social, economic and 
other phenomena of interest. Because indexes are made for measuring certain states of 
the world, they are not primarily used to test the causal relationships affecting such
12 Ibid.
13 Morgan (1988).
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states, whereas models often are constructed out of hypothesis we have (or would like 
to test) on such relationships.
Despite the differences between the roles of models and the roles of indexes, 
the relationship between models and the real world is somewhat similar to that 
between indexes and the real world.
Firstly, similar to the case of models versus real world phenomena, there is no 
one-to-one relationship between a concept and any instrument to quantify the concept, 
except in the very limited circumstances when the concept represents a single natural 
quantity.14 In other words, similar to the case of models versus real world phenomena, 
more than one index can be accepted as measuring a concept. Let us consider here the 
ideas of Hasok Chang, which illustrate this principle.15 According to Chang, even 
concepts such as ‘temperature,’ ‘length’ or ‘weight,’ do not represent single natural 
quantities, even if we believe that there is ‘real’ temperature, ‘real’ length, ‘real’ 
weight etc. that exist independently from the instruments that measure those concepts. 
Chang shows that historically, there have been many different instruments used to 
measure the ’real temperature’ or the ‘real degree of heat.’ He explains, however, a 
fundamental problem in confirming the reliability of such an instrument. In order to 
show, for example, that the mercury thermometer is reliable, we need to know that 
mercury expands uniformly (or linearly) with temperature between certain ‘fixed 
points’ (and beyond them), one of which is marked when the water freezes and the 
other when the water boils. To test the uniform expansion of mercury, we need to find 
out the relationship between the height of the column of mercury (h) and the
14 An example of this latter case is a concept that refers to mathematical fractions (for example, one- 
half), where there is a one-to-one relationship between the concept and its measurement.
15 See Hasok Chang (1996) on his paper titled ‘Spirit, Air and Quicksilver: the search for the “Real” 
Scale of Temperature.’
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temperature (T). That is, we need to know the function h(T) by making observations 
about the correlation between the two variables. But in order to do so, we have to 
have a reliable measure of temperature (T) in advance. There is accordingly 
circularity in the testing procedure.
tliChang introduces various attempts made by scientists m the 19 century to 
overcome this circularity problem and their scepticism about the accuracy of the 
mercury thermometer. One of the 19th century scientists, Henri Victor Regnault, 
succeeded in providing a solution to the circularity problem, based on the idea of 
‘comparability.’ Chang defines this ‘comparability’ idea as follows: if a thermometer 
were to give us the true temperature, it should at least always give us the same reading 
under the same circumstances; and if a type of thermometer is believed to be accurate, 
all thermometers of that type should agree in their readings. Under this criterion of 
comparability, the spirit thermometer is not accurate because spirit expands differently 
depending on its strength, so that spirit thermometers (made out of spirits with 
different degrees of strength) are not comparable. Regnault also rejected the mercury 
thermometer according to this criterion because the readings of mercury thermometers 
made with different types of glass, or even the same type of glass which had 
undergone different thermal treatments, would not agree with each other. Gas 
thermometers also did not satisfy the comparability requirement because Regnault 
found that the results of thermometers made with different gases were not always 
comparable. Regnault concluded that thermometers made with atmospheric air gave 
the best results in terms of their comparability because the results of air thermometers 
with different densities were quite comparable with each other, certainly better than 
those of the mercury thermometers.
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‘Comparability’ is an alternative to the need to prove that expansions of air, 
mercury, spirit or gas are uniform in order to accept thermometers made with those 
materials, because application of the criterion of comparability eliminates the need to 
prove the linear expansion of those materials. All types of thermometers except for the 
air thermometer were unsatisfactory because they failed to pass the comparability 
requirement, and the ‘comparability’ evidence provided sufficient reason for Regnault 
to support the air thermometer. We could say that Regnault regarded comparability as 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for choosing a reliable thermometer, assuming 
that such a thing existed.
For our purposes, it is important to recognise that in order to select one means 
of measuring even a relatively straight forward concept like ‘temperature,’ it was 
necessary to introduce a new criterion, in this case, ‘comparability.’ This new criterion 
may be applied to certain basic concepts such as temperature, length, weight and time.
On the other hand, there are other concepts that we do not have any 
conventional method of measuring, nor do we know conditions under which each 
competing measure is useful and reliable. Concepts such as ‘human development’ and 
‘general level of satisfaction,’ which I will be discussing in the later chapters, fall into 
this latter category. Chang’s study on the measurement of temperature shows that 
most concepts, even ones that are conventionally associated with quantities (such as 
temperature and length), do not represent a single natural quantity, and therefore do 
not have one-to-one relationship to instruments or indexes that measure those 
concepts. Chang concludes that in order to choose among competing instruments, we 
need criteria independent from concepts themselves, such as the criterion of 
comparability. This conclusion is even clearer in the case of concepts such as ‘human 
development’ and ‘general level of satisfaction.’
21
A second similarity between models and indices in their relationship to real 
world involves the fact that some indexes are made out of constituents that are 
considered to be causally related to the phenomena that the indexes aim to measure, 
just as models typically include factors intended to express causal relationships in the 
world. As we will see in the later chapters, the Life Satisfaction Indicator (LSI) 
consists of variables that are believed to cause the object of measurement, that is, the 
general level of satisfaction in Japan. The general level of satisfaction is measured by 
adding up factors that are considered to cause the phenomenon, and each factor is 
supposed to have a different degree of contribution to the occurrence of the 
phenomenon. Such degrees are represented as correlation co-efficients. The equation 
used to measure the general level of satisfaction is exactly the same as the equation 
that explains how the satisfaction is caused.
Finally, analogous to the case of models versus real world phenomena in 
Cartwright’s analysis, an index for a particular abstract concept measures phenomena 
in the world successfully only when a certain set of conditions is met. Cartwright’s 
analysis says that models represent causal relationship as capacities in nature, and 
they describe specific contexts in which those capacities display themselves in a 
lawful manner. This view of models leads us to believe that when the circumstances 
are not ‘right,’ a given capacity can be there but will not give rise to regular 
behaviour. Models will accordingly be able to explain the causal structure of 
phenomena in the world only when particular conditions are met.
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Similarly, an index for a particular concept provides a numerical 
representation of the concept, but because there is no one-to-one relationship between 
a number and a concept, certain data used in the index does not necessarily reveal 
information we are seeking. As with models, in order for indexes to successfully 
represent abstract concepts, certain conditions have to be met. For example, literacy 
rates reveal information about the population’s actual capability to acquire knowledge 
only when there are books to read and guidance available to systematise the inflow of 
new knowledge. The index may have the ability to measure an abstract concept such 
as literacy, but whether or not the index actually displays the ability depends on the 
conditions under which the measurement instrument is used.
Understanding these similarities between models and indexes, we can see 
three main benefits of recognising similarities between the scientific models and 
indexes for measuring phenomena in the world. Firstly, understanding of Cartwright’s 
view of models leads us to accept that a model is true of causal relationships in the 
world only when the conditions in which the model can exhibit its capacities are met. 
Accordingly when we use indexes we also need to examine the conditions under 
which we use the indexes. In practice, we need to be aware of the fact that the data 
used in the index reveal information we are looking for only when a certain set of 
conditions are met. Our knowledge of the limitation of models thus helps us to 
understand the relationship between indexes and the world.
Secondly, the awareness that there are many different ways of modelling even 
the same theoretical concept, which is brought out by Cartwright’s studies, leads us to 
accept that there is no one-to-one relationship between a model and a concept. As a 
consequence, a satisfactory model is chosen based on various concerns, which are 
independent from the theory or theoretical concept itself, such as the purposes for
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which the models will be used or whether the model meets mathematical 
requirements. The latter point was reinforced by Morgan and Boumans. I claim that a 
successful index for an abstract concept is also selected for reasons that are 
independent from the definition of the concept because there is no one-to-one 
relationship between the concept and its numerical representation.
Chang’s study the on the measurement of temperature discussed above 
illustrates this point, and his approach to selecting the most reliable measurement of 
temperature can be applied to other concepts that are not defined in terms of single 
natural quantities. I apply this approach to the Human Development Index (HDI), 
which has been developed to measure a concept of ‘human development.’ As detailed 
below, the HDI is expressed as a function of three variables, that is, HDI = f  (A, B, C). 
There is circularity in testing the HDI, which is similar to the case of testing 
thermometers, because in order to test how effectively the index measures human 
development using regression models, we need to first have a reliable measure of 
human development. One way to overcome this circularity and to select the most 
successful HDI is to introduce Chang’s criterion of ‘comparability’: to choose the 
index that is most stable under the same circumstances, and to choose a type of index 
that produces consistent results across different versions of the same type.
A third main benefit of recognising similarities between scientific models and 
indexes involves the importance of theory in testing the success of an index. 
Specifically, I believe that although the link between theory and index is inherently 
not as strong as in the case of theory and model, theory and theoretical properties may 
still play an effective role in testing whether or not an index is successful, which is the
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case in the models’ relationship to theories shown in Morgan and in Boumans.16 In 
particular, I will show in Chapter three the important role that theories play in the HDI 
and the LSI.
1-3: My account of successful indexes
The account of successful indexes introduced in this section is my own and is 
based on the role and the nature of indexes that we learn from our understandings of 
models. My account of successful indexes consists of criteria that are relative to the 
motivations and purposes of a particular quantification project by a particular index 
maker. I hold a relativistic account of indexes because of my view, consistent with the 
above discussion, that there is no one-to-one relationship between a concept and any 
instrument for its quantification when the concept does not represent a single natural 
quantity. In other words, I believe that there is more than one non-trivially different 
index that can be accepted as measuring, for example, ‘human development’ or 
‘satisfaction’ with our current knowledge. I also conclude that each index that has met 
some appropriate standard as a measure of ‘human development’ has a ‘capacity’ to 
measure the concept.
If one holds this particular view about the quantification of abstract concepts, 
it is not particularly interesting to ask the questions whether or not the HDI measures 
human development, or whether or not the Life Satisfaction Indicator LSI describes or 
explains the general level of satisfaction in Japan. The HDI may be just one of many 
indexes that measure human development. The same is likely to be true in the case of 
the LSI as a measure of the general satisfaction level in Japan. Also, answers to such 
questions do not give us instructions on how to use these indexes in order for them to
16 Morgan (1988) and Boumans (1999a).
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exhibit their capacity to measure ‘human development’ or the ‘general satisfaction 
level.’ The questions to be asked, instead, are ‘Do the HDI and the LSI satisfy the 
main motivations behind each quantification project?’ and ‘When or under what 
conditions do these indexes exhibit their capacity to measure or to explain the 
phenomena in question?’
As detailed below, in responding to these questions I apply three types of 
criteria, specifically purpose-dependent criteria, theory-dependent criteria, and 
conditions-dependent criteria.
1-3-1: Purpose-dependent criteria of successful indexes
My account of the purpose-dependent criteria of successful indexes is similar 
to Morgan’s account of satisfactory models introduced earlier in this chapter. As 
noted, Morgan emphasises that the early econometricians’ interests were not always to 
prove fundamental economic theory true. Rather, they were interested in models that 
serve less fundamental and more practical goals. My account similarly consists of 
criteria that are relative to motivations and purposes. I call a set of such criteria 
‘purpose-dependent criteria of successful indexes.’
However, one difference between the two accounts is that my account takes 
motivations to be much more project specific and to include considerations such as 
who does the quantification and what are the backgrounds (histories) of a project. As 
developed in the later chapters, for example, the principal motivation behind the HDI 
was the United Nations Development Programme’s interests in developing concept of 
human development as an alternative to the use of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), which had proved in many cases to be unsuccessful in improving human 
good. In the case of the LSI, the motivation involved the index-maker Fukuda
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Kousei’s attempt to resolve the contradictory relationship between changes in the 
levels of GDP and the levels of satisfaction with life in general revealed in a public 
opinion poll. Fukuda also aimed to identity policies that would improve the general 
level of satisfaction in Japan.
My view of successful indexes is also similar to Boumans’ account of 
satisfactory models, because both are based on awareness that there are many 
different ways of building successful models (or indexes) for a single concept or a 
particular theory. As a consequence, both Boumans’ account and mine believe that 
evaluations depend on the purposes for which scientists and policy-makers build 
models (or indexes). The difference between Boumans’ account and my view relates 
to the way in which various concerns relate to purposes. In Boumans’ account, 
concerns have to be integrated in ways that serve the purpose for which a particular 
model is made. (Picture A). In my view, the concerns that permit us to evaluate 
indexes are derived from project specific purposes. (Picture B).
Concern A Project specific purpose(s) 
for a measurement project
A model 
with purpose(s)
Concern Concern Concern
Concern B Concern C An index
Picture A Picture B
Figure 1.1 How successful models and successful indexes are made
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1-3-2: Theory-dependent criteria of successful indexes
The stronger emphasis I put on particular motivations of quantification of 
indexes compared to Morgan’s and Boumans’ account of models may arise from a 
fundamental difference between models and indexes, that is, that the latter are 
explicitly and primarily made for the purpose of measurement while the former may 
have different purposes often having to do with theoretical investigations. When we 
talk about models, they normally embody theoretical considerations -  models are 
made having some theories or of theoretical concepts in mind. In Boumans’ account, 
theories may make a minimum contribution to the creation of a model. But theories 
are still necessary to make models, because they are models of a reality that is 
captured by theories that define concepts, or by theories that imply certain regularities 
in the world.
By contrast, because of the primary purpose indexes have, and because objects 
of the measurement (concepts or ideas) can be chosen without a particular theory 
behind them, the relationship between theories and indexes is not clear. Rather, how 
important theory is in constructing an index is largely dependent on the particular 
motivation of the project. This can be seen from the different ways in which theories 
influence the two indexes -  the HDI and the LSI -  upon which I focus in this 
dissertation. As explained in the following chapters, the HDI has a strong link to the 
capability approach to well-being developed by Amartya Sen; Sen’s ideas were 
utilised from the beginning of the UNDP’s effort to develop an alternative policy 
objective to higher income and to produce an index to measure the alternative 
concept. Therefore, one important aspect of the capability theory by Sen -  that is, if 
used for the measurement of well-being, ‘capabilities’ can identify necessities of
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individuals that are relative to their personal characters (such as age, health 
conditions) -  can be effectively used for evaluating the HDI.
The LSI, on the other hand, was less obviously influenced by any particular 
theory. To some extent this index was influenced by Bentham’s idea that the 
improvement of the general level of pleasure in society should be the ultimate policy 
objective of a government. However, the link between the LSI and Bentham’s theory 
remains at a very general level; that is, the index measures the aggregation of some 
positive mental state (satisfaction) and the index shows the type of policies that will 
improve the level of the general level of satisfaction. The theory does not play a role, 
for example, in choosing between different kinds of data on the degree of happiness, 
satisfaction or pleasure. But the limited application of Bentham’s theory in the LSI 
does not form a basis to criticise the LSI, because nowhere is there an indication that 
the particular notion of ‘satisfaction’ that the index-maker chose to measure is the 
mental state defined by Bentham17. (This circumstance is unlike the case of the HDI, 
where the notion of ‘capability’ used in the Human Development Report, which 
publishes the index, expressly comes from Sen’s theory.)
1-3-3: Condition-dependent criteria of successful indexes
Under my view, whether an index is successful in revealing information of 
interest to us depends on whether a certain set of conditions are met where the 
measurement is conducted. Therefore, in my account of successful indexes it is also 
important to check whether an index is applied in circumstances where it can exercise 
its ability. I call this checking procedure ‘condition-dependent criteria of successful
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indexes,’ which, as explained in section 1-2, is influenced by Cartwright’s view on 
models as describing the exercise of capacities in the world.
In practice, an index having the conditional ability to convey useful 
information would imply the following: (1) empirical data used in the index (for 
example adult literacy rates in the HDI) are capable of revealing such useful 
information (for example, about ‘people’s ability to acquire knowledge’), but only in 
countries that satisfy a certain set of conditions; and (2) the ways in which different 
variables are combined and the weights assigned to them are governed by how the 
index is used and whether a set of conditions are met where the index is applied.
The ‘condition-dependent criteria of successful indexes’ does not appear in
1 ftBoumans’ analysis. This may be because he regards such a problem as a problem for 
model-users rather than for model-builders. But in the case of indexes this distinction 
is not possible, primarily because the purpose of indexes is to measure, and they 
cannot measure without fitting data into indexes. The selection of data sets for each 
sub-dimension of the HDI, for example, is an important part of the measurement of 
human development.
With this general background, I now proceed in Chapter two to the first of the 
three criteria to be reviewed, the purpose-dependent criteria for successful indexes as 
applied to the HDI and the LSI.
17 This does not mean that there is no link between the LSI and Bentham’s theory at a more concrete 
level. In fact, Fukuda identifies an aspect of the general satisfaction data he uses that is consistent with 
Bentham’s definition of pleasure. I will discuss such connections in Chapter three.
18 Ibid.
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Chapter two: Purpose-dependent criteria for the HDI and the LSI
In this chapter, I will test two indexes -  the Human Development Index (HDI) 
and the Life Satisfaction Indicator (LSI) -  according to one of the three kinds of 
criteria of successful indexes discussed in the previous chapter, specifically purpose- 
dependent criteria. I have chosen these two indexes because, despite the fact that they 
share the broad aim of measuring a concept of well-being that is richer than mere 
growth in income, the two indexes have very different structures. I want to find out 
why such differences arise and also how successful the two indexes are in achieving 
the aim of each measurement project. I conclude that differences in the specific 
purposes for which the indexes are designed play an important role both in choosing 
the particular concept of well-being and in the method of measurement used in each 
index. I also conclude that such differences affect the criteria by which we evaluate 
the success of each index.
The chapter is organised as follows: First, I will describe the background of 
the two indexes and in particular the motivations and purposes behind each of them. 
Second, I will give a brief description of the content of the two indexes, including 
discussions about why particular measurement methods were chosen for the two 
indexes. The last section will set purpose-dependent criteria for each index and 
examine the indexes accordingly.
2-1: Background of the construction of the Human Development Index and the Life 
Satisfaction Indicator
The Human Development Index (HDI) aims to measure and to make 
international as well as inter-temporal comparisons of ‘human development,’ a 
concept defined by the Human Development Report of the United Nations
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Development Programme (UNDP) as ‘a process of enlarging people’s choices.’ The 
UNDP’s main motivation was to set an alternative policy objective to growth in GDP, 
because policies which have GDP growth as the main objective had been associated 
with undesirable consequences in many countries (both developed and developing): 
drug-related crimes, pollution-related disease, the breakdown of families, and 
terrorism and violence. People in the UNDP’s Human Development Report Office 
believed that by shifting the policy objective to one in which humans are at the centre 
of concern would reduce such undesirable side-effect consequences. The definition of 
human development in the Human Development Report was developed to meet this 
requirement, on the implicit understandings that improved human development is by 
definition choice enlargement and that having wider opportunities to choose from 
results in an improvement, not essentially of economic conditions, but of human well­
being.1
On the other hand, the ‘Life Satisfaction Indicator’ (LSI) designed by an 
officer in the Japan Economic Planning Agency,2 Kosei Fukuda, was developed to 
measure people’s well-being in terms of their mental state: how happy or how 
satisfied they are about their lives in general.3
Fukuda’s original motivation in developing this index was to solve the 
paradox he found in the relationship between individuals’ satisfaction levels revealed 
in public opinion polls and the growth rate of the per capita GDP in Japan between 
1987 and 1993. He discovered that although the relationship was positive between 
1975 and 1986, from 1987 to 1993 the relationship turned negative, that is, people’s
1 Problems associated with these implicit understandings are discussed in the postscript of the thesis.
2 One of the ministries in Japan that is responsible for economic forecasting and analysis.
3 See Fukuda (1995).
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satisfaction levels were declining as per capita GDP grew. This negative relationship 
between satisfaction and GDP growth was a paradox because we would normally 
expect, and economists or policy-makers generally assume, that the growth of GDP 
would be associated with an increase in people’s satisfaction with their lives, in 
addition to their material well-being. Fukuda tried to find out the reason for this 
paradoxical relationship between the satisfaction level and GDP by searching for 
factors other than GDP that are likely to be causing the change in people’s satisfaction 
levels. One of Fukuda’s implicit assumptions was that in fact GDP had not became a 
variable that negatively correlates with the level of satisfaction. Rather, Fukuda 
conducted his investigation under the assumption that changes in other social or 
economic conditions must have distorted the relationship between the growth of GDP 
and people’s satisfaction level.
The LSI was also designed to be used for policy intervention by the 
government. For the government to improve the degree to which people find their 
lives satisfactory, government officials need to know which factors other than GDP 
are related to the level of satisfaction and to find out the conditions, i.e., the 
combinations and the weightings of those factors, under which people’s satisfaction 
levels improve. Accordingly, as detailed below, the LSI assesses the satisfaction level 
of individuals through adding up the satisfaction levels achieved in different areas of 
their lives, and associating these areas with objective indexes found statistically to 
cause changes in the related satisfaction levels. For example, if the relationship 
between a particular objective index such as consumer prices and the satisfaction level 
of the relevant area of life such as the area of ‘consumption’ is negatively correlated, 
and if it is found that the objective index (consumer price) is rising, then ceteris 
paribus we can infer that there is a pressure for the satisfaction level of this particular
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area of people’s lives to fall, which in turn is likely to cause the general satisfaction 
level to fall, ceteris paribus. Accordingly, as a policy maker the government would 
act to improve overall satisfaction by policies designed to reduce consumer prices, 
again ceteris paribus.
As reflected in the above discussion, both the UNDP and Fukuda are 
interested in improving societies in ways that cannot necessarily be achieved by 
income growth. But the objectives of the improvement as well as the purpose for 
which the UNDP and Fukuda create indicators are different. The UNDP sets human 
development as an alternative policy objective and designed the HDI to facilitate 
international and intertemporal comparisons of human development. On the other 
hand, Fukuda aims at maximising the general satisfaction level of the people in Japan, 
and the LSI was constructed to find policy variables that can be used to achieve the 
goal. As we see in the following sections, the methods of measurement used in the 
two indexes are also very different.
2-2: The method of measurement
2-2-1: The HDI''
In the HDI, three dimensions are chosen to measure the basic concept of 
human development. They are (1) for people to lead a long and healthy life, (2) for 
people to acquire knowledge and (3) for people to have access to resources needed for 
a decent standard of living. The index is a composite one that combines proxies for 
each of the chosen dimensions. These proxies or sub-indicators are, respectively, for
4 The definition of the HDI used in this paper is based on the 1998 Human Development Report 
unless otherwise stated.
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each of the three dimensions, (1) life expectancy at birth; (2) educational attainment, 
which is a composite indicator currently consisting of (a) the adult literacy rate at two- 
thirds weight and (b) the combined school enrolment ratio at one-third weight; and 
(3) the per capita real GDP in purchasing power parity dollars, adjusted for the 
assumption of diminishing marginal utility. In order to combine the three sub­
indicators into a single index, they are normalised by taking the difference between 
the minimum and the maximum values of each sub-indicator as a denominator. Each 
component of the HDI of a country can thus be calculated as:
Human Development Index component for x; =
(Actual Xj value -  minimum xj value)/(Maximum Xj value -  minimum xj value)
The HDI of a country is thus the unweighted average of the life expectancy index 
component, the educational attainment index component and the adjusted real GDP 
per capita (PPP$) index component. In other words, the HDI value is derived by 
dividing the sum of the three normalised index components by 3. A pictorial 
representation of the HDI is included in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1 Pictorial representation of the structure and normalised factors reflected 
in the HDI
2-2-2: The LSI
The LSI uses data from a public opinion poll conducted every May of 10,000 
Japanese residents over the age of 20. The opinion poll consists of about 30 questions, 
which include questions from which data is obtained concerning ‘the degree of 
satisfaction in life in general,’ ‘the degree of fulfillingness of life in general,’ ‘which 
aspects of your life you want to improve in the future,’ and ‘desires for government 
policy.’ The LSI uses data on ‘the degree of satisfaction in life in general’ (DSL), 
which is based on answers to the following question: ‘Over all, how satisfied are you 
with your current life?’ People are asked to choose one answer from six alternatives, 
specifically ‘satisfied,’ ‘almost satisfied,’ ‘rather unsatisfied,’ ‘unsatisfied,’ 
‘indifferent,’ and ‘cannot answer.’ The DSL is defined as the proportion of people 
who chose ‘satisfied’ or ‘almost satisfied’ among all the people who replied.
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One methodological issue involves Fukuda*s choice of the DSL data for the 
LSI. Fukuda selected the DSL among other alternatives because he wants the LSI to 
be a subjective index representing how rich one feels that one’s life is, and because he 
believes that the DSL is most suitable in these respects.
There were other responses to the public opinion poll that may have been used 
as alternatives to the DSL to evaluate the richness in people’s life, including answers 
to questions on ‘the degree of fulfilment in life,’ ‘the degree of insecurity (or 
uncertainty) in life,’ or the ‘standard of living.’ ‘The degree of fulfilment in life’ is 
defined as the proportion of all the respondents who chose ‘sufficiently fulfilled’ or 
‘rather fulfilled’ as an answer to the question, ‘To what extent do you feel that you are 
fulfilled in your life?’ (The six alternative answers were ‘sufficiently fulfilled,’ ‘rather 
fulfilled,’ ‘not very fulfilled,’ ‘not at all fulfilled,’ ‘indifferent,’ and ‘unable to 
answer.’) ‘The degree of insecurity (or uncertainty) in life’ is defined as the 
proportion of all the respondents who chose ‘I am worried and feel insecure’ as an 
answer to the question, ‘Are you worried or feel insecure about your life?’ (The three 
alternative answers were ‘I am worried and feel insecure,’ ‘I am not worried and do 
not feel insecure,’ and ‘unable to answer.’) The ‘standard of living’ data are derived 
from answers to the question, ‘Relative to the general public, to which category do 
you think you belong with respect to your standard of living?’ when people are asked 
to choose from ‘upper,’ ‘upper middle,’ ‘middle,’ Tower middle,’ Tower,’ and 
‘unable to answer.’ The ‘standard of living’ data are calculated by giving 100 points 
to those who answered ‘upper,’ 80 points to those who answered ‘upper middle,’ 60 
points to those who answered ‘middle,’ 40 points to those who answered Tower 
middle,’ and 20 points to those who answered Tower,’ adding all the points, and then 
dividing the result by the number of the total respondents.
Fukuda explains why he did not use any of these alternatives to the DSL. The 
reason Fukuda gives for not using ‘the degree of fulfilment in life’ for the LSI is his 
judgement that these responses focus more on the degree to which individuals have 
achieved their ‘personal’ (meaning inner or moral) goals, and less on the degree to 
which their everyday life has resulted in satisfaction from external conditions. 
Assuming that Fukuda’s interpretation of the term ‘fulfilment’ is correct, his defence 
is consistent with his aim of creating an index for use as a policy instrument through 
which government can improve richness in Japanese life otherwise than by income 
growth. Government objectives generally involve ones that can be influenced by 
policy variables affecting external conditions. But personal goals may include internal 
objectives that cannot be directly affected by government policies. For example, 
personal goals such as ‘to be honest,’ ‘to be generous to others’ or ‘to be industrious’ 
cannot be (at least directly) achieved by government interventions, such as those 
through taxes, interest rates, money supply or the provision of public goods.
Similarly, Fukuda does not use ‘the degree of insecurity (or uncertainty) in 
life,’ in part because, as with the case of ‘the degree of fulfilment in life,’ ‘the degree 
of insecurity (or uncertainty) in life’ tends to relate to personal issues over which 
governments do not have a direct influence. That is, uncertainties and a feeling of 
insecurity arise not only from aspects of well-being that governments can affect but 
also from an individual’s personal problems. However, this reason cannot fully 
explain Fukuda’s rejection of this alternative, since the same is true for the DSL. How 
‘satisfied’ one is in life depends not only on economic and social factors that 
government can improve, but also on factors such as the person’s social life, his
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relationship to his family, how he gets on with his colleagues at work, etc.5 Another 
reason why Fukuda does not use ‘the degree of insecurity (or uncertainty) in life’ for 
the LSI involves a concern that the data are affected not only by the person’s 
evaluation of the current state of affairs but also by his evaluation of his future 
prospects. But why does this factor matter for the LSI? My explanation is that 
governments need to have a fixed point of reference for their effort to improve well­
being using various policy instruments. In the case of the LSI, such reference point is 
the current state of the public satisfaction: given this evaluation by the Japanese 
public, the government tries to make improvements in the future. If, as Fukuda 
claims, ‘the degree of insecurity (or uncertainty) in life’ reflects anticipation over 
conditions at some unspecified time in the future, this data set is arguably not suitable 
for the purpose of the LSI.
Finally, Fukuda claims that ‘the standard of living’ alternative is not 
appropriate for the LSI because this evaluation expressly focuses on how a 
respondent’s life is relative to others. However, such a relative evaluation is not 
inconsistent with the subjective evaluation in which the LSI is interested. A subjective 
assessment of one’s current life can be made in comparison to the state of life of 
others. Instead, the real problem Fukuda intends to make about ‘the standard of 
living’ alternative must be that its virtually total emphasis on the person’s relative 
evaluation may limit the scope of his subjective evaluation of his well-being, that is, 
how a person sees his own life irrespective how others in the society are doing. For 
one of the requirements of a subjective evaluation is that each subject is free to use his 
own criteria for the assessment.
5 For convenience, the reference to ‘his’ or ‘he’ will be used to refer to ‘his or her’ or ‘he or she.’
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Once the DSL is chosen as the indicator for subjective well-being, the next 
stage in the development of the LSI is to find factors that explain changes in the DSL. 
Here, Fukuda assumes that the DSL should be an aggregate of the degrees of 
satisfaction in different areas of life. The assumption is not free from problems, which 
I discuss in the next chapter, but here I will focus on the procedure of selecting such 
areas. Fukuda identified candidates for the different areas of life that affect the general 
satisfaction level using the results of the opinion poll in two areas, specifically the 
questions asking people about the ‘requirements for government policies’ and the 
questions on the ‘areas of life on which you want to work towards improvements.’ 
Fukuda notes that the best data set for the purpose may be the answers to the section 
of the opinion poll on ‘the degree of satisfaction in different areas of life,’ but these 
data are available only from 1986, which is not sufficient to run regressions. For this 
reason he chose two alternative data sets for which the data are available for a 
relatively long period of time, specifically (1) the ‘requirements for government 
policies’ (available since 1967) and (2) ‘areas of life on which you want to work 
towards improvements’ (available since 1974). Fukuda takes areas in which people 
see the need for government policy intervention and areas in which people want to 
work towards improvements as areas in which people are not satisfied, and regards 
these areas as candidates to explain the change in the DSL.6
Regression models are used to identify which of these areas of life have 
satisfaction levels (the strength of the requirements people have for government in 
different areas of life) that are most strongly related to the changes in the level of the 
DSL. The method here is to select the areas of life that have a significant effect on the
6 Some assumptions are required for this connection to be sound. I will discuss these assumptions in 
Chapter four.
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DSL and to find the correlation coefficient of the regression function explaining the 
level of the DSL using the following methodology: first, multiply (-1) by the variables 
that are expected to have negative coefficient; then run a regression using all the n 
variables available that are expected to be relevant to the DSL; eliminate the variable 
that has the smallest t-value, and run the regression again, this time with n-1 variables; 
again, eliminate the variable with the least t-value and run the regression with n-2 
variables; continue the process until all the remaining variables pass the t-test (for 
example with 5% significance). Five areas were selected under this statistical
' 7selection process, specifically leisure, prices, education, employment, and housmg.
The next step in the process of developing the LSI assumed that the feeling of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction people have about each of those five areas of life is 
further influenced by phenomena in society that are measured by objective factors, 
such as total working hours or the inflation rate. Accordingly, this next step was to 
find such phenomena for each of the five areas. The method of choosing such 
objectively measurable phenomena was first, to identify from the ‘social life statistical 
index’ compiled by the Secretariat (one of the ministries of the Japanese government) 
individual indexes that are relevant for each area.8 The second part of this process was 
to choose one of the individual indexes as the ‘basic index’ for each of the areas and 
then to select further non-basic indexes (three to six) that are most strongly correlated 
to the basic index.9 The final part was to vary the combinations of the non-basic
7 Among the items that were not selected by this process are, for example, social security, traffic 
safety, and energy.
8 Fukuda categorises the individual indexes regarded as relevant for the degree of satisfaction in each 
area of life based on the New National Life Indicators, which divides aspects of life into 8 areas (such 
as education, housing, working) and 4 criteria (such as security and equality). (Fukuda 1995, pp. 146-7, 
167).
9 The decision on which objective index should be chosen as the basic index involves a subjective 
judgement of the index-maker. (Fukuda 1995, p. 153)
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indexes (combinations of two to three), and use the regression function that has the 
DSL as an explanandum and the objective indexes for each area of life as explanans 
to select combinations of indexes for each area that best explain the DSL.10 These 
operations were used to obtain the correlation coefficient (weight) assigned for every 
objective index (both basic and non-basic) that explains the satisfaction level of the 
five different areas of life, as well as to obtain the correlation coefficient (weight) 
assigned for each of five areas of life used to calculate the satisfaction levels in the 
DSL. This process results in a LSI that measures the level of satisfaction in life in 
general and that is composed of different satisfaction levels for five areas of life, each 
of which is measured by several objective indexes.11 A pictorial representation of this 
process is included in Figure 2.2. Table 2.1 lists an example of the LSI based on a 
time-series result between 1975 and 1993.
10 The problem of how to aggregate objective indexes with different units is solved by the 
normalisation method, which is to divide the difference between the actual value and the mean value by 
the standard deviation. (Fukuda 1995, p. 152) This method of normalisation was used by W. M. 
Persons as early as 1919 when he attempted to make the cyclical fluctuations of economic data 
comparable within and between data series. (See Morgan 1990, p. 60)
11 Satisfaction levels of different areas of life are all measured by percentage (the same unit) and the 
weighted summation is done by regression. The trend-elimination operation is conducted for the 
satisfaction level of life in general.
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Figure 2.2 Pictorial representation of the structure and factors reflected in the LSI
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Table 2.1 The Life Satisfaction Indicator: a time-series result between 19759312
Constant Leisure Prices Education Housing Employment Adj-R2 St Err DW
-0.102 0.350 2.694 1.215 0.592 1.443 0.8870 0.3661 1.2363
(-1.29) (2.05)* (6.80)** (6.97)** (2.64)** (4.90)**
Leisure factor:
Constant Total working hours
Leisure Related 
Expenditures Adj-R2 St Err DW
-0.011 -0.885 -0.764 0.6988 0.5633 1.1004
(-0.08) (-5.99)** (-5.16)**
Price factor:
Constant Rates of increase in the CPI
CPI/IPI (Price index for 
imported goods) Adj-R2 St Err DW
0.067 -0.653 -0.414 0.6997 0.5378 0.6246
(0.54) (-5.05)** (-3.20)**
Education factor:
Constant Education fees Students absent from high schools
Numbers of 
youth crime Adj-R2 St Err DW
-0.034 1.121 -0.422 -2.155 0.8212 0.4289 2.2188
(-0.35) (4.63)** (-2.17)* (-6.49)**
Housing factor:
Constant Budget for utilities
Gini-coefficient for 
land assets
Total area of 
parks in cities Adj-R2 St Err DW
0.1
(1.46)
0.196
(2.13)*
-0.294
(-4.16)**
0.656
(7.13)**
0.8949 0.298 0.8518
Employment factor:
Constant Total working hours Unemployment rates Adj-R2 St Err DW
-0.064 -0.609 -0.457 0.895 0.3191 0.9956
(-0.87) (-6.83)** (-5.12)**
Notes: ** indicates 5% significance and * indicates 1% significance in null-hypothesis tests.
12 Table translated from Fukuda 1995, Appendix page 28.
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2-3: Purpose-dependent criteria of the index
As discussed above, although both indexes are primarily concerned with 
improving the well-being of a society, their more specific objectives as well as the 
methods used to measure this well-being are very different. As detailed below, this is 
partly because of differences in philosophical ideas about what is good for a society, 
but also because of differences in (1) who makes the index, (2) what the expected 
ranges of applicability are, and (3) how the index is to be used in practice. The 
discussion reveals that wide varieties of concerns other than those related to concepts 
enter into the process of constructing indexes.
This chapter and the two chapters that follow do not ask the more fundamental 
question of which index is better to use in improving well-being of a society. The 
question is discussed in the postscript of the thesis.
2-3-1: The HDI
As noted above, the HDI was developed to measure and thus to encourage 
improvements in human development, which the UNDP proposed as an alternative 
policy objective to that of higher income level. The HDI is intended to be used to 
compare degrees of human development across countries and across time. I use five 
criteria to examine the extent to which the HDI achieves this purpose. The five 
criteria, discussed in the succeeding sub-sections of this chapter, are:
1. Universality
2. Differentiation from a GDP measure and more discrete orderings of 
countries
3. Policy usefulness
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4. Comparability across space
5. Comparability across time
2-3-1-1: Universality
According to Basic Facts about the United Nations, one of the principles of the 
United Nations is to act based on the sovereign equality of all its Members.13 The 
principle of equality fundamentally affected the structure of the HDI by making one 
of the purpose-dependent criteria of the HDI its universality. Actually, the concept of 
universality applied in two different ways, specifically requiring that the HDI be 
universally applicable and that it be universally acceptable.
The former purpose -  that the HDI be universally applicable -  results from the 
fact that the UNDP, which is a branch of the United Nations and which created and 
publishes the results of the HDI, had to equally consider the member countries’ 
different ideas about what human development is. In other words, the HDI has to 
conform to diverse values that people in the member countries have: the HDI has to 
be a universal index in a sense that it has to apply universally, notwithstanding these 
diverse values.
The concept of human development defined as ‘enlarging choice’ by the 
Report seems to pass the test that it be universally applicable. For example, a review 
of discussions about the UNDP’s human development project in newspapers and 
magazines did not show objections that the HDI is inadequate as a definition of 
universal value. Difficulties in meeting the criterion of universal applicability arise
13 See United Nations (1998), p. 5.
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once an attempt is made to represent or redefine the concept in a concrete way, as I
show in the following discussion.14
The consideration of universal applicability fundamentally affects the
identification of the different dimensions of choice in the HDI. Specifically, in order
for the index to be universally applicable, the dimensions of the HDI must measure
choices in life that are important notwithstanding diverse aims that people have across
different cultures, age groups, or genders. On this point, the Report says,
 a broad definition [of human development] makes it possible to
capture better the complexity of human life -  the many concerns 
people have and the many cultural, economic, social and political 
differences in people’s lives throughout the world.15
As noted above, the three dimensions used in the HDI are: ‘to lead to a long 
and healthy life,’ ‘to acquire knowledge,’ and ‘to have access to resources needed for 
a decent standard of living.’ These each qualify as broadly defined expressions of 
choices. All appear to meet the criteria that they be universally applicable. Less broad 
and less general expressions of the third dimension, for example, may be ‘having a 
TV, a phone, a car, a washing machine, a refrigerator, and a house with at least two 
bedrooms plus a bathroom.’ But such expressions are not appropriate for the HDI, 
because they are too detailed and culturally specific to serve as universally applicable 
criteria for evaluating the choice people have. By contrast, the broadly defined 
dimensions of the HDI are well suited for the UNDP’s measurement project.
Another less obvious example of a dimension that does not meet the criterion 
of being universally applicable is ‘being employed,’ which some may say is an
14 There is a related issue of whether the HDI is comprehensive, that is, whether it covers the range of 
factors that are considered important to human development. I have not discussed this issue separately, 
but it appears to be the basis for some suggested addition to the dimensions of the HDI, for example, 
the suggestion discussed below of including the dimension of political and civil rights.
15 UNDP (1990), p. 11.
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important dimension of choice. If the UN consisted only of cultures and societies that 
value employment as an important option in life, then this dimension should be 
included in the HDI (as it is in the LSI). However, this is not actually the case. There 
are some societies, for example, that do not consider women working as an important 
element of choice enlargement. Here again, the fact that there is not a universal
agreement on the applicability of this measure distinguishes the three dimensions used
\
in the HDI, which do appear to be universally applicable.
As noted above, a second aspect of the universality requirement is the test that
the dimensions chosen for the HDI measurement be universally acceptable. The
impact of this criterion can be seen in the consideration of including political and civil
rights, which the UNDP’s Human Development Report Office acknowledges as
important aspects of human development. The Human Development Report Office’s
view is expressed in the 2000 Report, which features specifically issues related to
human rights, notes:
At all levels of development the three essential capabilities are for 
people to lead a long and healthy life, to be knowledgeable and to have 
access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living. But the 
realm o f human development extents further: other areas o f choice 
highly valued by people include participation, security, sustainability, 
guaranteed human rights -  all needed for being creative and 
productive and for enjoying self-respect, empowerment and a sense of 
belonging to a community. 6
An adequate conception o f human development cannot ignore the 
importance o f political liberties and democratic freedoms. Indeed, 
democratic freedom and civil rights can be extremely important for 
enhancing the capabilities of people who are poor.17
However, on the issue of political and civil rights, again there is a conflict 
among member countries. But the reason for the conflict is different from the example
16 UNDP (2000), p. 17, emphasis added.
17 Ibid., p. 20, emphasis added.
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of whether to include the dimension of employment. As explained below the reason 
why this dimension is not included in the current HDI is not fundamentally because 
some countries believe that the dimension is not appropriate for evaluating human 
development, nor that the member countries are opposed to the proposed method of 
measuring political and civil rights. The problem exists in the UNDP publishing the 
result.
As a matter of substance, Partha Dasgupta, Meghnad Desai and many others
believe that the HDI is incomplete as a measurement of choice enlargement without
the dimension of political and civil rights.18 Thus, Desai claims as follows:
 human development was to ensure that everyone had certain basic
capabilities -  to lead a long and healthy life, to be able to engage in, 
and profit by, productive work, and to communicate freely and have 
access to information, and to participate in the political and social life 
of the community. Political freedom has to be seen as providing a 
capability, especially the last two: to communicate and to participate 
in the community}9
Desai, who contributed in creating the HDI, has designed ‘a political freedom 
index’ that consists of five clusters (integrity of self, rule of law, political 
participation, freedom of expression, and equality before law), each of which is in 
turn related to a set of indicators for which qualitative and quantitative data must be 
gathered. Although Desai is aware of the immense task that would be required to 
implement his methodology for measuring political freedom on a consistent basis for 
a number of countries, he also notes that ‘there are enough sources for data -  from 
non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch to official bodies such as US State Department — .’20
18 See Dasgupta (1990) or Desai (1995).
19 Desai (1995), p. 201, emphasis added.
20 Ibid., pp. 2 1 8 - 9 .
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Given the plausibility of the project of measuring political freedom, the fact 
that this factor is not included in the HDI must be caused either because there is no
universally accepted method of measuring political freedom, or because the inclusion
of the factor itself is a problem for some countries. We can see that the latter is the
case from Desai, who explains the following:
At this stage in any social science research done in an academic 
environment, one would present the results. But research on political 
freedom is not so straightforward. Since the research was undertaken 
with a view to incorporation in the United Nations Development 
Programme’s (UNDP’s) Human Development Report for 1992, it had 
a diplomatic rather than academic environment to cope with. The 
methodology proposed here was explained to the relevant committee 
of the UN Economic and Social Council and was approved. But when 
the actual score for 101 countries was computed, a number o f 
countries objected officially in the UN General Assembly and 
elsewhere. It was not contended that the results were wrong or 
contained errors. The argument was made that the UNDP had no 
mandate to work on human rights and so could not publish such an 
index!21
Consistent with Desai’s explanation on this matter, the 1993 Report notes:
Further work [on measures of political freedom] is needed, preferably 
by academics who can look at this question in an environment free 
from international political pressures.2
This discussion is illustrative of the fact, noted above, that because of the 
nature of the HDI’s index-maker, the dimensions in the index must meet not only the 
criterion of universal applicability -  that is, that they conform to different ideas 
people have about what are the important elements in enlarging choice -  but also the 
criterion of universal acceptability. To satisfy this latter criterion, the dimensions of 
an index for human development must be accepted by all the countries that are the 
members of the UN. It follows from this discussion that an index may be universally 
applicable but not universally acceptable for a variety of reasons. For example,
21 Ibid., p. 219, emphases added.
22 UNDP (1993), p. 105.
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universally applicable dimensions of the HDI may not be universally accepted by 
mistake, or because of bribery, or because of the type of political pressures that Desai 
points out.
A further issue concerns how to identify dimensions of an index that will be 
universally acceptable. In general, if an evaluation of well-being affects international 
resource allocation or other international policy decisions, that dimension is not likely 
to satisfy this criterion, since different countries are likely to have different opinions 
about how the evaluation should be made based upon their circumstances. For 
example, UN member country A , which seeks grants from international organisations, 
may want the index to focus on areas of development in which the country is 
relatively poor and in need, thus advantaging it compared to other countries 
competing for the same grants. Or another UN member country B may not want an 
index that emphasises particular aspects of the society where its development is slow 
because the government of country B regards the publication of such information as 
disadvantageous to its reputation. The UNDP’s HDI must be accepted by UN member 
countries like A and B that have different interests in how the HDI will be used.
In short, because the HDI has to be both universally applicable and universally 
acceptable, aspects of choice that are universally regarded as important -  such as 
political and civil rights -  are not included in the measurement. The HDI must thus be 
seen in light of the fact that it was produced under strong political pressure. The broad 
concept of human development as choice enlargement did not prompt such political 
pressures, but efforts to quantify and define the concept more specifically did prompt 
political pressures.
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2-3-1-2: Differentiation from a GDP measure and more discrete orderings of
countries
A second purpose-dependent criterion of the HDI involves the interest in 
differentiation. Here the differentiation involves two aspects: (1) the interest in an 
index that will give a ranking that need not coincide with the one based upon GDP, 
and that is better for what we want to measure; and (2) the interest in a measure that 
will permit more discrete orderings of countries that are genuinely different in their 
levels of human development.
The former interest developed naturally as a purpose-dependent criterion 
because the initial goal of the UNDP’s human development project was to facilitate 
an alternative policy objective to that of simply encouraging higher income levels. 
The project was also motivated by the fact that even among countries with similar 
levels of income, there are diverse ranges of development as measured by the choices 
people have in their lives. Therefore, the country orderings according to the HDI will 
not usually resemble that of GDP rankings.
On the issue of the index’s ability to discriminate in general, the Report says 
that this condition is generally required for the index to be universal. The Report says, 
‘As a measure of universal index, the HDI needs variables that discriminate among 
countries.’23 However, the reason the Report gives for treating this need as part of the 
criterion of a universal index is not a convincing one. If the ability to discriminate is a 
criterion of a universal index, we may in principle reject an index that is more 
accurate than others in measuring human development only because it is less 
discriminatory compared to rival indexes. Unless we regard the index’s ability to
23 Ibid., p. 105, Italics by the Report.
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discriminate as more important than accuracy, however, such a judgement is not 
appropriate. Universality and the ability to discriminate may complement each other 
in producing an accurate index, but as I show in the following discussion, universality 
does not require that an index discriminate well.
This is not to say that an index’s ability to discriminate is unimportant. But its 
importance is not because this ability is a general requirement for universal indexes, 
but rather because we want an index to be useful in providing discrete orderings of 
countries (probably for policy reasons).
On examining rankings in the HDI, we find that the HDI is indeed successful 
in giving orderings of countries that are distinct from the country rankings produced 
by a GDP measure. For example, using the 1998 Human Development Report, I find 
the following facts:
1. Among the 20 countries with the highest HDI ranking, only two 
(Belgium 12th and Austria 13th) are ranked exactly the same as in the real 
GDP per capita (PPP$) rankings. The largest differences in the ranking is 
17 places (for Finland, which ranks 6th in the HDI and 23rd in the real 
GDP ranking). The average absolute difference between the two 
rankings among these 20 countries is 8.75 places.
2. Among the 20 countries with the lowest HDI ranking, only one country 
(Guinea-Bissau 164th) is ranked exactly the same as in the real GDP per 
capita (PPP$) result. The largest difference in the ranking is 28 places 
(for Angola, which ranks 156th in the HDI and 128th in the real GDP 
ranking, and for Senegal, which ranks 158th in the HDI and 130th in the 
real GDP ranking). The average absolute difference between the two 
rankings among these 20 countries is 5.8 places.
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In order for the HDI to be a successful measure of human development, 
however, we need to know not only that the index gives a ranking different from a 
GDP measure, but also that the index is better than the GDP for what we want to 
measure. For this purpose, we would need to do a more detailed comparison between 
rankings of the different types of the measurement of human development. The 
discussion that follows concerning the interest in a more discrete ordering of countries 
provides examples of such micro level analyses of the different versions of the HDI.
As noted above, the HDI was also motivated by an interest in facilitating a 
more discrete ordering of countries that are genuinely different in their levels of 
human development. This motivation is apparent from a comparison of the three 
alternative types of educational attainment indexes used in the HDI, one in use prior 
to 1991, one in use from 1992 to 1994 and the current one in use from 1995.1 use this 
comparison also to explore a number of difficulties involved in implementing this 
purpose of obtaining a more discrete ordering of countries.
Originally, to measure educational attainment, only the adult literacy rate was 
used. To explain this choice, the Report stated that ‘literacy is a person’s first step in 
learning and knowledge-building,’ and therefore ‘for basic human development, 
literacy deserves the clearest emphasis.’24 However, there developed a concern that 
adult literacy rates did not discriminate among developed countries, since 24 countries 
had a 99% adult literacy rate (1985 data). Accordingly, from the 1991 Report through 
the 1994 Report, the indicator for educational attainment was modified to include 
both adult literacy and the mean years of schooling, with two-third weights on the
24 UNDP (1990), p. 12.
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former and a third weight on the latter.25 This change was consistent with the Report’s 
aims of constructing an index that gives different rankings of development from those 
based on GDP levels and that provides a more discrete ordering of countries. (The 
purposes of using such a more discriminating index may also include more pragmatic 
reasons, such as convenience in using the discriminatory indicator for making policy 
decisions.) In any case, the alternative educational attainment index used between the 
1991 Report and the 1994 Report gave results that did provide a more discrete 
ordering of countries, as detailed below.
I have examined the effect of the changes in the educational attainment index 
on countries’ educational attainment rankings. Included in Table 2.2 are the rankings 
based on the 1991 Report figures for mean years of schooling (1980 data) including 
the 24 countries that had a 99% adult literacy rate (1985 data).
25 See UNDP (1993), pp. 105-6.
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Table 2.2 Country rankings according to ‘mean years of schooling’
(among countries with a 99% adult literacy rate)
Ranking Country Mean years of schooling
1 USA 12.2
2 Canada 11.4
3 United Kingdom 10.8
4 Japan 10.4
5 Denmark 9.7
6 Norway 9.6
Austria 9.6
8 Sweden 9.4
France 9.4
10 Australia 9.3
11 Finland 9.2
12 New Zealand 8.9
13 Germany 8.8
14 Hungary 8.6
15 Switzerland 8.3
16 Netherlands 7.9
Belgium 7.9
18 Czechoslovakia 7.8
19 Luxembourg 7.7
Ireland 7.7
21 USSR 7.6
22 Iceland 7.5
23 Poland* 7.3
24 Bulgaria* 7
25 Cyprus* 6.9
26 Korea, Rep. Of* 6.6
Romania* 6.6
Philippines* 6.6
29 Greece* 6.5
30 Italy* 6.4
31 Barbados 6.3
32 Hong Kong* 6.2
Bahamas 6.2
Chile* 6.2
* C o u n t r ie s  th a t  h a v e  l o w e r  t h a n  a  9 9 %  a d u lt  l i t e r a c y  r a te .
The above table reveals that when in 1991 the educational index was changed 
to add mean years of schooling to the adult literacy rate, the 24 countries ranked
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equally by literacy rate (countries with 99% adult literacy rates) were discriminated 
into 20 different levels. The countries with a large drop in their educational attainment 
rankings because of the new educational index were: Bahamas (1st to 32nd), Barbados 
(1st to 31st), Iceland (1st to 22nd), USSR (1st to 21st), Luxembourg (1st to 21st), Ireland 
(1st to 19th), Czechoslovakia (1st to 18th), Netherlands (1st to 16th), and Belgium (1st to 
16th).
But the fact that an indicator provides a more discrete ordering of countries 
does not say whether or not the indicator is correct. In fact, the latest educational 
attainment index that has been used since the 1995 Report, which is the aggregate of 
adult literacy rates and the combined school enrolment ratio (with the two-third 
weights for the former and a third weight for the latter), results in a very different 
ordering of countries than the index used from 1991 through 1995. Again, I have 
examined the effect of the change on the countries’ rankings of educational 
attainment. To do this I have compared the results in the 1994 and the 1995 Reports. 
The following table lists the rankings of educational attainment in the 1994 Report 
HDI -  rankings based on the aggregation of adult literacy rate (1992) and the mean 
years of schooling (1992), with two-thirds and one-third weights on each -  among 
countries with a 99% literacy rate:
26 I used data from the 1991 Report (with mean years of schooling [1980] and literacy rates [1985]) 
for the comparison between the 1990 Report type index and the 1991 -  1994 Report type index, and 
used data from the 1994 Report (with mean years of schooling [1992] and literacy rates [1992]) and 
data from the 1995 Report (with combined school enrolment ratio [1992] and literacy rates [1992]) for 
the comparison between the 1991 -  1994 Report type index and the 1995 Report type index. The 
different changes in the country-ranking found in two sets of comparisons show that different countries 
are sensitive to different types of educational data, assuming no change during this 1980-92 period of 
the general structure of the country’s educational sector relative to other countries (e.g. USSR is 
relatively high in its literacy rates but the period of schooling tends to be relatively low, whereas the 
educational structure in the USA produces high performances in both aspects), but only changes in the 
absolute levels of each aspect within the structure.
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Table 2.3 Country rankings according to the old ‘educational attainment
index,’ 1994 Report (among countries with a 99% adult literacy
rate)
Rankings Countries
Educational
Attainment
Index Rankings Countries
Educational
Attainment
Index
1 USA 2.81 Latvia 2.58
2 Canada 2.8 26 Lithuania* 2.57
3 Norway 2.78 Russian Federation* 2.57
France 2.78 28 Korea, Rep. Of* 2.55
Australia 2.78 29 Argentina* 2.53
6 United Kingdom 2.76 30 Poland 2.52
7 Switzerland 2.75 31 Uruguay* 2.47
Germany 2.75 32 Italy” 2.45
9 Sweden 2.74 33 Spain* 2.42
Austria 2.74 Belarus* 2.42
11 Belgium 2.73 35 Bahamas 2.39
12 Netherlands 2.72 Chile* 2.39
13 Denmark 2.71 37 Saint Kitts and Nevis 2.38
14 Japan 2.7 Mongolia* 2.38
Finland 2.7 39 Cyprus* 2.35
16 New Zealand 2.69 Samoa* 2.35
17 Luxembourg 2.68 41 Bulgaria* 2.32
18 Hungary 2.63 42 Jamaica* 2.32
19 Barbados 2.61 Moldova, Rep. Of* 2.32
20 Czechoslovakia 2.6 44 Armenia* 2.31
21 Iceland 2.59 Georgia 2.31
22 Israel* 2.58 Philippines* 2.31
Ireland 2.58 Philippines* 2.31
Estonia 2.58
* Countries that have lower than a 99% adult literacy rate
The following table, on the other hand, lists the rankings of educational 
attainment in the 1995 Report HDI -  rankings based on the aggregation of adult 
literacy rate (1992) and combined first-, second-, and third- level gross enrolment 
ratio (1992), with two-third and one-third weight on each, respectively -  among 
countries with a 99% literacy rate:
58
Table 2.4 Country rankings according to the new ‘educational attainment
index,’ 1995 Report (among countries with a 99% adult literacy
rate)
Educational I Educational
Attainment Attainment
Rankings Countries Index Rankings Countries Index
1 Canada 0.99 Kyrgyzstan* 0.9
2 USA 0.98 Uzbekistan* 0.9
Finland 0.98 37 Israel* 0.89
4 Netherlands 0.95 Barbados* 0.89
Norway 0.95 Belize* 0.89
France 0.95 Czech Rep. 0.89
7 Spain* 0.94 Estonia 0.89
Belgium 0.94 Latvia 0.89
Austria 0.94 Russian Federation* 0.89
Denmark 0.94 Antigua and Barbuda* 0.89
New Zealand 0.94 Moldova, Rep. Of* 0.89
Ireland 0.94 46 Italy* 0.88
13 Iceland 0.93 Greece* 0.88
Germany 0.93 Cyprus* 0.88
15 Japan 0.92 Trinidad and Tobago* 0.88
Sweden 0.92 Hungary 0.88
Australia 0.92 Lithuania*
Korea, Dem. People’s
0.88
United Kingdom 0.92 Rep. Of* 0.88
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.92 Philippines* 0.88
Armenia* 0.92 Guyana* 0.88
Georgia 0.92 55 Chile* 0.87
22 Switzerland 0.91 Ukraine* 0.87
Korea, Rep. Of* 0.91 Kazakhstan* 0.87
Poland °-91 Saint Lucia* 0.87
Grenada* 0.91 Azerbaijan* 0.87
Saint Vincent* 0.91 Tajikistan* 0.87
Turkmenistan* 0.91 61 Fiji* 0.86
Samoa (Western)* 0.91 62 Luxembourg 0.85
29 Bahamas* 0.9 Costa Rica* 0.85
Argentina* 0.9 Cuba* 0.85
Uruguay* 0.9 Suriname* 0.85
Slovakia 0.9 Romania* 0.85
Belarus* 0.9 Lebanon* 0.85
Dominica* 0.9
♦Countries that have lower than a 99% adult literacy rate.
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A comparison of these two tables shows the dilemma of trying to decide 
among the different measures of educational attainment. By the standard of their 
ability to distinguish among countries the measure of educational attainment has 
become less effective, because the latest educational attainment index provides a less 
discrete ordering of countries than the previous index. As noted above, in the 1991 
Report, the 24 countries with a 99% adult literacy rate (and thus an identical ranking 
under the pre 1991 Report) were discriminated into 20 different levels. In the 1995 
Report, however, the 27 countries with a 99% literacy rate were separated into only 
11 categories.
However, as noted above, the fact that an index is more discriminatory than 
the other is not a sufficient reason to prefer the former. The discrete ordering has to 
reflect differences in countries that are genuinely different in their levels of human 
development. Therefore, there is another aspect of the dilemma, which relates to the 
very different country rakings that resulted when in 1995 the educational attainment 
index was changed from adult literacy rates plus mean years of schooling to adult 
literacy rates plus combined school enrolment ratio. Specifically, among countries 
whose adult literacy rates remained at 99% (the highest score for the indicator) for 
both the 1994 and 1995 Human Development Reports, some countries faced large 
drops or large increases in their rankings from 1994 to 1995. Countries with 
significant drops in their rankings are: Luxembourg (17th to 62nd), Hungary (18th to 
46th), Switzerland (7th to 22nd), Australia (3rd to 15th), the United Kingdom (6th to 
15th), Germany (7th to 13th) and Sweden (9th to 15th). Countries with large 
improvements in their educational attainment rankings are: Georgia (44th to 15th), 
Saint Kitts and Nevis (37th to 15th), Ireland (22nd to 7th), Finland (14th to 2nd), New 
Zealand (16th to 7th), Netherlands (12th to 4th), Iceland (21st to 13th) and Denmark (13th
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to 7th). Because the adult literacy rates in these countries remained the same
throughout the period, and because we would expect mean years of schooling and
combined school enrolment ratio to be relatively stable from 1994 to 1995, we can
attribute most of the rakings changes to the change in the type of data used.
In reality, it appears that the new educational attainment index for the 1995
Report was chosen without examining the implication of the significant changes in
many of the country rankings. Instead, it appears that this latest change in the
educational attainment index was made only for reasons related to the quality and the
source of the data. The Report explains that the change was made
- - mainly because the formula for calculating mean years of schooling 
is complex and has enormous data requirements. Data on mean years 
of schooling are not provided by any UN agency or international 
organizations. As a result, estimates must sometimes be used, which 
are not always acceptable. The combined enrolment ratio overcomes 
both these problems. It shows the stock of literacy quite easily for 
those under age 24. And it is based on the work of UNESCO.27
The problem with this data-based rationale, of course, is that it does not tell us 
whether the new index is actually a more effective or more accurate measurement of 
educational attainment. There is a particular problem in choosing the newest index 
(1995 index for short) over the 1991 index, without knowing whether or not both are 
measuring a general capability to acquire knowledge. This is because the better 
quality of data should justify a change in the index only if the two indexes are 
measuring the phenomenon we are interested in, but for one of them we have data sets 
with better quality than the other. This chapter is concerned with purpose-dependent, 
a priori criteria of indexes, not empirical criteria such as data quality. I talk about the 
issue related to quality of data to emphasise that the ability to give discrete orderings 
and the quality of data are two separate criteria, so that indexes that pass the former
27 UNDP (1995), p. 134.
61
criterion do not necessarily use better data, nor are indexes that use better data 
necessarily produce more reliably discrete orderings of countries.
It is possible, for example, that the difference in results of the two indexes 
arises not because they are measuring the same phenomenon and one has better 
quality data than the other, but because the two indexes are in fact measuring different 
phenomena. In this case it might well be advisable not to change the index but to 
focus on better collection of data to improve the index. In this case, two 
considerations in choosing between the two indexes, the better quality of data 
available or better measurement-device, would be in conflict.
Is there any way to know the difference (or the similarity) in the potential 
capacity of the indexes to meet a particular purpose independent from the results they 
produce? Especially, are we able to find out which index has the better capacity to 
measure the capability ‘to acquire knowledge’? As indicated above, a problem 
common in creating a measurement-device is that we do not know apart from the 
measurement what the world looks like with respect to the concept in question.
One potential way to deal with this problem of not having prior knowledge 
about the rankings of countries with respect to the concept ‘to acquire knowledge’ 
itself is to look to information on the relationship between this concept and other 
concepts for which we have good data.
One possible such relationship is that between the educational attainment 
index and adjusted real per capita GDP in purchasing power dollars (PPP$), for which 
we have good data, plus the knowledge we have that countries that have achieved the 
highest levels of educational attainments are not necessarily the ones that are at the 
top of the income scale. Using the 1991 Human Development Report, I found the 
following:
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2.
3.
Table 2.5
Among the top 12 countries in educational attainment index, only two 
countries (Norway and Finland) have the same rankings in the GDP and 
in the educational attainment index;
Only two countries (Japan and Sweden) get higher rankings in the GDP 
compared to the educational attainment index, but both only by one 
ranking; and
Eight countries have significantly higher rankings in the educational 
attainment index compared to the GDP index, as reflected in the 
following table:
Educational attainment index rankings and GDP index 
rankings based on the 1991 Human Development Report 
(Selected comparisons)
Country
Educational attainment 
index ranking GDP index ranking
Canada 2 10
USA 1 6
Australia 8 21
France 8 12
UK 3 20
Denmark 5 9
New Zealand 13 23
Austria 5 14
Overall, the result from the analysis shows that countries that obtain the 
highest educational attainment scores are not the ones that have the 
highest income levels.
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I also examined the relationship between the educational attainment index in 
the 1995 Report and the adjusted real per capita GDP (PPP$). Using this data I found 
the following:
1) Among the top 12 educational attainment countries, only the USA 
obtains a higher ranking in the GDP compared to the educational 
attainment, but only by one ranking;
2) A total of 11 countries get higher results in the educational attainment 
rankings compared to the GDP rankings. The differences in their 
rankings are in general large, which can be seen from the following 
table:
Table 2.6 Educational attainment index rankings and GDP index 
rankings based on the 1995 Human Development Report
(Selected comparisons)
Country
Educational attainment 
index ranking GDP index ranking
Canada 1 8
Netherlands 4 20
Finland 2 14
Norway 4 15
France 4 11
Spain 7 29
Belgium 7 14*
Austria 7 13*
Denmark 7 12*
New Zealand 7 26
Ireland 7 30
* Rankings between the two indexes for these countries are not as 
large as the numbers suggest, because there are six countries which 
are at tie in 7th rankings.
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3) Again, the overall observation is that countries which obtain the top 
rankings in their educational attainments are not the ones that enjoy the 
highest income levels.
As the above results show, unfortunately, neither analysis is useful for our 
purpose. Specifically, both the 1991 index and the 1995 index are consistent with the 
general observation that countries that have achieved the highest levels of educational 
attainments are not necessarily the ones at the top of the income scale. So this 
particular observation about the relationship between educational attainment and 
income does not help in choosing one index over the other.28
Given the limits in testing measurement-devices with respect to the general 
concept ‘to acquire knowledge,’ a further alternative is to make the concept less 
abstract while keeping it a universal value. This approach would respond to the 
problem with a concept as abstract as ‘to acquire knowledge’ that too many indexes 
related to educational attainment are acceptable. Examples of such less abstract 
characterisation of the concept may be, in addition to ‘to be able to read and write 
with understanding’ (the definition of literacy) to have information-sorting skills, to 
be able to construct a logical argument, to be able to operate basic computer soft-ware 
programmes, to be able to solve basic mathematics, etc. This list of more concrete 
objectives may suggest a certain rankings of countries. For example, the 1998 Report 
includes the following observation on the relationship between various important uses 
of the general capability to acquire knowledge and income levels:
28 There may be relationships between different countries’ educational attainment and other social 
phenomena that may form as justifications for selecting among alternatives. For example, an 
observation that countries that have achieved high levels of political liberty may not necessarily be the 
ones that have the highest levels of educational attainment may distinguish between different indicators 
for education.
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Industrial countries have achieved nearly 100% literacy rates and 85% 
enrolment ratios. But new surveys show that many people -  18% of 
adults on average in 12 European and North American countries -  
though “literate”, have such low levels of skills that they cannot meet 
even the basic reading requirements of a modem society. Another 29% 
do not have the ability to be trained in skilled employment. Industrial 
countries may start falling behind the fast-growing developing 
countries, especially in technical education. Fewer than a third of 
students in the industrial countries now enrol for applied or natural 
science -  in Norway and the Netherlands only 1 student in 5. But in 
Chile, China, and the Republic of Korea and South Africa the 
proportion is 1 in 2 or 1 in 3.29
The statement shows that ‘technical literacy’ does not necessarily correlate 
with the amount of education. For example, as noted, Netherlands and Norway have a 
much lower proportion of students enrolled for applied or natural science than Chile, 
China and the Republic of Korea, although the general educational attainment levels 
in the former countries are higher than in the latter countries.30
Based on such observations, I have compared the three educational indexes 
used in the HDI between 1991 and 1995 to assess which of the three better reflects 
this technical literacy factor. For this purpose I prepared the following list ranking 
these five countries in the three different measures of educational attainment:
Table 2.7 Country rankings according to different educational attainment
indexes (Selected comparisons)
Country 1990 Report 1991 Report 1995 Report
Norway 1 5 4
Netherlands 1 16 4
Chile 45 42 55
China 94 92 103
Republic of Korea 37 34 22
29 UNDP (1998), p. 23.
30 See the above quote.
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This data, although very summary, suggest that in fact the index in the 1991
Report may be the best measure of educational attainment among these three, since it
shows less distinctions between Norway and Netherlands on the one hand and Chile,
China and the Republic of Korea on the other hand. In the 1991 Report the average
ranking of Norway and Netherlands is 10.5 ([5 + 16] / 2 = 10.5), compared to 56 for
Chile, China and the Republic of Korea ([42 + 92 + 43] / 3 = 56), or a difference of
45.5 places. In the 1990 Report, the average ranking of Norway and Netherlands is 1,
compared to 58.7 for Chile, China and the Republic of Korea ([45 + 94 + 37] / 3), or a
difference of 57.7 places. For the 1995 Report, the average ranking of Norway and
Netherlands is 4, compared to 60 for Chile, China and the Republic of Korea ([55 +
103 + 22] / 3 = 60), or a difference of 56 places.
Of course, this very limited comparison is problematic without more data.
Indeed, some may say that data that would correspond to even a more refined
definition of the content of educational attainment are not available. That may be so.
But as Amartya Sen notes in his book ‘Commodities and Capabilities,’ more data
should become available if organisations and researchers raise demands for such data:
Given the limitations of reliable data, it is not easy to make extensive 
comparisons of the achievements of different countries in the field of 
extending capabilities and enhancing functionings. One reason why 
the data tend to be relatively scarce in this area compared with, say, 
data underlying GNP and GDP estimates, is the lack of demand for 
such data. There is no reason why it should not be possible to get more 
comparative data on, say, morbidity or undemutrition, in different 
countries. The weakness in the theory of well-being and living 
standards has been partly responsible for the underdevelopment of the 
data base.31
31 Sen (1985), p. 73, emphasis by Sen.
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2-3-1-3: Policy usefulness
The third criterion derived from the purpose of the project of quantification is
policy usefulness. This is also a criterion for satisfactory econometric models by
Morgan as well as a generic criterion for successful models by Boumans. The index-
maker’s intention that the HDI be suitable for policy uses is expressed, for example,
in the following statement by the 1990 Report:
In any system for measuring and monitoring human development, the 
ideal would be to include many variables, to obtain as comprehensive 
a picture as possible. But the current lack of relevant comparable 
statistics precludes that. Nor is such comprehensiveness entirely 
desirable. Too many indicators could produce a perplexing picture -  
perhaps distracting policymakers from the main overall trends. The 
crucial issue therefore is of emphasis.33
The HDI is useful for policy-making to the extent that information obtained 
from the index can be analysed quickly and easily by policy-makers. Using a limited 
number of dimensions (for example three, as in the current HDI), the ups and downs 
of the overall level of the HDI can be easily analysed because changes can only 
happen through changes in the three dimensions. As reflected in the above quotation, 
however, if there were many more dimensions to the index, the result would be ‘a 
perplexing picture;’ there would be too many more ways in which the overall levels 
can be affected. Accordingly, in examining an index with respect to its practical 
usefulness, whether the index measures human development precisely or imprecisely 
becomes a minor concern.
It is also important to distinguish what we mean by usefulness in this context. 
Here we mean that the HDI can be useful at the macro level, for example, in 
evaluating whether the conditions of human development are improving in a
32 Morgan (1988) and Boumans (1999a).
33 UNDP (1990), p. 11.
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particular country. We do not mean that the HDI and its three dimensions can 
necessarily be useful at the micro level to assess whether a particular policy will 
provide an improvement in human development. In fact, as developed more fully in 
Chapter Four, the index is not made for constructing or evaluating policies to improve 
human development, since the three dimensions of the HDI are not chosen having this 
aim in mind. Investigations such as how the government should intervene to improve 
the level of human development of a particular country have to be done by other 
means.
2-3-1-4: Comparability across space
From its beginning, the HDI was designed for comparison of human 
development across different countries, that is, comparability across space. The 
comparability across space is also one of the criteria for a successful thermometer 
discussed by Chang.34 He argued that one of the properties that scientists required for 
the measurement instrument they were looking for was stability -  that the chosen 
instrument can produce consistent results under a wide range of circumstances. 
Applied to the case of the HDI, this requirement that the index provide comparability 
over space leads to a number of more specific requirements.
Firstly, the data sets needed to calculate the HDI must generally be available 
from countries all over the world. The data sets used in the HDI -  life expectancy at 
birth, adult literacy rate, combined first-, second-, and third- level gross school 
enrolment ratio, and real GDP per capita -  are available from most of the member 
countries of the UN. However, some compromises have been made in an effort to 
improve the functioning of the HDI. In particular, in the case of the first- or second-
34 Chang (1996).
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level enrolment data, or both, more than 50 countries had to use estimated or
provisional values in the 1998 Report. This need to use estimated or provisional
figures was a cost that had to be paid to increase the dimensions of measuring
educational attainment. (As noted above, in the original HDI, only adult literacy rates
were used to measure educational attainment.)
A second specific requirement to provide comparability over space is that the
three dimensions of the HDI must be relevant for all the countries under investigation.
That is, the dimensions have to be relevant as factors that contribute to ‘choice
enlargement’ (the basic definition of human development), regardless of the country
to which we apply the index. As noted above, the HDI dimensions are for people
(1) to lead a long and healthy life, (2) to acquire knowledge, and (3) to have access to
resources needed for a decent standard of living. As the 1990 Report explained, these
dimensions were chosen because they are essential at all levels of development and
thus can apply to all countries:
In principle, these choices can be infinite and change over time. But at 
all levels of development, the three essential ones are for people to 
lead to a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have 
access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. If these 
essential choices are not available, many other opportunities remain 
inaccessible.35
Finally, at a very practical level, it appears that in order to make multilateral 
comparisons among countries, we need to use a composite index like the current HDI, 
as opposed to making vector comparisons of the three different dimensions. As 
discussed below, in fact the latter type of comparison is essentially unable to produce 
multilateral orderings of countries’ levels of human development.
35 UNDP (1990), p. 10.
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Sen offers a vector comparison means of measuring capabilities in the sub-
section of his book called ‘Incompleteness: Fundamental and Pragmatic.’ This
means is proposed for cases where there is no agreement on the relative weights to be
attached to different dimensions. Because weights assigned to three dimensions in the
HDI are not determined with full confidence or with complete agreement, such a
means may be more suitable for the HDI’s evaluation of human development. In what
follows, I will examine whether a ‘dominance partial order,’ which is one of the
alternative ways in which we could measure human development, would be a good
alternative to the current HDI.
First, it is important to understand what a ‘dominance partial order’ is. A
‘dominance partial order’ is used when we want to order the objects of comparison
according to more than one criterion at the same time. A ‘dominance partial order’
provides ordering of those objects without specifying particular relative weights for
each criterion, because the order is determined according to the rule that having more
in each criterion is better. The order is ‘partial’ because often the comparison using
the above rule limits the number of objects that can be ordered. According to Sen:
- - a particular selection of value-objects (in this case, the functionings 
and capabilities that are accepted as valuable) would yield a 
‘dominance partial order’ even without specification of relative 
weights. Having more of each relevant functioning or capability is a 
clear improvement, and this is decidable without waiting to get 
agreement on the relative weights to be attached to the different 
functionings and capabilities.37
If we apply the principle of dominance partial order to the rankings of human 
development, the rule would be as follows: country A has a dominant position in the 
human development ranking compared to country B if A is at least equal to B in all
36 Sen (1992), pp. 46-9.
37 Ibid., p. 46, emphases by Sen.
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three dimensions and greater in one of them. Rankings of countries according to this
rule will not produce a complete ordering, but may produce partial orderings that are
enough for the particular purpose for which they may be used.
To see whether it is practical to use the ‘dominance partial order’ approach in 
the HDI rankings, I have examined what dominance partial orderings we can obtain 
from the data sets for the three dimensions of the HDI for the countries at the lower 
scale of development -  the lowest 20 countries in the HDI ranking in the 1998 Human 
Development Report. Because the dimension of educational attainment is measured in 
terms of two variables (adult literacy rates and combined school enrolment ratio), the 
actual test of dominance ordering is conducted using four different data sets, 
specifically life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, combined first-, second- and 
third- level gross school enrolment ratio and real GDP per capita in purchasing 
power dollars. The following table summarises the data sets for these 20 countries:
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Table 2.8 HDI rankings of the lowest 20 countries from the 1998 Human
Development Report
HDI rank Country
Life
Expectancy 
at birth 
(years)
Adult literacy 
rate (%)
Combined 
school 
enrollment 
ratio (%)
Adjusted 
real GDP 
per capita 
(PPP$)
155 Bhutan 52 42.2 31 1382
156 Angola 47.4 42 30 1839
157 Sudan 52.2 46.1 32 1110
158 Senegal 50.3 33.1 33 1815
159 Haiti 54.6 45 29 917
160 Uganda 40.5 61.8 38 1483
161 Malawi 41 56.4 76 773
162 Djibouti 49.2 46.2 20 1300
163 Chad 47.2 48.1 27 1172
164 Guinea-Bissau 43.4 54.9 29 811
165 Gambia 46 38.6 39 948
166 Mozambique 46.3 40.1 25 959
167 Guinea 45.5 35.9 25 1139
168 Eritrea 50.2 25 29 983
169 Ethiopia 48.7 35.5 20 455
170 Burundi 44.5 35.3 23 637
171 Mali 47 31 18 565
172 Burkina Faso 46.3 19.2 19 784
173 Niger 47.5 13.6 15 765
174 Sierra Leone 34.7 31.4 30 625
Source: UNDP (1998), p. 130.
The method I used to obtain dominance partial orderings of these countries 
using the four factors in the HDI is simple. First I calculated how many bilateral 
dominance relationships existed in the 10 countries at the bottom of the HDI rankings: 
that is, how many combinations of two countries we can find in which one country 
has at least the same level in all four of the basic factors of human development and 
more in one factor than the other. There are only six such combinations, specifically: 
Gambia > Sierra Leone - (1)
Eritrea > Niger - (2)
Eritrea > Burkina Faso - (3)
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Mozambique > Burkina Faso - (4)
Guinea > Burundi - (5)
Gambia > Burundi - (6)
I then assessed whether there were any dominance relationships among three 
country combinations with the character of A > B, B > C, which would make 
A > B > C .  I determined that there is no dominance relationship among three 
countries.
Then I did the same operation adding 5 more countries from the bottom of the 
HDI ranking. I found the following two additional bilateral relationships:
Chad > Mozambique - (7)
Chad > Guinea - (8)
From (4) and (7), and (5) and (8), we obtain two dominance relationships 
ranking three countries, specifically:
Chad > Mozambique > Burkina Faso - (9)
Chad > Guinea > Burundi - (10)
Still, there were no combinations of countries with dominance relationships 
involving more than three countries using these 15 countries.
Finally, I added 5 more countries from the lowest part of the HDI ranking and 
repeated the operations. Here, I found 5 more bilateral relationships, specifically the 
following:
Senegal > Eritrea - (11)
Sudan > Eritrea - (12)
Bhutan > Eritrea - (13)
Sudan > Mozambique - (14)
Angola > Guinea - (15)
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From the combinations of inequalities (2) and (11), (3) and (11), (2) and (12),
(3) and (12), (2) and (13), (3) and (13), (4) and (14), and (5) and (15), we obtain 8
more dominance relationships involving three countries, specifically:
Senegal > Eritrea > Niger (16)
Senegal > Eritrea > Burkina Faso (17)
Sudan > Eritrea > Niger (18)
Sudan > Eritrea > Burkina Faso (19)
Bhutan > Eritrea > Niger (20)
Bhutan > Eritrea > Burkina Faso (21)
Sudan > Mozambique > Burkina Faso - (22)
Angola > Guinea > Burkina Faso (23)
There are still no combinations of inequalities with dominance partial
orderings of more than three countries.
The result of the examination above can be summarised as follows:
1. Among the countries with the lowest 10 HDI values, there are only 6 
bilateral dominance relationships, and none among more than two 
countries.
2. If we include 5 additional countries (ranked from the 11th to the 15th
lowest in the HDI ranking), there are altogether 8 bilateral dominance 
relationships, and 4 of these 8 bilateral relationships form 2 sets of 
dominance orderings of three countries. There are no dominance 
relationships involving more than three countries.
3. If we include 5 further countries to have all of the lowest 20 countries
in the HDI ranking, there are altogether 13 bilateral dominance 
relationships, and 11 of these 13 bilateral relationships form 10 sets of
dominance orderings of three countries, but still there are no 
dominance relationships among more than three countries.
The general conclusion from the above examination is that if we abandon any 
relative evaluation of the sub-dimensions of the HDI, the number of countries we can 
order becomes very restricted. For example, there is a total of 45 bilateral 
relationships possible for the 10 countries at the bottom of the HDI ( 1 0 x 9 / 2  = 45), 
but, as discussed above, there are only 6 bilateral relationships among these 10 
countries ranking them according to partial dominance ordering. This and the other 
analyses above show as follows:
■ Firstly, the HDI rankings are largely dependent on weighting the four 
variables in the HDI.
■ Secondly, rankings that are not too partial (say, rankings with more than 
three countries) are not easy to obtain amongst these countries with the 
lowest levels of the basic capabilities.
■ Thirdly, in some cases we can usefully compare human development 
relative to one or two other countries without making any relative 
evaluation among the three dimensions of the HDI. For example, as noted 
above, we know that both Guinea and Gambia are dominantly advanced in 
human development (measured in terms of the three dimensions, four 
variables) over Burundi. Accordingly, these measures of human 
development can be sufficient in some cases, for example, for some 
decisions that international organisations may have to make for resource 
allocations among these countries.
In sum, in order to obtain a complete ranking of 174 countries with respect to 
their degrees of human development, it is critical that we use an aggregate index with
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relative weights assigned to the components. On the other hand, for some purposes we 
do not necessary need a complete ordering. Therefore, the decision to use a composite 
index instead of a set of individual indexes is fundamentally based on whether, as a 
practical matter, a more complete ordering of the countries’ human development is 
needed.
2-3-1-5: Comparability across time
This aim -  that the HDI provides comparability in rankings over time -  was 
added to the human development project four years after the publication of the first 
Human Development Report in 1990. One of the consequences of adding the desire to 
make intertemporal comparisons of the HDI was to fix the minimum and maximum 
values of the denominators when normalising the three dimensions, each of which has 
a different unit of measurement. Prior to the 1994 Report, the minimum and 
maximum values of each variable that determined the common denominators used in 
the normalising process varied from year to year. The change to fixed values was 
made because fixed denominators are regarded as more suitable for making 
intertemporal comparison. That is, if the denominators change over time, this might 
cause an anomaly in which, for example, one country’s actual life expectancy 
increases but their HDI longevity score goes down because the denominator increases 
due to changes in the life expectancy of another country (either at the bottom or at the 
top of the scale, for example, because a war in one of the poorest country has 
worsened its life expectancy).
Note, however, that the interest in fixing the denominators in the normalising 
process arises essentially from a desire to compare the HDI values over time. There is
38 See Dasgupta (1993), and UNDP (1993), p. 108.
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no need to fix common denominators if, instead, the HDI is used for comparisons 
over time of HDI rankings, rather than actual values. If denominators are allowed to 
vary, changes in the HDI value (or the value of one of its sub-dimensions) of country 
A can happen merely because of a change in the performance of a county B at the 
bottom (or top) of one of the sub-dimensions of the HDI. But this change would affect 
the ranking of country A only if HDI values of country B go beyond or below those of 
country A. And if that happens, than surely their rankings should be changed, that is, 
the ordering of the two countries should be reversed. Accordingly, the anomaly 
explained above is irrelevant if we only seek information regarding the HDI ranking 
of a country over time. It is only when we want to use the index for comparisons over 
time of the HDI values that the fixing of common denominators is required.
The period for which the HDI is designed to be effective in making 
intertemporal comparisons is determined by the way the fixed minimum and 
maximum values of each variable are chosen. Those values are chosen by tracing 
records (and estimates) of 30 years into the past and 30 years into the future. 
According to the Report, the choice was made, firstly, because there is no 
internationally comparable data that are reliable for a period longer than 30 years. 
Secondly, in order to make comparisons over time for the foreseeable future, we need 
to look not only retrospectively but also prospectively at likely minimum and 
maximum values.39
Another reason to limit the fixing of minimum and maximum values to 30 
years from now is that scientific development even within the next 30 years may 
significantly change both the structure of the world and the scientific tools we use for
39 See UNDP (1993), p. 109.
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studying it. For example, having access to and being able to make use of the internet
may become critical in many dimensions of our lives (health, education, consumption,
resource management and employment), so that it may be appropriate to include new
minimum and maximum values, or even new dimension(s) to the measurement of
human development, even within a few decades from now.40
This discussion of the means of normalising the three dimensions of the new
HDI is related to my earlier discussion of the measurement of ‘real’ temperature by
Chang, where a thermometer that is stable across circumstances and time is chosen
amongst rival instruments41 Marcel Boumans, in his paper ‘Representation and
Stability in Testing and Measuring Rational Expectations,’ points out that
standardisation is a way to construct a stable instrument. He explains as follows:
By testing a model one tries to find out to what extent the model 
covers the data of the phenomenon, while to be a candidate for a 
measurement formula the model must represent the whole data range.
And among the possible representations the standard model represents 
the most stable correlation under different circumstances.42
Boumans uses as an example a mathematical formula that measures supply 
elasticities in a rational expectations framework43 Applying the ‘minimalist 
overdetermination’ strategy suggested by Chang,44 Boumans chooses a formula that 
(1) provides the most stable relationship between variables in the model with respect 
to empirical data, and (2) can be applied to a wide domain of values of the variables. 
In this section we found that the new HDI based on a revised normalisation method is 
more ‘stable’ than the previous index because the former can be used for 60 years
40 On this, see for example, The Economist, June 26th -  July 2nd 1999.
41 Chang (1996).
42 Boumans (1999b), p. 387.
43 Boumans (1999b).
44 Chang (1996).
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without causing anomalies in the measurement, whereas the old index was in 
principle only applicable for one year.
2-3-2: The LSI
In this section I will examine the LSI -  which, as discussed above, was 
developed by Fukuda to be used for policy-making to improve the general level of 
satisfaction in Japan -  in the light of the five purpose-dependent criteria I applied to 
the HDI, specifically: (1) Universality; (2) Differentiation with the GDP; (3) Policy 
usefulness; (4) Comparability across space; and (5) Comparability across time.
2-3-2-1: Universality
Since the LSI is designed to measure the satisfaction level of those in a single 
country, Japan, its ability to provide comparisons among different countries is not 
relevant as a criterion for a successful LSI. However, one can examine this criterion 
of universality at a different level, that is, within Japan, as applied to the LSI.
As applied to the HDI, I distinguished between two concepts of universality, 
that is, the issues of whether the index is universally acceptable and whether it is 
universally applicable. The former issue was relevant to the HDI since the HDI 
required support from the different member countries of the UN. However, this issue 
of universal acceptability is not relevant to the LSI, since this was not dependent on 
governmental approval or support.45
The issue of universal applicability is relevant to the LSI. Specifically, the 
question of universal applicability as applied to the LSI is essentially whether the
45 Although Fukuda is a government official, his development of the LSI was included in the privately 
funded publication not a publication funded by the government.
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index is valid for the whole Japan, not for an average individual or for an individual in 
one town. This question can be answered, first, by examining the nature and quality of 
the sample used in the public opinion survey conducted by the Japanese government 
that was the principal basis for the degree of satisfaction level (DSL) data used to 
develop the LSI. That is, this first issue is whether or not the sample used for this 
survey is representative of the range of people and groups in Japan. It seems quite 
likely that this survey is so representative in most respects, since the sample is 
substantial -- a sample size of 10,000 -  and is collected from across Japan. Thus, the 
LSI appears based upon a sample that is representative of the whole Japan in terms of 
regions within the country. But the sample is not necessarily representative of the 
whole Japan in terms of all different age groups, because the sample does not include 
information about Japanese people under 20.
A second issue related to the LSI’s universality is whether the index measures 
a concept that is relevant for all the individuals in Japan. Here again, it appears that 
the LSI’s focus on satisfaction satisfies this standard. The basic concept of 
satisfaction, leaving aside the issue of whether or not one believes it to be the essential 
goal of human endeavour, can be regarded as relevant for all the individuals in Japan. 
So the LSI appears relevant to individuals throughout Japan, and in this sense as well 
appears to meet the criterion of being universally acceptable across the domain that is 
relevant, that is the country of Japan.
2-3-2-2: Discrimination from a GDP measure
As with the HDI, an essential purpose behind the construction of the LSI was 
to find a measure that is different from the GDP. As discussed above, Fukuda 
discovered that in fact the improvement of the GDP in Japan had not been making the
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Japanese people in general more satisfied, and therefore he tried to find a measure of 
well-being that would better explain the general satisfaction level of the Japanese 
public. Accordingly, as long as the index is successful in achieving its primary aim, it 
should give results that need not coincide with those of a measure using GDP.
2-3-2-3: Policy usefulness
This factor of usefulness was at the core of the LSI, since Fukuda’s basic 
motivation was to develop an index that would permit the development and 
improvement of governmental policies to increase satisfaction levels of the Japanese 
public.
The LSI should be successful in meeting this criterion for two reasons. Firstly, 
most if not all of the five areas of life reflected in the LSI were categorised in a way 
that is easily influenced by government policies. As noted above, these areas are 
employment, housing, consumption, education and leisure, and in all of these areas 
the government can implement programmes to affect the areas. For example, even in 
the area of leisure, the government can improve satisfaction to some extent by policies 
to encourage fewer working hours. For this reason, the LSI does not include purely 
private aspects of a person’s satisfaction with life, which are not subject to 
government intervention. For example, there is little, if anything, that a government 
can do to help people to meet and fall in love, or to encourage a husband and a wife to 
help one another. Although there are other things that government can do, for 
example, to encourage good family relationships through provisions of childcare, 
counselling, or new tax schemes, generally the five areas used in the LSI are more 
obviously areas where government policies can make a difference.
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A second reason why the LSI should be useful for policy-making involves the 
way the variables were chosen. As discussed above, Fukuda used statistical methods 
to identify the variables used in the LSI. Accordingly, this process provided empirical 
evidence that changes in the components of the LSI might be associated with 
improving the level of ‘the degree of satisfaction in life in general’ (DSL).
The above analysis of the policy usefulness of the LSI contrasts with that of 
the HDI. As explained above, the HDI was designed to measure only the main aspect 
of choice enlargement and a limited number of dimensions was included so that 
policy makers could easily follow changes in the levels of all the sub-indicators. 
Accordingly, the HDI can be used as a guide to the degree of human development of a 
country, but the particular structure of the HDI cannot be used to develop strategies 
for government policy. In the case of the LSI, however, the index was designed to 
find important policy variables that it was demonstrated would affect the level of the 
DSL. Accordingly, the numbers of variables (sub-indexes) did not have to be small in 
order to be useful for policy purposes. Put another way, the LSI was designed to 
identify the policy factors that would improve what the index measures, that is the 
general satisfaction level in the Japanese society, thus making the use of the LSI for 
policy purposes more direct than that of the HDI.
2-3-2-4: Comparability across space
The LSI is constructed for a single country -  Japan -  based on particular data 
sets obtained from the country. Accordingly, the index is not designed to be applied 
anywhere outside Japan. Further, the index is not constructed to provide analysis 
between different regions of Japan either, because the LSI does not have sub versions
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for regions of Japan. The LSI, therefore, has no capacity to compare or discriminate
across space, but nor was it designed to do that.
2-3-2-S: Comparability across time
As applied to the LSI, the criterion that the index provides comparability over 
time amounts to asking whether the LSI is robust enough not to break down over 
time, which Fukuda found had occurred with respect to the capacity of real income to 
measure human well-being or satisfaction. Such robustness requires both a stable 
index, that is, one that will provide identical results over time if the circumstances 
remain stable, and a flexible index, that is, one that has the ability to reflect 
differences in circumstances over time. The LSI was constructed in such as way as to 
meet both of these robustness requirements. As explained above, the LSI is based 
upon variables that are regularly updated to correlate with the general level of 
satisfaction as reflected in yearly public opinion polls. Accordingly, the index is stable 
in its ability to measure satisfaction in stable circumstances, and is also flexible in that 
the index can reflect changes over time in both the variables and the degree to which 
they affect the general satisfaction level.
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Chapter three: Theory-dependent criteria for the HDI and the LSI
This chapter discusses the HDI and the LSI in terms of the criteria of 
successful indexes that are derived from the indexes’ relation to theory. I will start by 
explaining the strong link between the HDI and a well-being evaluation theory called 
the capability approach developed by Amartya Sen. The next section explains that the 
relativistic and absolutist views on poverty are not incompatible by examining the 
ideas of Peter Townsend, who is a proponent of the former. In this section I conclude 
that successful evaluation of well-being requires assessment of both relative and 
absolute aspect of need. I then show that the traditional well-being evaluation 
approach (called commodity-based approach) is incapable of revealing necessities 
that are relative to individuals. The following section shows that, on the other hand, 
the evaluation based on Sen’s capability approach is able to reveal such ‘relative 
necessities’ of individuals, although the theory is not sufficient in implementing the 
actual measurement of ‘capabilities’. The following section examines the HDI with 
respect to the capability approach by Sen. Specifically, I will investigate the HDI’s 
link to the capability approach focusing on an aspect that is not considered by the 
Human Development Report: that is, I examine the index’s ability to identify 
necessities of individuals that are relative to their personal characters. The rest of the 
chapter is devoted to examining the LSI. As explained in Chapter one, Bentham-like 
ideas of pleasures and pains do have an effect on the LSI, but the effect is at a very 
general level. So I will discuss just how close the LSI is to Bentham’s original ideas 
briefly at the end of the chapter.
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3-1: Relationship between Amartya Sen's capability theory and the HDI
This sub-section of the chapter is organised as follows: first, I will briefly 
describe Amartya Sen’s capability theory, then I will explain the historical link 
between Sen’s capability theory and the human development project from which the 
HDI was developed. The third section explains what ‘relative necessities’ mean and 
why they are important in evaluating the well-being of individuals. The fourth section 
explains the limit in the ‘commodity-based approach to well-being’ (the more 
traditional method of evaluating well-being) in that the approach does not reveal the 
relative necessities of individuals. The fifth section shows that one of the strengths of 
capability theory is its ability to identify the relative necessities of individuals. The 
section also identifies some problems to be solved before capability theories can be 
put into a measurement of well-being. The final section examines how effective the 
sub-indexes of the HDI are in revealing the relative necessities of individuals.
3-1-1: Sen’s capability approach to evaluating well-being
Sen’s capability approach involves the identification of what Sen calls the 
‘functionings’ of individuals instead of characteristics of commodities, and the 
examination of people’s well-being by evaluating either people’s functionings 
themselves or people’s sets of functionings called their ‘capabilities.’ In this section I 
will explain functionings, commodities and capabilities and their relation to the 
concept of well-being.
In his book ‘Commodities and Capabilities’ Sen defines functionings and 
distinguishes these from commodities as follows:
A functioning is an achievement o f a person: what he or she 
manages to do or to be. It reflects, as it were, a part of the ‘state’ of 
that person. It has to be distinguished from the commodities which are 
used to achieve those functionings. For example, bicycling has to be
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distinguished from possessing a bike. It has to be distinguished also 
from the happiness generated by the functioning, for example, actually 
cycling around must not be identified with the pleasure obtained from 
that act. A functioning is thus different both from (1) having goods 
(and the corresponding characteristics), to which it is posterior, and
(2) having utility (in the form of happiness resulting from that 
functioning), to which it is, in an important way, prior.1
According to this definition, a functioning is a part of the state of a person.
Functionings are different from commodities because ‘functionings are features of the
state of existence of a person, and not detached objects that the person or the
household happens to “produce” or “own”.’ A functioning relates to commodities in
that a functioning is achieved by a person’s ability to make use of relevant
commodities: for example, the functioning ‘cycling’ is achieved by the combination
of a person’s ability to cycle and the availability of a bicycle. Because functionings
are states of existence of a person, functionings are also described by Sen as ‘doings
and bemgs.’ I will be referring to this expression often in the following discussion
because it is a simple and accurate characterisation of functionings.
The capabilities of a person, on the other hand, reflect ‘various combinations
of functionings (“beings”) he can achieve.’4 That is, a person’s capabilities reflect the
range of functionings that the person is able to perform or to be, for example, cycling,
swimming, reading, enjoying, being satisfied, etc. As Sen also put it, capabilities
reflect or represent ‘the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another.’5 By this
he means that a person is free to lead one type of life or another to the extent that his
capabilities (that is, his range of functionings) permit a range of possible doings or
beings.
1 Sen (1985), pp. 10-1, emphases added.
2 Sen (1985), p. 15.
3 Sen (1992).
4 Sen (1985), p. 14.
5 Sen (1992), p. 40.
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Sen found it useful to clarify the relationships between capabilities, 
functionings, commodities and their impact on people’ s choices using the following 
notations:6
Xi = the vector of commodities possessed by person i,
c( • ) = the function (not necessarily linear) converting a commodity vector 
into a vector of the range of characteristics of those commodities,
fi ( • ) = a personal ‘utilisation function’ of z, reflecting one pattern of use of 
the commodities that i can actually make in generating a functioning vector out of a 
characteristic vector of the commodities that i possesses, given V s personal features 
and z’s space and time location,
Fi = the set of ‘utilisation functions,’ fj, being any one that person i can choose. 
If person z has the utilisation function fj ( • ), then with his or her commodity 
vector Xj, person z’s achieved functionings will be given by the vector bj, as follows: 
bj = fj (c (xj)).
If Vi ( • ) is the valuation function of person z, then the value of the vector of 
functionings bi, is given by 
Vi = V| (fj (c (X j) ) ) .
According to the Sen, Vi (• ) can be person z’s valuation function using either a certain 
objective standard, or the subjective standard of the person himself. But the 
evaluation represented by Vi ( • )  is not the same as an evaluation based only on how 
happy the person is, regardless of whether happiness is assessed objectively or
6 The following notations and formulations of them are taken from Sen (1985), pp. 11-4.
7 Sen (1985).
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subjectively.8 Given that there is a set of utilisation functions available for a person 
(Fi), the functionings vectors feasible for the person for a given commodity vector Xi 
are given by the set Pi ( X j ) ,  as follows:
Pi (xj) = [ bj | bi = fi ( c (xO), for some f  i ( • )  e Fi ]
If the person’s choice of commodity vectors is restricted to set Xi, then the person’s 
feasible functioning vectors are given by the set Qi ( X j ) ,  as follows:
Qi ( X j )  = [ bj | bi = fj ( c (xj)), for some fi (• ) e Fj and
for some Xj e XJ.
If we want to express a person’s feasible functioning vectors in terms of the 
person’s ‘freedom of choice,’ then we can say that Qi (x j represents a person’s 
freedom of choice over functionings, given his personal features Fj (possible 
conversion of characteristics into functionings) and his access to commodities Xj. As 
noted above, ‘capabilities’ reflect a person’s freedom to choose from different types 
of life that are made possible by different combinations of doing and beings. Qi ( X i ) ,  
therefore, represents the ‘capabilities’ of person i given his personal features and his
8 Sen (1985) notes that ‘while ht ( • ) [the happiness function of person i that is related to the
functionings achieved by i ] is also a scalar-valued function , we should not fall into the trap of
assuming that the evaluation of how good h, is (i. e. how high the ‘well-being’ happens to be) must be 
given by the corresponding ut [which is an evaluation function of /*, ( • )  defined as h , = ht ( f (c  ( X j ) ) ] .  
The function ht just tells us how happy the person is with the functioning vector bi} and it does not tell 
us how good that way of living is, or even how good person i himself thinks it is. Whether or not
happiness is a plausible criterion of the goodness of a l i f e  , valuing a life and measuring the
happiness generated in that life are two different exercises.’ (12) According to Sen (1985), therefore, if 
v, is an objective valuation function, then two individuals with the same x, c ( •) and f (  ■) will have 
exactly die same v’s. If on the other hand, v,- is a subjective valuation function, then even two 
individuals with the same x, c( ■) and f (  • )  may have different v’s. Some individuals’ subjective 
valuation functions may have only one criterion of ‘happiness’, but this is by no means the only way 
individuals assess their own achieved functionings (6,‘s). Besides, how to measure happiness may 
differ from person to person, that is, different individuals may have different w’s. An objective standard 
of evaluating bt can in principle be happiness only, but for this to happen, the claim that the only 
criterion of the goodness of life is happiness must be accepted. If vf is a subjective evaluation function, 
and if we use it for the measurement of well-being, then necessities that are identified by the 
measurement are relative not only to personal features, space and time, but also to the view each person 
has about how to evaluate good in his or her own life. It is only when v, is an objective evaluation 
function and if we take the standard of evaluation as given (fixed or absolute) that necessities identified 
by v, are relative only to personal features, space and time.
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access to commodities; it reflects the range of functionings (doings and beings) the 
person can achieve.
Given the valuation function vj( • ), it is possible to characterise the values of 
functionings that the person can possibly achieve, given by the set Vi,
Vi = [ Vj | Vj = Vi (bj), for some bi in QJ.
A further important issue is how functionings and capabilities are related to a 
person’s well-being, since the latter is what we are ultimately interested in measuring. 
On this issue, Sen notes, reasonably, that ‘functionings are constitutive of a person’s 
being, and an evaluation of well-being has to take the form of an assessment of these 
constituent elements.’9 That is, these functionings are part of the person’s beings, so 
that if we want to evaluate the person’s well-being, we need to do so in terms of his 
range of functionings. Therefore, to evaluate a person’s actual well-being using the 
above notations, we should use the valuation function, Vj, that represents the valuation 
of person i ’ s  achieved functionings given his or her commodity vector X\ and personal 
features fj.
On the other hand, if we want to measure the person’s capability for achieving 
well-being, the appropriate measure is the valuation of a set of functionings that a 
person can possibly achieve, which is Vj in the above notation. By knowing the 
person’s capability set rather than only his actual use of certain functionings, we can 
distinguish, for example, whether the person is not eating for reasons other than a lack 
of food (for example, in order to fast) or just does not having anything to eat, when 
such a distinction is of direct interest. This is an advantage of the measurement of 
well-being using a capability set (V j) rather than achieved functionings (bi): the
9 Sen (1992), p. 39.
90
former allows us to evaluate whether or not there were alternatives available to the 
state the person actually achieves in the latter. The fact that the capability set is 
analytically superior does not of course, mean that it is always possible. Faced with 
the difficulty in practice in measuring the capability set, as Sen notes, ‘one might have 
to settle often enough for relating well-being to the achieved -  and observed -  
functionings, rather than trying to bring in the capability set.’10
3-1-2: A historical relationship
There is a clear historical relationship between the HDI and Amartya Sen’s
capability theory. As Meghnad Desai notes in an article on the HDI, ‘it is from this
twenty year old literature on inequality and poverty and especially the notion of
capabilities that the concept of human development traces one of its strongest roots.’11
The following examples from the Human Development Reports and the related
background papers reflect the strong link between Sen’s capability theory and the
concept of human development:
Human Development has two sides: the formation o f human 
capabilities -  such as improved health, knowledge and skills -  and the 
use people make o f their acquired capabilities -  for leisure, productive 
purposes or being active in cultural, social and political affairs.12
*  *  *
The three dimensions of the HDI relate to one or many capabilities 
that they are expected to capture. Thus, longevity captures the 
capability of leading a long and healthy life. Educational attainment 
captures the capability of acquiring knowledge, communicating and 
participating in the life of the community. Access to resources needed 
for a decent standard of living captures the capability of leading a 
healthy life, guaranteeing physical and social mobility, communicating
10 Ibid., p. 52.
11 Desai (1991), p. 352.
12 UNDP (1990), p. 10, emphases added.
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and participating in the life of the community (including 
consumption).13
*  *  *
Do they have the capability to live long? Can they avoid mortality 
during infancy and childhood? Can they escape preventable 
morbidity? Do they avoid illiteracy? Are they free from hunger and 
undernourishment? Do they enjoy personal liberty and freedom? These 
are the basic features of well-being which derive from looking at 
people as the centre of all development activity. Enhancing their 
capabilities to function in these elementary ways is what lies at the 
core o f human development,14
One can see a strong link between the capability approach and the human 
development concept in terms of the importance of freedom of choice. As detailed 
above, the HDI focuses on human development as a process of enlarging people’s 
choices. That is, a central idea behind the human development project is that the 
larger the opportunities to choose from, that is, the larger the degree of freedom of 
choice, the better. Similarly, capability approach naturally leads to evaluating 
people’s freedom of choice. As detailed above, the most significant aspect of the 
capability approach to well-being is that it does not focus on the amount of materials 
that individuals possess (but are not necessarily able to make use of), but the range of 
things individuals can actually do with those materials. As Sen puts it, the ‘capability 
to achieve functionings (i.e. all the alternative combinations of functionings a person 
can choose to have) will constitute the person’s freedom -  the real opportunities -  to 
have well-being.’15
13 UNDP (1993), p. 105, emphases added.
14 Anand and Sen (1992), quoted in UNDP (1993), p. 107, emphases added.
15 Sen (1992), p. 40.
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3-1-3: Relative aspects of well-being and absolute criteria for the measurement
One theoretical issue that arises in assessing well-being concerns the extent to 
which this assessment should be based upon relative or absolute measures of what is 
‘needed.’ As detailed below, I conclude that a proper examination of well-being 
requires assessment of both relative and absolute aspects of need. Specifically, I 
define measurements of well-being that successfully take into account ‘relative 
necessities’ of individuals as measures that are able to reveal how much an individual 
with particular personal characters who lives in a particular place and time needs in 
order to achieve a certain absolute standard of well-being.
Peter Townsend, who is a proponent of a relativistic view of poverty, claims 
as follows:
Any rigorous conceptualisation of the social determination of need 
dissolves the idea of ‘absolute’ need. And a thorough-going relativity 
applies to time as well as place. The necessities of life are not fixed.
They are continuously being adapted and augmented as changes take 
place in a society and in its products. Increasing stratification and a 
developing division of labour, as well as the growth of powerful new 
organisations, create, as well as reconstitute, ‘need’.16
Townsend’s comments emphasise that the ‘necessities of life’ change even for 
a person with given personal features because of changes in ‘society and in its 
products’ as well as changes in the person’s ‘place.’ This circumstance can be 
regarded as involving changes relative to time and space. However, Townsend does 
not address a different range of necessities that occur even where time and space are 
given. Specifically, necessities will also differ depending on whether the person is 
old/young, male/female, fit/disabled, etc. This latter kind of necessities I describe as 
relative to personal features. Accordingly, in order to evaluate the necessities of life 
we must consider them relative to time, space and to such personal features. In the
16 Townsend (1979), pp. 17-8, emphases added.
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following, I assume that when we talk about necessities of life being relative, they are 
relative with respect to time, place and personal features. Of course, a difficult 
question is which personal features to include as the basis for differentiating 
individuals. For example, if we take strength of the will as a relevant personal feature 
in judging people’s necessities, individuals with weaker will who suffer disadvantages 
caused by the weakness can be viewed as ‘needy,’ whereas if we do not include such 
a personal feature as relevant, those with weaker will not be so viewed. The 
discussion below involves some aspects of the problem regarding which personal 
features to include.
A further issue is whether this relativistic view is adequate to assess well­
being. I agree with Townsend that that there is a relative aspect to well-being, because 
people’s needs are relative to who they are and where and when they live. However, 
as I show below, a relativistic view on poverty is not incompatible with the 
recognition of an absolutist component. In fact, I believe that there must be added to 
this relativistic view on poverty some absolutist aspect in order properly and 
effectively to evaluate well-being. I believe this is required for two types of reasons. 
First, although there is a relative aspect to well-being, there is a point at which well­
being (or more precisely its lack) can be put in objective terms. Sen (1983) expresses 
this idea concerning poverty in explaining that there is ‘an irreducible absolutist core 
in the idea of poverty.’ That is, there are circumstances that are objectively so 
desperate that individuals suffer from starvation and malnutrition. Accordingly, even 
if all the individuals in a particular place and time experience these conditions (and so 
people are not ‘relatively’ poorly off), we can agree that they are in poverty. In this 
sense at least the notion of well-being cannot be seen in purely relativistic terms.
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A second reason for the need for some absolute considerations relating to 
measures of well-being pertains to the need to resolve competing claims for resources. 
We can see this need in the following example. Let us assume that two individuals 
from different regions of a country with different circumstances make the following 
claims of need to the national welfare officer:
1) A (with personal features F i , F2 and F3) in region R at time T needs X.
2) B (with personal features F’i, F ’2 and F’3) in region R’ at time T’ needs Y.
Let us also assume that the welfare officer wants to act so as to improve the
overall well-being in the country, but that the government does not have enough 
resources to satisfy both claims. In such circumstances, information given in the two 
sentences above is not enough to resolve which need will be satisfied, because it does 
not say why A needs X or why B needs Y, or how important it is that A gets X or that 
B gets Y.
So the two individuals add some information to their original claim to specify 
what they mean by ‘A needs X’ or ‘B needs Y.’ Their revised claims may look like 
the following:
1’) A (with personal features Fi , F2 and F3) in region R and time T needs X in 
order to H (or to enable A to H).
2’) B (with personal features F’i, F’2 and F’3) in region R’ and time T’ needs 
Y in order to I (or to enable B to I).
In order to decide which of the two individuals’ needs will most affect the 
overall well-being and thus should be satisfied from the public resources, the officer 
has to find a common ground for comparison between those claims. That is, the 
officer has (1) to identify the types of factors or outcomes that are important to well­
being -  for example, whether the considerations H and I in the above example are
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such factors -  and (2) to have some method of quantifying the results so that 
comparisons can be made over time, place and individual circumstances.
Therefore, if we want to make inter-personal comparisons of well-being over a 
number of people, even if we want to reveal necessities relative to space, time and 
personal features, we need reference points for comparison; we need to find widely 
acceptable ideas about the ‘needs’ that relate to improvements in well-being for 
individuals regardless of where and when they live and what are their personal 
characters. This is the second area in which relative necessities are related to absolute 
criteria for well-being.
3-1-4: The commodity-based approach and its limit
In this section I will explain why one of the most commonly used approaches 
to the evaluation of well-being across individuals -  the ‘commodity-based approach’ 
-  does not meet the requirement stated above that account be taken of relative aspects 
of well-being.
The commodity-based approach evaluates the well-being of individuals in 
terms of the commodities to which they have access. Under the commodity-based 
approach, commodities are seen in terms of their characteristics, that is, the various 
desirable properties each commodity has.17 For example, a certain amount of food is 
seen as giving the owner access to the properties or benefits of the food, including 
preventing him from starving, yielding nutrition, creating pleasure, and providing 
opportunities to socialise with others. One version of the commodity-based approach, 
for example, is the ‘basic needs approach’ used by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), which evaluates whether or not a particular society provides basic
17 Sen (1985), p.9.
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needs defined in terms of certain levels of commodities. Broadly speaking, indices 
based on income figures are also versions of the commodity-based approach, 
assuming that income is a proxy for how many commodities the income can buy.
A commodity-based approach to the measurement of well-being falls short of 
meeting the condition required for the type of measurement we are seeking: a 
measurement that reveals necessities that are relative, and that can be used for inter­
personal comparisons of individuals or inter-country comparisons of countries. Under 
a commodity-based approach, for example, individuals are regarded as equally well- 
off, regardless of their differences, as long as they have the same amount of 
commodities. However, this result is too simplistic. For instance, a certain amount and
4
type of food may be enough to prevent a healthy adult from starving, but the same 
amount and type may not be adequate if the person has a deficiency in his digestive 
mechanisms, as may occur, for example, in many developing countries. Similarly, that 
a person possesses a pair of trousers and a T-shirt may be enough for us to know that 
he can be protected from the weather and can socialise with others without shame if 
he is a missionary in a South American forest, but not if the person is a banker who 
works in the City. More broadly, a commodity-based approach may show that two 
countries have the same GDP, but this may be very misleading if, for example, one of 
the countries is in a very temperate climate where few resources are necessary to 
provide heat and protection from the elements, but another country is in a very harsh 
climate where substantial resources are needed just to provide these circumstances.
Thus, for a measurement of well-being to be effective, it must be able to 
capture differences in the use individuals can make of commodities that result from 
differences in time, space and personal characters. In order for the measurement to do 
so, it has to shift its attention from commodities to the relationship between
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commodities and individuals, or more specifically, to individuals’ achievements in 
making use of commodities in ways that enable the individuals to satisfy a certain 
standard of well-being.
3-1-5: The capability approach and its ability to reveal relative necessities of 
individuals
Now I will explain why the evaluation of functionings and capabilities is able 
to reveal relative necessities. As the earlier description of the capability approach 
shows, functionings reflect what a person is able to do with commodities, and 
capabilities represent the aggregate of such functionings. Because functionings are 
part of a person’s being and some of them constitute his well-being, if we focus on 
those (well-being) functionings, we can identify and measure differences among 
individuals in their ability to turn commodities into things that constitute a part of
•  • 151their well-being. What use a person can make of commodities to achieve such 
functionings depends on his personal features as well as his particular environment. 
Therefore, if a person’s well-being is evaluated in terms of the person’s set of 
functionings, the evaluation will take into account differences in individuals’ personal 
features and other relevant differences. For example, a person who is less capable of 
making use of a given set of commodities because of his particular personal features 
would be identified as having lower well-being than those who are more capable. The 
use of functionings or a capability set therefore captures differences in well-being that 
are relative to personal features and the surrounding environment, differences that the 
commodity-based approach to well-being does not reveal.
18 As I noted above, the core idea of Sen’s capability approach to well-being is that we should focus on 
the evaluation of individuals’ functionings rather than their access to commodities, because the former 
is capable of identifying relative necessities that the commodity-based approach cannot.
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3-1-5-1: Problems in implementing the capability approach to the measurement o f
well-being
I find that capability theory itself does not provide answers for the following 
problems that must be solved before the measurement of well-being in terms of 
functionings (or sets of them which are capabilities to function) can be practically 
applied:
(1) Functionings include not only those associated with well-being but 
also those associated with ill-being, and for some functionings it is not 
clear to which category they belong;
(2) There are many different states that could be considered as states of 
well-being, so a choice has to be made about which functionings to use 
to evaluate well-being;
(3) Depending on what to regard as a reason for a person’s not achieving a 
certain functioning, there are many different necessities that can be 
revealed, and a decision has to be made about how far ‘back’ to go in 
searching for the reason;
(4) The choice of functionings implicitly determine whose relative 
necessities to take into account and whose not to;
(5) There are problems in making interpersonal comparisons of well­
being; and
(6) There is a need to aggregate different functionings when we want to 
measure overall levels of well-being.
I will explain each problem in turn.
Problem (1): As detailed above, the functionings that underlie the capability 
approach are constitutive of being and include a range of possible actions or beings,
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such as eating, seeing, thinking, moving, breathing, being depressed, having a pain, 
and worrying. Because they are constitutive of being, functionings include not only 
those associated with well-being but also those associated with ill-being, such as the 
last three functionings in the previous sentence. In order to evaluate the well-being of 
individuals, however, we need to use only those functionings that are constitutive of 
well-being rather than ill-being, or we need to include negative weights to the latter 
(that is, for example, to consider someone better off if a functioning of ill-being, such 
as worrying, declines). Either way, we need a clear distinction between the two types 
of functionings. However, some functionings are not clearly related to well-being or 
ill-being. For example, the functioning ‘working’ can be related to well-being or/and 
to ill-being. One way to deal with this problem is to summarise functionings into 
more general ones that are either well-being or ill-being, such as ‘being productive,’ 
rather than ‘working.’
Problem (2): This problem involves the fact that there is potentially a very 
large number of functionings defined by the capability approach that could be said to 
constitute states of well-being. However, obviously we need to identify a finite 
number of functionings in order practically to use them to measure well-being. This 
second problem has two aspects. Firstly, we want a finite number of functionings to 
cover broad aspects of well-being, and secondly we have to decide which aspects of 
well-being to take into account and which ones to leave out. The answer to the first 
aspect of the problem is similar to that for Problem (1). Specifically, to be practical, 
the measure of well-being should include functionings that are general rather than 
specific, such as ‘being fit’ rather than the aggregation of functionings such as 
‘running for 3 km,’ ‘walking for 30 minutes,’ ‘lifting a 10 kg object,’ etc. The second 
aspect of the problem has to be solved by a particular index-maker’s decision based
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on some criteria, such as the UNDP’s decision to use the three dimensions for the 
measurement of human development based on the consideration of universality or 
Fukuda’s decision to use the five areas of life based on statistical results.
Problem (3): When we recognise the need to identify necessities as relative to 
time, space and personal features of individuals in the capability approach, we 
confront the issue of how detailed we can be in recognising such relative features. 
One particular issue is how far back in a logical progression of such personal features 
or circumstances we should proceed. For example, consider the progression of 
circumstances that could reflect an individual’s achieving the functioning ‘taking 
minimum calories for relevant age and sex.’ A particular individual may not be able 
to achieve this functioning, first, because of a lack of sufficient income to purchase 
food, but this lack could be not because the family’s aggregate income is insufficient 
but rather because of a second reason, for example, that a family member spends most 
of the disposable income for drinking; this family member may have started to drink 
excessively because he was fired from his job, a third reason; he may have been fired 
from his job because — , and so on. Alternatively, a person may not get the minimum 
intake of calories because he cannot get to town to buy food; he cannot get to town for
grocery shopping because he has a problem with his legs; he is disabled because ,
and so on.
What is the problem in having many possible reasons why individuals could 
fail to achieve a certain functioning? The problem is that we have to decide which 
circumstances to use to reveal the individuals’ relative necessities. Using the first 
example discussed above, the individual’s relative necessities could be additional 
income to buy him enough food, if we take only the first reason; the relative 
necessities would be solving the family member’s drinking problem if we take the
101
second reason; and it would be for the family member to find a new job if we take the 
third reason. In assessing individuals’ relative necessities, we need to decide at which 
level to focus and how far back to go in looking for the individual’s circumstances. 
Without some narrowing of the ‘relativist’ considerations, it would be impossible to 
construct a measure of well-being that could be meaningfully applied on an aggregate 
basis, for example, to decide on the allocation of scarce resources. We need an 
independent criterion for this narrowing of relativist considerations.
Problem (4): The fourth problem is that because different functionings are 
sensitive to different information on relative necessities, a decision to use a particular 
functioning rather than another for inter-personal comparisons of well-being 
implicitly involves a decision about whose necessities to take into account and whose 
not. To use the previous example, the functioning ‘taking minimum calories for 
relevant age and sex’ distinguishes people who do not have income to buy food that 
provides the minimum calories or do not have access to such food for various reasons 
(such as children of mothers who do not have the knowledge about the minimum 
calories necessary for children), from those who can buy or have access to such food. 
However, this functioning -  ‘taking minimum calories for relevant age and sex’ -  
does not distinguish those who have problems with their digestion mechanisms from 
those who do not have such problems in determining whether both have an equal 
amount of energy. In other words, the functioning ‘taking minimum calories for 
relevant age and sex’ does not reveal the relative necessities of individuals who have 
digestion problems and therefore need more than the standard minimum for their age 
and sex in order to obtain equal energy. Therefore, by using the functioning ‘taking 
minimum calories for relevant age and sex’ as an indicator for health, the evaluation 
is implicitly ignoring the relative necessities of those who have digestive problems.
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One solution to this problem would be to use broader functionings such as 
‘being healthy.’ This broader functioning differentiates not only those who have 
digestion problems from those who do not, but also other characteristics of 
individuals and the environments in which they live. For example, the functioning 
differentiates those who have access to clean water from those who do not if the 
former suffer from illness because of bad quality water; or those who are exposed to 
air pollution from those who are not if the former contract diseases because of the 
polluted air. ‘Being healthy’ distinguishes people who are healthy from those who are 
not healthy for all sorts of reasons.
There are, however, possible problems in using such broad descriptions. One 
such problem is that such descriptions may ignore circumstances in which the 
societies under consideration may regard the individual as responsible. For example, a 
society may consider the individual responsible for lung cancer caused by heavy 
smoking, or for heart-related disease caused by consuming excessive alcohol. The fact 
that ‘being healthy’ distinguishes unhealthy from healthy people no matter what the 
reasons behind the ill-health implies the following: if the functioning is used to 
evaluate the well-being of individuals, it identifies needs for them to be healthy 
regardless of who is responsible for the individual’s states of well-being (or ill-being).
A second difficulty with a broad description of functioning is the difficulty of 
measurement, since there often are no adequate ways to quantify such broadly defined 
functionings. In the case of ‘being healthy,’ for instance, it would be hard to obtain an 
‘objective’ measure for it. Accordingly, it may be necessary for index-makers to 
sacrifice analytic completeness in taking into account relative necessities in order to 
obtain practical results. For example, it may be necessary to use a measure such as the
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‘availability of minimum calories for relevant age and sex’ and ignore those with 
digestive problems, at least in cases where these problems are not widespread.
Problem (5): The fifth problem is related to interpersonal comparisons of 
well-being. One way of comparing between well-being of different individuals using 
functionings is to use the function Q, using the above notion by Sen. The function Q 
represents a set of a person’s feasible functioning vectors. The function Q can be 
useful in the limited case where one individual has the same functionings (or 
capability sets) as another, plus other functionings that the latter individual does not 
have. That is, either QA (xA) <= QB (xB) or QB (xB) cz QA (xA). In the former case, we 
may say that A is better-off than B, and in the latter case we may say that B is better- 
off than B. Thus, if we were looking at two individuals whose functionings consist of 
only having access to museums and exhibitions and to sports facilities, if individual A 
gains access to libraries, then we may say that individual A is better-off than 
individual B.
Even in this simplified case, however, we may not be justified in concluding 
that individual A is better-off than individual B. This conclusion assumes that if an 
individual has the same set of functionings as another individual plus additional 
functionings, the former is better off than the latter, regardless o f his aims and goals 
in life. But this assumption may not always be appropriate, for example in a case 
where A has all the functionings that B does plus more, but A’s functionings are all 
exercise oriented and A wants to write a history book. In this case, we may not want 
to conclude that A is better-off than B only because A has a larger set of functionings 
than B. We need to consider not only the number of functionings available, but their 
value to the individual, and for this, again, we need to look into the function V.
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A more general aspect of this problem involves the fact that it will not often 
happen that individuals will have completely overlapping capability sets of 
functionings. In most cases the capability set of functioning for one person (person A) 
will be different from another person’s (person B), and A’s set of functionings will not 
include 2?’s set of functionings, or vice versa. (That is, neither Qa ( x a )  <2 Qb ( x b )  nor 
Qb ( x b )  <2 Qa ( x a ) . )  In this case we cannot make interpersonal comparison of well­
being unless we know, using Sen’s notation, whether Qa ( x a )  -  [Qa ( x a )  3 Qb ( x b ) ]  is 
more valuable than Qb ( x b )  -  [Qa ( x a )  3 Qb ( x b ) ] .  In order to make this type of 
comparison, it becomes necessary to attach relative values to different functionings. 
To use Sen’s notation again, we need to be able to determine the Vi function for 
individual i.
As we see below, interpersonal comparison of well-being is a problem that we 
always have to confront when deciding the function V, which allows for the 
comparison between Vj(Fj) and Vj(Fj). The problem involves another area where there 
is a difficulty in including comprehensive information about the differentiating 
characteristics of individuals, specifically the individuals’ different goals and desires. 
In this case the difficulty involves the fact that the functionings that are the basis of 
capability theory might be very differently valued by different people, depending 
upon their aims in life.
If, for example, the function V is determined by letting each individual 
evaluate his set of functionings, the problem of interpersonal comparisons involves 
the appropriateness of the assumption that the subjective evaluation of functionings 
are comparable across individuals. If, alternatively, the function V is determined by a 
particular index-maker assigning the relative importance of each feasible functioning 
of each individual, the interpersonal comparison problem involves the index-maker’s
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ability (or the belief in his ability) to determine those importance factors. Another 
type of V, of which the HDI is an example, uses a particular set of functionings with a 
particular relative weight assigned to each. The interpersonal comparison problem 
concerning this type of function V is that each functioning might be in fact very 
differently valued by different people, depending upon their aim in life, and still 
specific weights for a specific set of functionings have to be chosen. For example, 
consider the functionings of having access to museums and exhibitions on the one 
hand and having access to a sports facility on the other. The former would be very 
highly valued by those who want to become artists while the latter would be highly 
valued by those who want to become athletes.
Problem (6): The final problem in practically applying capability theory 
concerns the interest in obtaining an aggregate, overall index of well-being using the 
set of functionings. The problem is that the capability approach itself does not 
determine how to combine different functionings to make such an overall evaluation 
of capabilities. The theory does not determine which type of composite measurement 
to use, for example, whether to make this composite measure using a product of the 
functionings or an aggregation of them. Nor does it say anything about the relative 
weights to assign to the functionings under consideration. Here again using Sen’s 
notation, this is another aspect of the difficulty of determining the Vj function for 
individual i .19
19 Sen is aware of the fact that in order to use functionings and capabilities for measurement, in practice 
we must face the problem of selecting and weighting them. He says, ‘there is no escape from the 
problem of evaluation in selecting a class of functionings -  and in the corresponding description of 
capabilities. The focus has to be related to the underlying concerns and values, in terms of which some 
definable functionings may be important and others quite trivial and negligible.’ (Sen 1992, p. 44) 
Much of the discussion in the rest of the chapter is concerned with the reasons for choosing one type of 
functionings rather than another, and the effects of doing so.
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Let me now summarise the conclusions from the foregoing considerations of 
various problems in practically measuring well-being by reference to the functionings 
in the capability sets: Firstly, in order to evaluate the well-being of individuals, we 
need to use descriptions of functionings that are general enough to be states of clearly 
well-being, not ill-being. Secondly, because there is a large number of states that can 
be regarded as states of well-being, we have to decide which of them to include in our 
measurement of well-being, a process that also encourages the use of general 
functionings. Thirdly, because of practical concerns, we have to make a number of 
choices in determining how much to take into account different individuals' relative 
necessities. Thus, we cannot consider all the background circumstances that may have 
affected an individual’s functionings (for example, a drinking family member as 
discussed in problem 3), nor can we take into account all circumstances that affect 
these functionings (for example, an individual’s digestive disorder as discussed in 
problem 4), or an individual’s different goals and values (for example, an individual’s 
desire to be an artist as discussed in problem 5). In deciding which functionings to use 
for the measurement of well-being, thus we must implicitly make decisions on which 
relative necessities to recognise and which to leave out of consideration. Finally, in 
order to apply the capability theory to measure well-being, we also have to decide 
upon a method to obtain an overall level of well-being.
3-1-5-2: Problems in implementing a commodity-based approach to the measurement 
o f well-being
The previous section discussed the limits of a capability-based approach to the 
measurement of well-being. As detailed below, some, if not all of those problems also 
apply to a commodity-based approach, particularly such an approach based on the use
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of individual commodities rather than an aggregate commodity measure such as the 
GDP.
The first problem relates to some functionings involving ill-being rather than 
or in addition to well-being. Under a commodity-based approach, an analogous 
problem arises because some commodities may directly or indirectly produce ill- 
effects. For example, having access to electricity may be a very important aspect of 
well-being, but the production of increased electricity may produce more pollution, 
which in turn produces ill-being in terms of increased health problems, etc. Similarly, 
having access to more housing may result in deforestation that will have negative 
consequences in term of the individual’s well-being. More directly, production of 
weapons may on the one hand provide some measure of protection and security and 
increase the GDP, but may also facilitate or encourage crime and violence, so that an 
economy producing more weapons -  and thus increasing the production of 
‘commodities’ -  may be worse-off. A commodity-based approach to calculating well­
being must accommodate or at least be affected by these types of considerations.
The second problem involves the large number of functionings that may relate 
to well-being. This type of problem would also exist in a commodity-based approach 
using individual commodities, since there is, of course, a large number of different 
commodities that may be included in an index. This is not such a direct problem for 
an aggregate commodity-based approach such as one using GDP, at least for a static 
measure. In order to obtain comparable results over time, however, it is necessary to 
adjust for inflation, and here these is a problem in selecting particular commodities to 
include in a ‘basket of commodities’ to measure the inflation rate, comparable to the 
problem of identifying a limited number of functionings to measure well-being.
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The third and fourth problems noted above involve the issue of how far ‘back’ 
to go or how many individual circumstances to take into account in determining the 
relevant capabilities. There does not seem to be a similar problem under a 
commodity-based approach to well-being. That is, in this latter approach, the 
commodities -  either individually or in the aggregate -  are by definition, the 
measurement of well-being, and the issue does not arise of whether and how the 
commodities can be used by individuals. (As noted above, however, this is a basic 
reason for concluding that commodity-based approaches are inadequate measures of 
well-being.)
The fifth problem involves the different goals and desires that individuals may 
have. This problem also exists in a commodity-based approach involving the use of 
individual commodities, since different commodities may be important to different 
individuals, and the selection of the commodities can be significant in determining the 
actual well-being measured by the commodity-based index. At an aggregate level, 
that is, if we use the income measure for the inter-personal comparison of well-being, 
the problem relates to the assumption that individuals can be equally well-off with the 
equal level of income, regardless of different values and goals in life. Using an 
example noted above, if both the artist and the athlete have the same income, they will 
be considered equally well-off under the income measure, even if, for example, using 
sports facilities in general is more expensive than going to art museums.
Finally, the sixth problem involves the difficulty of combining different 
functionings into an aggregate measure. This is not a problem for commodity-based 
approaches, which can rely on the market to value the commodities either individually 
or in the aggregate.
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3-1 -5-3: The HDI and the practical problems
Capability theory itself does not give solutions to the problems discussed 
above. We need criteria outside the theory in order to select and attach values to sets 
of functionings that measure the well-being of individuals in ways that reveal relative 
necessities. An analogous point was made in Boumans (1997), where he claimed that 
successful models are the ones that combine various ‘ingredients’ -  including 
theoretical notions, mathematical concepts or techniques, stylised fact, empirical data, 
policy views, analogies and metaphors -  in such a way that the model meets some 
criteria. These criteria are not only theoretical, but could be mathematical, statistical 
or related to usefulness in policy-making.
Let me consider how the HDI deals with the six problems discussed above, 
specifically, what are the criteria outside the theory used to resolve those problems 
and what are the answers provided.
Concerning problem (1), the outside criterion used to resolve the problem is 
the criterion of universality. As detailed above, this is a part of the purpose-dependent 
criteria for the HDI, requiring that the index use only very general dimensions of 
human development, specifically, to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire 
knowledge, and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. 
These three dimensions are general enough to be clearly regarded by all the member 
countries of the UN as a part of well-being that relates to human development and not 
to ill-being.
Regarding problem (2), the criterion of policy usefulness, which is another 
purpose-dependent criterion for the HDI, provided a solution to the problem of a large 
number of potential functionings. The criterion of policy usefulness required the index
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to have a limited number of dimensions, and thus only three general dimensions are 
chosen to cover a broad aspect of human development.
Problem (3) is the problem of how far ‘back’ to search for the reasons for not 
achieving a particular state of well-being. The HDI deals with this problem by use of 
the three basic indicators that do not really address the reasons why individuals 
achieve a particular level of well-being. Accordingly, under the HDI, this is a problem 
for the index-users (such as international organisations, national or local government) 
rather than a problem for the index-maker.
Problem (4) involves the need to decide whose relative necessities to take into 
account. For the HDI the purpose-dependent criteria determined the three dimensions 
of the HDI, so that, for example, a dimension related to political and civil rights was 
not included because it was not universally acceptable. As a result, relative necessities 
of those who do not have the right to vote are not revealed in the HDI results.
Regarding problem (6) concerning the development of an aggregate measure, 
the previous chapter showed that in order for the HDI to be comparable across 
nations, which is one of the purpose-dependent criteria for the index, the HDI must be 
a composite one. As detailed below, the particular relative weights assigned to the 
three dimensions of the HDI and the particular method of aggregation are determined 
partly based on statistical criterion and partly on the idea that those dimensions are 
‘equally important’ for human development. However, as I show in the following 
chapter, the latter reason is misleading because equal weights (based on the idea of 
equal importance) are assigned after normalising the three different units of 
measurement for the different dimensions, and therefore, they are not actually 
weighted equally. As I will argue, a particular assignment of relative weights by the 
Report does not ‘solve’ the interpersonal comparison problem. Rather, the way
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relative weights are assigned determines the conditions under which the index is 
supposed to be used.
3-1-6: Capability approach, relative aspects of well-being and the HDI
In this section, I will examine the link between the concept of human 
development and capability theory from a point of view that is not directly discussed 
in the Human Development Report nor in its background papers: I will examine the 
HDI with respect to its ability to identify the relative necessities of individuals. I find 
such a theoretical criterion is useful in testing the HDI because of the measurement 
project’s close connection to the capability approach to well-being developed by Sen. 
As I have claimed in chapter one, how important theories are in constructing an index 
and in what way they are important depends on the motivation of a particular 
measurement project. The following sections investigate the HDI with respect to the 
following questions: l)what are the functionings or capabilities measured by the 
selected data? and 2) what are the relative aspects of well-being identified by the 
data?
3-1 -6-1: Life expectancy at birth
The Human Development Report’s definition of life expectancy at birth used 
in the HDI is ‘the number of years a new-bom infant would live if prevailing patterns 
of mortality at the time of birth were to stay the same throughout the child’s life.’20 
The life expectancy figure is derived from a model that defines a relationship between 
the following variables: mortality rates (q); the number of persons living at the 
beginning of an age interval (1); the number of person-years (number of persons
20 See UNDP (1998), p. 219.
112
multiplied by years) that would be lived within an age interval (for example of five
years) by the cohort of 100,000 infants who are assumed to be bom on the same day
(L); and the total number of person-years that would be lived after the beginning of an
age interval by the cohort of 100,000 infants who are assumed to be bom on the same
day (T). All of these variables are derived from observed age-specific death rates (m).
Therefore, these age-specific death rates are the only empirical data on which the life
expectancy figure is based. There are several versions of models from which life
expectancy is derived, but the basic theory behind the models that are most frequently
used is that life expectancy can be defined as the number of years lived by a
hypothetical group of infants bom on the same day, whose number reduces each year
only in accordance with a set of age-specific death rates that are assumed to be fixed
0 1at the values of the starting year. Since these life expectancy figures use the past 
age-specific death rates, they therefore are affected by the upbringings of the past.
Moreover, according to Lucas, the relationship between the age-specific death 
rates and the overall life expectancy used in the HDI (HDI life expectancy, for short) 
suggests that a population with a higher HDI life expectancy generally has lower 
death rates throughout the lower age bands.22 The result is appealing because it
suggests that the HDI life expectancy measure ‘can be seen as an indicator of the
chance that the members of a population have of surviving to what would commonly 
be called a “reasonable age”.’23 This measure also correlates highly with the quantity 
and quality of the provision of goods and services such as nutrition, sanitation, health
21 See, for example, Shryock et al. (ed.) (1976), chapter 15, and Lucas (1985), pp. 15-6. See Appendix 
1 for an example of a model to derive life expectancy.
22 Ibid.
23 Lucas (1985), p. 75.
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care and education.24 These relationships imply that if the figure is used as a policy 
objective, it will encourage governments to improve the provision of those goods both 
in terms of their quantities and qualities.
The brief description of how life expectancy is derived for the HDI shows that
1) it measures the expected duration of life of a population assuming that a set of age- 
specific death rates remain constant for each cohort, whereas in fact, such rates are 
known to be constantly changing;25 2) it is an expected duration of life of a cohort of 
infants who are assumed to be bom on the same day with the identical capacity to 
survive (i.e. empirically collected age-specific death rates are assumed to be the only 
cause for the number of the cohort to decrease as time goes by); and 3) it is derived 
from a set of age-specific death rates of a population that existed (or ceased to exist) 
between time t-a and t and therefore is a demography of that particular population.
Bearing this definition of life expectancy in mind, we can state using the 
capability approach that the indicator measures the capability to achieve a functioning 
‘surviving for a certain duration as a member of a population that exists between time 
t-a and t where a  is a time interval, assuming that the age-specific death rates of the 
population remain constant and that the population can be represented by a cohort.’
3-1-6-1-1: Comparison to other alternatives
Before discussing the relative necessities revealed by life expectancy at birth, I 
will first discuss the reasons why life expectancy at birth is more appropriate as a
24 There may be some delays for this relationship to be observed.
25 See Lucas (1985), p. 74. This is why Lucas claims that ‘to some degree it [the life expectancy 
indicator] is perhaps best seen as a model not of the real world, but of the concept of mortality.’ (Lucas 
1985, p. 16)
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measure of the capability to live a long and healthy life than other possible 
alternatives.
Before turning to these comparisons, let me consider the possible objection to 
using life expectancy at birth that the assumption that age-specific mortality rates 
remain constant is an obviously false assumption about a mortality performance of a 
population under consideration. However, this by itself does not seem a valid 
objection. Every estimate is calculated by assuming certain patterns or regularities in 
the population of interests. Assumptions about the stability in the pattern of behaviour 
or phenomenon, which are not true in reality, may be used when we do not know 
better ways to make the assumption closer to reality. In this case, we know that age- 
specific death rates change constantly, but we do not know what the patterns are for 
the change or whether they are completely random. In such a case, we may reasonably 
assume that the age-specific death rates based on data from a particular time-period 
will apply continuously over time even if we know that this assumption is not an 
accurate description of reality, simply because we are aware of no better alternative. 
To criticise an approach only because it uses assumptions that are not accurate 
descriptions of reality is not constructive. Instead, we should examine whether the 
assumption and the model used for life expectancy at birth are good ones for deriving 
an estimated value of longevity, and whether that particular value is appropriate for 
the project of measuring human development. To do so, I will review what 
alternatives are available to estimate longevity, what are the differences between them 
and life expectancy at birth, and what are the reasons to prefer the latter. Specifically, 
for these purposes I will examine the following three indicators of the average number
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of years a person in a given population lives and compare them with life expectancy at 
birth (LEO) used in the HDI.26
(1) Life expectancy indicator 1 (LEI): This is a measure based upon the 
historical average life span.
(2) Life expectancy indicator 2 (LE2): This indicator uses the crude death 
rate based upon the number of deaths in a year per 1,000 of the 
midyear population.
(3) Estimation of potential lifetime (EPL): This measure uses an average 
of each person’s conditional life span expectation based on various 
personal characteristics such as age, class, region of residence and 
race.
The difference between the LEI and LEO is that in the former we obtain a real 
historical average life span, while the latter assumes that a set of age-specific death 
rates remain constant for a hypothetical group of infants bom on the same day and 
derives a projected average life span. As we see from the way LEO is calculated as 
shown in Appendix 1, LEO is a summary measure of age-specific death rates based 
upon age intervals, normally between one and ten years. Because of the way in which 
LEO is obtained, the measure is responsive to the improvement of mortality of 
particular age groups. Accordingly, the LEO is useful in evaluating the success of 
policies targeting health conditions relevant to a particular age group. For example, 
improved medical care for new bom babies will immediately be reflected in the LEO 
through changes in the mortality rates of the age group of new bom babies. By 
contrast, since the LEI uses historical data on average life span, the LEI cannot
26 The following discussions are heavily influenced by Lucas (1985), but unless indicated, I developed 
the actual arguments.
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reflect such a change in the short to middle term. That is, under the LEI the results of 
policies to improve health conditions will be reflected in an improvement in life span 
only after those who benefited from the policy prove to have lived longer than the 
previous average. If for example, health policy was targeted toward new bom babies, 
the full magnitude of the effect of this policy on the population’s life span would be 
seen only after all of the babies affected complete their lives. Accordingly, it could 
take 60 years or more to see the full result of the new policy.
There is another significant difference between LEO and LEI, that is, the 
extent to which a target level of longevity is implicit in the measurement. As we can 
see from Appendix 1, LEO is calculated as a summation of the proportion of those 
bom in the same year who die between each age interval. It may be said to be implicit 
in this calculation method that the optimum state is where all the cohort bom in the 
same year are alive at an age interval, that is, where the age-specific death rate is zero, 
at least for age intervals below some age at which basic biological morbidity may 
affect the death rates. Put another way, since a higher measure under LEO results as 
the age specific death rates for the age intervals decline, it is implicit in the use of this 
measure that the optimum state exists for a particular age interval when the death rate
• 97is zero. This could also be seen to imply a normative idea that LEO measures the 
degree to which a society’s circumstances allow its members to attain what has be 
described as an essential right -  the right to live as long as biologically possible.28 On 
the other hand, LEI, which is an estimated longevity based on how many years people 
in the past have managed to live, does not reflect any target level of longevity.
27 This implicit assumption is that all individuals within an age interval could survive, that is, that the 
age-specific death rate can be zero. This assumption may, of course, not be met in many cases, for 
example, because of death from accidents or diseases that cannot be prevented.
28 See Lucas (1985), pp. 74-5 and Herrera (1976).
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As noted, LE2 uses the crude death rate based upon the number of deaths per 
year per 1,000 of the midyear population. The difference between LE2 and LEO is that 
the former is not appropriate for a comparison over populations that have different 
age structures. This is because a population which has a relatively higher proportion 
of old people will normally have a higher crude death rate compared to another 
population which has a relatively lower proportion of old people. Evaluations of 
longevity based on crude death rates could be controversial because a population with 
a relatively higher proportion of old people, only because of this characteristic, could 
be ranked lower than another population with a lower proportion of the old. This 
lower ranking could result even if the former population has uniformly lower age-
70specific death rates compared to the latter. LEO, which is derived from age-specific 
death rates, does not suffer from this deficiency, and therefore is more suitable for 
comparison over populations that are known to have different age structures.
Finally, the estimation o f potential lifetime {EPL) is an indicator suggested by 
Desai as an alternative to LEO for measuring the capability to lead a long and healthy
3 0life. EPL specifically measures the difference between a person’s age today and the 
person’s expected length of life given his/her personal characteristics and other 
social/economic variables such as age, class, region of residence and race. Since life 
expectancy is conditional on age more than any other single characteristic, EPL is 
defined as the difference between the current age and the conditional life expectancy 
(in years), which in turn is defined as the reverse of age specific mortality. 
Mathematically, the EPL of the jth person of age i can be described as follows:
EPL] = (L*ij -  Lij) (1)
29 See Lucas (1985), p. 16.
30 Desai (1989).
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In this formulation L*ij is the life expectancy of the jth individual of current 
age i and Lij is the age of the jth individual of current age i. Under the EPL, L*i varies 
depending on the characteristics of the jth individual other than his/her current age. 
Specifically:
L*ij = L*i + Y (Zij) (2)
In this formulation L*i is the average life expectancy of persons of age i, Zj is 
the vector of characteristics of the jth individual, and Y (Zij) is the individual-specific 
conditional life expectancy. In order to simplify matters, Y (Zij) is assumed to have a 
zero conditional as well as unconditional mean.
EPL has the advantage of taking into consideration the effects that certain 
personal characteristics are likely to have on an individual’s life-span, rather than 
focusing only on what is essentially a combined effect of all sorts of causes, i.e., the 
overall death rates by age categories used in the LEO.
The method EPL uses in deriving an individual’s capability to lead a long and 
healthy life is also in line with capability theory. EPL shows the expected years of life 
given the personal characteristics Zj. In other words, EPL tells us the average number 
of years people who live under conditions Zj can be expected to live, consistent with 
the type of measures relative to individual characters that we require in capability 
measures.
There are, however, disadvantages in the EPL methodology. For example, 
EPLs calculated for entire populations favour countries with growing populations 
over those with relatively static populations. Let me explain why. Using equations (1) 
and (2) above, the aggregate level of EPL (EPL) is calculated as follows:
EPL = Z S  (L*ij -  Lij)
= P (L* - L)
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where L is the average age of the population, that is, EE Lij = PL, and L* is 
the overall average life expectancy of the population, i.e., PL* = EE L*ij. 
Alternatively, EPL can be expressed as a function of population (P), average life 
expectancy (L*) and the ‘age gap,’ which is defined as the difference between the 
overall life expectancy of a nation (L*) and the average age of the population (L) 
relative to L*. That is,
EPL = P • L* • T 
Where T = (L*-L)/L*
Under a given level of age-specific mortality rates in two countries, the 
average age of a population (L) will decrease in a growing population compared to a 
population that is static or declining. (That is, as the number of births increases in the 
country with a growing population, the average age of the population will decline 
more rapidly than in a country with a lower birth rate.) This makes both L*-L and the 
‘age gap’ (T) higher in a growing population compared to a static or declining one. 
For this reason the aggregate EPL will favour countries with growing populations 
compared to those with static populations. The Human Development Report cites this 
‘natalist’ bias as a reason for not opting for the EPL in the HDI used for international 
comparisons.31
In sum, an analysis of the use of the LEO -  that is, the life expectancy at birth 
-  compared to the three alternatives confirms that LEO has the following benefits:
1) it is useful for policy evaluations in the short to medium term;
31 See UNDP (1993), p. 105.
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2) it provides a measure against an implicit standard where the optimum 
state exists where individuals live as long as biologically possible, 
arguably an essential right;
3) it enables comparisons over populations with different age-structures;
4) it emphasises improvement in the population’s chance of surviving to a 
reasonable age; and
5) it does not have a ‘natalist’ bias by favouring countries with a growing 
population.
Point 3) definitely fits into the purpose of the HDI because different countries 
have very different age-structures. Regarding point 1), since human development was 
developed as an alternative policy objective to the GDP growth, it is important for 
governments to see the effect of their policies to improve general health conditions 
not too far in the future. The second and forth points are each consistent with the 
UN’s goals of providing basic human rights to all. Finally, the fifth point is consistent 
with the Report’s reluctance to make any (implicit) value judgement between a 
growth in population and an improvement in average life span.
The above is not to say, however, that the LEO is superior to all the alternative 
measures in all respects. In particular, as noted above, from the point of view of 
incorporating the essence of capability measures (i., e., its ability to take into account 
necessities of individuals relative to their personal features, time and space), EPL is 
more appropriate to measure the capability to lead a long and healthy life than LEO. 
The principal difficulty in the EPL is its ‘natalist’ bias, as discussed above. 
Accordingly, it would be appropriate for the makers of the HDI to consider whether 
this bias overweighs the benefits of the EPL in term of its consistency with the 
capability measures.
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3-1-6-1-2: Identification o f relative necessities
In order for a capability measurement to identify relative necessities, as 
discussed earlier in the chapter, we need a common (or absolute) criterion relative to 
which we reveal necessities of different individuals or groups of individuals. Such a 
criterion implicit in the life expectancy at birth is to live as long as (biologically) 
possible, because the age-specific death rates, from which we derive the life 
expectancy of a population, regard the state where no one dies between any age- 
interval (zero death rate) as the optimal state. We can say that an explicit criterion set 
by the HDI is a life expectancy of 85 years, because it is the maximum in the scale 
that measures the capability to live a long and healthy life. Therefore, relative 
necessities revealed by the life expectancy in the HDI are necessities of a population 
in general to be able to live until 85 given its characteristics.
There are a variety of reasons behind a population’s not being able to achieve 
the life expectancy of 85 years, such as inadequate provision of nutrition, bad 
hygienic conditions, war, a high proportion of suicide, and other diseases or accidents. 
Similarly, the necessities for the population to achieve the target level also vary: 
provision of nutritious food, a clean water supply, a stable political environment, 
adequate mental-health care, solutions to private problems, effective medical 
treatment etc. The capability measured by life expectancy does not discriminate 
between these different reasons for achieving a particular level of life expectancy. 
This is one of the problems discussed above that is inherent in the measurement of 
capability, that is, that the measurement does not itself dictate the extent to which we 
identify relative necessities. That is, it does not discriminate between various sorts of 
reasons behind a population’s poor performance on the longevity measure during a
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certain time and at a certain place, and therefore does not provide guidance on what 
needs should be met in order to see improvements.
What about necessities relative to features specific to each individual? Could 
such necessities be identified by the capability measurement using the life expectancy 
figure used in the HDI?
Improvement in health conditions and conditions relevant for survival at an 
individual level contribute to an improvement in life expectancy in the following way: 
by improving the probability of surviving between now and a  years later (the time 
interval in the data on age-specific death rates used to derive life expectancy figures) 
and thus improving the performance of the relevant age-specific death rate. 
Improvement of the death rate for any age interval should contribute to longer life 
expectancies. Therefore, there is a very large number of ways in which individual 
improvements in the probability to survive contribute to an improvement in the 
overall life expectancy of the population. This implies that in theory, at the individual 
level, there are no fixed criteria relative to which the necessities of each individual are 
identified in terms of the overall target, such as a life expectancy of 85 years.
In practice, however, there may be such criteria, not at an individual level but 
at the level of a group of individuals who share common characteristics that are 
recognised as resulting in poor performances in life expectancy. As I have mentioned 
earlier, in fact, there exists evidence that a population with a higher life expectancy 
generally has lower death rates throughout the lower age-bands, and also that there is 
a strong correlation between life expectancy and the provision of goods such as 
healthy food, sanitation, health care and education. Because of such evidence, low 
overall life expectancy could be seen as an indication that the mortality rates in the
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younger age-groups need to improve and that improvements need to be made in 
providing proper nutrition, sanitation, health conditions and education.
3-1-6-2: Adult literacy rate and the school enrolment ratio
The adult literacy rate, according to the definition provided by the Human 
Development Report, is the percentage of people aged 15 and above who have the 
ability, with understanding, both to read and to write a short, simple statement on their 
everyday life. This test for literacy, if constructed properly, therefore is a 
measurement for ‘the capability to read and write with understanding.’ This test for 
literacy applied to an individual measures whether a person can read and write with 
this understanding. This capability measure, however, does not measure whether the 
individuals are in fact reading and writing. That is, the person who is literate could 
choose not to use his ability to read and write or may not have the resources to read or 
write. In this case, the literacy test measures the maximum proportion of the 
population that is in fact reading and writing at a functional level.
A population’s literacy rates, analogous to the life expectancy figure, can be 
seen as a summary of a population’s overall achieved level of functional literacy, 
since this summary assigns equal weight to each individual in the population. If we 
see the population’s literacy performance as reflecting all the possible individual 
states with respect to reading and writing, a literacy rate can be seen as a measure of a
32 See UNDP (1998), p. 218.
33 As the 1990 Human Development Report notes, sometimes there are difficulties in controlling the 
quality of the literacy measurements in practice. (UNDP 1990, p.l 12) Therefore, the measurements and 
comparisons of literacy across societies are reliable only if the quality of the measurements is 
internationally well monitored. The 1998 Human Development Report also reports evidence suggesting 
that literacy is not necessarily a good measure of being able to read and write with understanding in the 
modem era. The Report says that ‘many people -  18% of adults on average in 12 European and North 
American countries -  though “literate”, have such low levels of skills that they cannot meet even the 
basic reading requirements of a modem society.’ (UNDP 1998, p. 23)
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set of functionings in the population and therefore, a measure of a capability set in a 
formal sense of the term.
But the result from the literacy test is not the same as ‘the capability of 
acquiring knowledge,’ which the Report wants the HDI’s educational index to 
measure. The capability to read and write with understanding is an important 
condition for the capability to acquire knowledge in civilised societies, but being able 
to read and write with understanding is not sufficient for a person to be able actually 
to acquire knowledge. I propose that in order for the literacy rates to measure a 
person’s ability actually to acquire knowledge, the person needs (1) materials (books 
and other publications), (2) informative interactions with others, and (3) some 
guidance on how to accumulate and organise knowledge, in addition to the ability to 
read and write. Therefore, under my proposal, in order for literacy tests to measure 
‘the capability of acquiring knowledge,’ we need to determine whether these three 
conditions also exist.34
3-1-6-2-1: Comparison to other alternatives
As explained above, the HDI has used different means of measuring ‘the 
capability of acquiring (or being able to acquire) knowledge.’ Specifically, since the 
1996 Report the HDI has used the combined gross school enrolment ratio and the 
literacy rates, and in the earlier Reports, the educational dimension was measured 
firstly by the adult literacy rate only and then by the combination of the literacy rate 
and the mean years of schooling. Let me now consider whether this most recent
34 Here I am talking only about knowledge that requires reading and writing for its acquisition; 
therefore, other types of knowledge, such as how to cycle or use a pair of scissors, are not included.
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measure -  the combined gross school enrolment ratio and the literacy rate -  is 
superior to the other two alternatives used earlier in terms of capability measures.
The combined gross school enrolment ratio as detailed by the Human 
Development Report is calculated as the number of students enrolled in a level of 
education -  whether or not they belong in the relevant age group for that level -  as a 
percentage of the population in the relevant age group for that level. Note that the 
numerator of this ratio is not limited to the members of the particular age group. One 
alternative to this, which is called the net school enrolment ratio, would be only to 
include students who are enrolled at school in the relevant age groups. However, I 
believe that the ratio used in the current HDI -  the gross figure -  is better in terms of 
measuring a dimension of capability to reflect relative aspects of well-being. 
Specifically, in counting those who are enrolled at school later or earlier than the 
standard age, the gross figure takes into account individual differences regarding their 
learning speed or the right timing for school education. That is, given that different 
individuals in a society may be able to learn more effectively at an earlier or later age 
than the norm, the gross figure is able to measure differences based upon the 
educational experience of these individuals.
In any event, the first comparative issue I consider is whether the combination 
of the literacy rate and the combined gross school enrolment ratio is a better measure 
for the capability of acquiring knowledge compared to the literacy rate only. I believe 
that it is better in light of the above discussion on the three conditions that must exist 
for literacy effectively to measure the capability of acquiring knowledge. That is, a 
calculation of the proportion of people from the relevant age group who are provided 
with school education could be a good indicator for the degree to which society meets 
these three conditions. Specifically school education provides a measure of whether
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the individuals have been provided with (1) materials useful for building knowledge,
(2) guidance about the method of learning things, and (3) opportunities to interact 
with others who have similar interests and who are at the similar levels of education. 
Therefore, the combined gross school enrolment ratio should complement the literacy 
rate in measuring the capability to acquire knowledge.
The next issue is whether the combined gross school enrolment ratio is more 
suitable for the purpose of the HDI than the mean years o f schooling, as previously 
used in the HDI. I believe that the combined gross school enrolment ratio is 
preferable, for reasons that are similar to the preference for the use of the life 
expectancy of birth compared to the average life span as discussed above. 
Specifically, the combined gross school enrolment ratio is expressed in terms of a 
ratio that implicitly assumes that a 100% combined school enrolment ratio among the 
school age population is the optimum target level of educational attainment. 
Accordingly, the closer the ratio for this proportion is to 100%, the nearer we can say 
that the proportion is to this optimum level. However, since the mean years o f 
schooling is expressed in terms of number of years, this measure does not have any 
such implicit target. As discussed earlier in the comparison of different measures of 
life expectancy, it is advantageous for the HDI to have such a target since this target 
encourages a society to educate all the individuals in the school age. This 
encouragement occurs since the target level of 100% is reached only when everyone 
m the school age population is enrolled in school.
35 Note that since the combined gross school enrolment ratio includes in the numerator individuals 
enrolled in school who are not in the particular age group, it is possible to have a ratio greater than 
100%, and to this extent the measure is not as effective in providing an implicit target. Use of the net 
school enrolment ratio, discussed above, would be more effective for this purpose. However, as 
discussed above, there are the advantages to using the gross ratio, and these advantages appear to me to 
support use of the gross ratio than the net ratio.
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Still, we need to keep in mind that both of these measures are only indicators 
for the three conditions noted above, not the direct measurement for them. That is, the 
fact that students are registered in schools does not necessarily mean that they have 
been provided with books to read, people to interact with, or appropriate guidance for 
building knowledge. There is, in fact, evidence that in some societies schools have 
very poor facilities and students do not get proper guidance from teachers.
3-1-6-2-2: Identification o f relative necessities
Let me now consider how the use of the combined gross school enrolment 
ratio relates to the concept of relative necessities as expressed above. As noted, 
relative necessities refer to the fact that an individual’s ability to utilise particular 
resources -  and by extension a society’s ability -  depends on the personal 
characteristics of the individuals, and such abilities can be measured in terms of 
individuals’ functionings. In this case, the relative necessities are measured in 
reference to whether the individual is 1) literate; and 2) has enrolled at school whether 
or not the person belongs or belonged to the relevant age group (assuming the person 
is 15 or over), respectively. By the current HDI measure, only those who have 
achieved both functionings are regarded as ‘capable of acquiring knowledge.’
Let us first consider what this circumstance means at an individual level. In 
this case it is apparent that an individual may lack either or both of these functionings 
of being able to read and write and of being or having been enrolled at school for a 
variety of reasons. For example, the former -  not being able to read and write -  may 
result because 1) the individual is not provided with appropriate school education;
2) the individual is disabled and does not have the physical ability to read and write;
36 See, for example, Bruce Fuller (1986).
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or 3) the individual is not interested in learning. Some major reasons for the latter -  
not being or having been enrolled at school -  may be 1) the individual lives in a rural 
area with no means to commute to school; 2) the individual’s parents will not allow 
him to go to school, but instead require him to do something else (usually to work); or
3) a war is going on and the civil services such as schools are paralysed. Because the 
literacy test and the combined school enrolment ratio do not discriminate between 
these various reasons, these measures do not provide complete measures of the 
relative necessities in terms of different individuals’ functionings.
Further, the use of the gross school enrolment ratio also implicitly assumes 
that individuals who are registered at school have functionings that allow them to take 
advantage of school enrolment (as a proxy for the provision of educational 
opportunities and materials). However, this does not reflect the needs of those who 
are registered and yet are not actually provided with education at school, for example 
those who are registered and yet do not go to school because they are bullied or they 
are forced to work.
So far, I have discussed the implications for the relative necessities if the 
literacy tests and school enrolment ratio are applied at the individual level. Of course, 
the actual figures for the dimension of education in the HDI are summaries of these 
measures over a population. That is, the adult literacy rate measures the proportion of 
people who are literate in the population, and the combined school enrolment ratio 
measures the proportion of the people in the population of relevant age who are 
enrolled at schools. As described above, educational attainment in the HDI is an 
aggregate of the literacy rate and the combined school enrolment ratio, with two-third 
and one-third weights, respectively. The maximum level for this educational 
dimension in the HDI is 100%, which consists of a 100% literacy rate and a 100%
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combined school enrolment ratio. Unless everybody in the population is both literate 
and enrolled at school (if they belong to the relevant age group), educational 
attainment will not reach its maximum level of 100%. Accordingly, although both 
literacy rates and combined school enrolment ratio are summary measures of a 
population, they do reflect the necessities of different individuals to be literate and 
enrolled at school. That is, the HDI measurement of the ‘capability to acquire 
knowledge’ does adjust for those in the population under consideration who have not 
yet achieved either or both of these functionings by causing a lower than target level 
of educational attainment.
A further advantage the literacy rate and school enrolment ratio have over 
other summary measures such as average income or average life span is that the 
literacy rate and school enrolment ratio are expressed in terms of proportions, and as a 
result they are able to indicate distributional aspects of the educational attainment. 
Accordingly, unlike these other summary measures, the number of people who are not 
literate or who are not enrolled at school cannot be averaged out by the number of 
people who are literate and who are enrolled at school. (In this sense the educational 
attainment measure is similar to the measure of the life expectancy at birth, which 
also has provides some distributional aspect of well-being. This is because the life 
expectancy at birth is aggregated in such a way that a population with a higher life 
expectancy at birth generally has lower death rates throughout the lower age bands. 
As discussed below, as an aggregate measure, the real GDP is much more problematic 
because of its inability to take into account distributional aspects.)
As with the analysis as the individual level, a problem with this capability- 
measurement of educational attainment using literacy rates and the school enrolment 
ratio is that the measurement does not discriminate between different reasons why the
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population has not achieved the target of 100% educational attainment. Any reason -  
from the government not providing the population with appropriate primary teaching 
to the populations’ not being willing to learn how to read and write -  is a reason for 
some proportion of the populations’ being incapable of acquiring knowledge. If the 
measurement is to be used to allocate resources, it would, however, be very helpful to 
know why the population has a low level of educational attainment.
3-1 -6-3: The real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity dollars
The per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is normally used to estimate the 
average income of the people in a country. Even this correspondence is not without 
problems,37 but in this section, I will examine the GDP figure as a measurement of a 
dimension of capability, assuming that the GDP per capita is an appropriate 
estimation of the average income of the population in a country. (In this section I will 
sometimes refer to the HDI’s ‘income figure.’ This term refers to the per capita real 
GDP figure adjusted to account for inflation and other factors noted in this section.)
Under this assumption, the GDP per capita measures the degree to which the 
people in the country are capable of purchasing (and consuming) goods and services 
in the particular country. More precisely, the GDP per capita data reveal the 
maximum functionings (among a set of them) an average individual in the country 
could achieve in terms of purchasing and consuming goods and services. I say that 
this data reveal the maximum such functionings because the average GDP figure 
assumes that the average individual has the capability to use all his income for 
purchasing goods and services for himself. There may, however, be reasons why this 
average individual may not have this capability, for example because of existing debts
37 See, for example, Morgenstem (1963), and Dombusch, Fischer and Startz (1998).
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that must be repaid or because the distribution system in the country does not provide 
access to many goods and services.
There are, however, more basic problems with the use of the GDP per capita 
in the HDI. These problems concern the fact that the HDI income figure is supposed 
to measure the degree to which people in the country are capable o f having access to
-JO  # m
resources needed for a decent standard o f living, not the capability of the average
individual to purchase and to consume goods and services. The use of the GDP per 
capita figures is much more problematic in the case of the former goal compared to 
the latter, for a number of reasons.
First, as other commentators have noted, not all the needs to maintain a decent 
standard of living can be purchased. Some such needs, for example, clean water and 
clean air or public playgrounds for children, cannot be purchased by an individual 
consumer, but have to be supplied publicly. There are other needs that may be 
regarded as necessary for a decent standard of living that simply cannot be satisfied 
materially; participation and communication in the local community may be examples 
of such needs. These problems may not be crucial if we can reasonably assume that 
countries will provide public goods necessary for a decent standard of living, that 
people do not pay disproportionally high taxes for these goods, and that people’s non­
material needs are satisfied, so that the GDP can measure only the rest of the needs 
for a decent standard of living. However, these assumptions are not likely to be
38 The 1990 Human Development Report uses ‘having access to resources ‘ and ‘having command
over resources ’ interchangeably. I will use the former expression in this paper.
39 This does not mean that the citizens of the country do not bear the expense in a collective sense. 
However, the expense they bear is normally much less than the value they enjoy from using these 
public goods. More importantly, a country’s income level does not correspond systematically with the 
country’s provision of public goods. A country’s provision of such public goods depends on 
government tax scheme, the size of the population, the public’s preference for public goods and the 
availability of mechanisms through which such preferences can be reflected.
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reasonable for many countries. Further, there is likely to be a bias in the countries for 
which the assumptions are or are not reasonable. Specifically, it is likely that these 
assumptions are reasonable for developed countries, which have effective political 
systems to encourage the provision of public goods and non-monetary aspects of a 
decent living standard, but will not be reasonable for under developed countries with 
very limited political rights. To the extent that this bias exits, the use of the GDP per 
capita is inconsistent with the universality goal of the HDI, that is, to provide a 
measure that is universally applicable.
A second problem in using the GDP per capita for the measurement of 
command over resources for a decent standard of living relates to the concern that the 
measure does not take into account relative necessities. To some extent the HDI has 
attempted to adjust for such necessities. Thus, the HDI uses the real GDP figure 
instead of the nominal one, and thus takes into account the fluctuations in purchasing 
power caused by inflation (the change in prices over time). The index also makes 
adjustments (in dollars) to account for the degree of openness of the economy, the 
relative size of tradable and non-tradable sectors, and the possible overvaluation of 
exchange rates.40 These adjustments aim at using the income figure for international 
as well as inter-temporal comparison of the degree to which people in different 
countries have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. However, 
these adjustments do not take into account differences in personal features or 
differences in climates and cultures that may give rise to different levels of income 
needed to achieve a similar standard of living for different individuals or group of 
homogeneous individuals. Even the adjusted real GDP per capita implicitly assumes
40 See UNDP (1993), p. 106.
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that individuals in countries with the same amount of income will be able to satisfy 
their needs to the same extent. For example, this measure assumes that A who is 
young, fit and lives in a temperate climate and B who is ill, needs expensive medical 
treatment and lives in an extremely cold climate can achieve a decent standard of 
living to the same degree with the same amount of income. This implicit assumption 
is a problem from the point of view of the capability theory, because the income 
figure ignores necessities relative to the individual’s personal features and 
surrounding environment.
One way of making the GDP indicator more sensitive to the necessities 
relative to different countries as well as to the actual capability sets people enjoy in a 
particular society is to adjust the GDP for different personal features and 
environmental factors such as the following: 1) climate conditions; 2) the proportion 
of the population that is disabled; and 3) the degree to which the society has 
infrastructures permitting the free movement of goods and people. The last type of 
adjustment is important in the measurement of capabilities using indicators that 
evaluate individual access to resources. That is, for example, in order for an individual 
to be actually capable of ‘moving around,’ the fact that a disabled person has a 
wheelchair is not sufficient. We also need to know whether there are wheelchair 
ramps and the accommodations that actually enable the person to move around. 
Because indicators about individuals (or an average individual) such as the GDP per 
capita do not tell us how advanced a society is in terms of the infrastructures which 
facilitate the individuals’ capabilities, we need to compliment such individual 
indicators with social indicators.41
41 I would like to thank Patrick Feng (a visiting scholar at the Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, 1999) 
for pointing this need out.
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A third problem with the adjusted real GDP figure is that it is an average one, 
and therefore it cannot really measure the proportion of individuals in the country 
who have achieved the income level necessary to enjoy a decent standard of living. 
One possible way to provide such a measure is to disaggregate the GDP data 
according to regions, genders, or ethnic groups, assuming that there exist some 
regularities between income levels and these classifications. Results obtained from 
regional disaggregation and gender disaggregation are in fact presented in the Human 
Development Report.
An alternative way of solving at least partly the problem of using an average 
income figure for a measurement of capability to reveal the relative necessities of 
individuals is to use distribution-adjusted income. In fact the 1994 Human 
Development Report calculated income-distribution-adjusted HDI for each country by 
multiplying income (adjusted for by the diminishing marginal utility assumption) by 1 
minus the Gini coefficient. An example using this data for Sri Lanka and Botswana 
can serve to explain how this adjusted figure relates to the capability issue. Sri Lanka 
and Botswana have similar HDI rankings and are both categorised as ‘medium human 
development’ countries in the 1992 Human Development Report. But Sri Lanka ranks 
much higher than Botswana if income is adjusted for distributional inequality.42 These 
rankings may imply, together with other information, that in Sri Lanka, a higher 
proportion of people have access to resources that allow them to enjoy a decent 
standard of living than in Botswana. This inference is likely to be true especially 
because both countries’ average income levels are not very high; (If the average 
income of a country is very high, even people at the bottom of the distribution may be
42 See UNDP (1994), p. 107. Sri Lanka’s HDI (1992) and income-distribution-adjusted HDI (1992) are 
0.665 and 0.510 respectively, and those of Botswana’s are 0.670 and 0.374 respectively.
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said to have achieved a decent standard of living.) Accordingly, a capability measure 
that gives Sri Lanka a higher ranking compared to Botswana is superior to the one 
that ranks them equally.
There is another reason why a distribution-sensitive income figure may be 
superior to the income figure currently used in the HDI in terms of capability theory. 
Specifically, the use of an average income (distribution-insensitive income) measure 
such as used in the current HDI does not take into account necessities that are relative 
to what others in the same community have. Recall, for example, Adam Smith’s well 
known concern with the well-being of individuals in terms of their access to resources 
enabling them to appear in public without being ashamed. The quotation from 
Townsend at the beginning of this chapter also provides a similar message: what are 
considered necessities differ according to what others in the same society have, 
demand and produce.43 If we take the view that what constitutes a decent standard of 
living is relative to time and place, as Townsend does, then a capability measure that 
aims at revealing relative necessities of individuals should take into account the 
distribution of income. That is, where the income distribution is relatively flat, 
individuals in the society will have a greater relative sense of well-being than in a 
society of comparable average GDP per capita where the income distribution is more 
skewed.
So far I have ignored the diminishing marginal utility assumption applied to 
the income figure used in the HDI. The actual income figure in the HDI has been 
scaled so that the income level beyond the world average is discounted progressively
43 Townsend (1979).
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as the level gets higher.44 Here, I would like to examine whether this adjustment in the 
income figure solves any of the problems discussed so far about the use of the per 
capita GDP to measure the capability to have access to resources.
In the 1998 HDI, the real per capita GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
dollars was adjusted by applying progressively lower weights for amounts beyond a 
poverty line set as the world average income. Diminishing value beyond this poverty 
level income is expressed by applying a modified version of the Atkinson formula. 
Specifically, for any per capita income that lies between the poverty level and twice 
the poverty level, the Atkinson parameter (the elasticity of the marginal utility of 
income with respect to income) is taken to be one-half; for any income between two 
and three times the poverty level, the parameter is taken to be two-thirds, and so on. 
This approach can be expressed as follows:
W (y) = y for 0 < y < y*
= y* + 2 (y — y*)1/2 for y*< y < 2y*
= y* + 2 (y*)1/2 + 3 (y-2y*)1/3 for 2y*< y < 3y*
Now recall two different problems addressed above concerning the use of the 
average per capita GDP to measure a dimension of capability sets. One problem is 
that in using an income figure for the capability measure, we assume that the same 
amount of income will satisfy needs of different individuals to the same degree. The
second problem is that the average data do not reveal the proportion of individuals in
44 The 1999 Human Development Report uses a new method of representing the diminishing marginal 
utility assumption. The new method does not have a threshold income below which there is no discount 
and beyond which there is a progressively larger discount, as was the case previously. Instead, the 1999 
HDI income index applies the diminishing marginal utility assumption throughout the income scale by 
taking the logarithm for every income level. But the points I make in the following discussion still 
apply for this new method adjustment in income data.
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the country who have not achieved the level of income necessary to enjoy a decent 
standard of living.
The diminishing marginal utility adjustment in the income figure used for the 
HDI implies that countries with higher average incomes obtain marginally less of an 
increase in their standard of living than those with lower incomes when they both 
receive the same amount of additional income. This characteristic of the adjustment 
implies as a policy matter that if resources are allocated among countries in order to 
make the most efficient use of resources, the resources will go to the country with the 
lower income level. Accordingly, I conclude that the adjusted income data is superior 
to the non-adjusted data because the former can capture at least one aspect of relative 
well-being, that is, the fact that those who earn less income are likely to benefit more 
from a given increase in income in terms of their ability to achieve a decent standard 
of living.
This aggregated approach to the adjustment for the diminishing marginal 
utility is not, however, the optimum way to make such an adjustment in order to 
reflect relative necessities. For this purpose it would be better to apply the diminishing 
marginal utility adjustment to the individual data from which we obtain the average 
country figures, not to the averaged country figures. This intra-country adjustment 
would essentially allow the income adjustment used in the HDI to reflect the relative 
necessities within a country as well as between countries. Thus, this intra-country 
adjustment would allow the index to distinguish between two countries with the same 
average income level but very different income distributions. Assuming that the 
diminishing marginal utility applies within the country, then the most efficient 
allocation of resources would likely be to provide the resources to the country with 
the higher proportion of poor people compared to the country with the more equal
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income distribution, at least if one assumes that the resources would actually be 
provided to the poor people in this country. Although this result could have the 
perverse effect of encouraging or rewarding countries with an unequal income 
distribution, the result would be analytically more consistent with a focus on the 
relative necessities.
The above analysis on the benefits of the diminishing marginal utility 
adjustment does not, however, apply to necessities relative to personal features and 
surrounding environments. The adjustment, for example, is not sensitive to the fact 
that those who are physically disabled need more resources for a given level of well­
being than others who are not disabled, nor is the adjusted income sensitive to the fact 
that those who live in a cold climate need more resources than those who live in 
milder climate. Therefore, although the adjustment captures relative needs of 
individuals measured by income, such an adjustment does not capture relative needs 
that are not reflected in the income figure but are also relevant to a measure of the 
command over resources to maintain a decent standard of living.
3-1-6-4: Summary o f the subsection
The discussions in the subsections of 3-1-6 have shown a number of important 
points relative to the HDI’s consistency with capabilities and relative necessities. 
First, the discussion showed that the indicators and proxies chosen for each of the 
three dimensions of the HDI are not necessarily the best alternatives with respect to 
the HDI as a measure of essential capabilities. Life expectancy at birth and the 
aggregation of the adult literacy rate and combined gross school enrolment ratio do 
have advantages over other measures of health and education as measures of 
capability, but the estimation o f potential lifetime as a measure of health is better than
139
life expectancy at birth strictly in terms of a capability measure. The capability 
dimension for a decent standard of living is clearly better measured by a distribution 
adjusted GDP compared to the HDI’s current income figure -  the adjusted real GDP 
per capita ($PPP).
Second, the selected data -  life expectancy at birth, literacy rates and 
combined school enrolment ratio, and adjusted real GDP per capita in purchasing 
power dollars -  do not measure essential capabilities (sets of doings and beings that 
are the components of well-being) unconditionally. In order for them to measure such 
capabilities of interests, various implicit assumptions have to be made. In the case of 
life expectancy at birth, it is assumed that a particular set of age-specific mortality 
rates applies throughout a cohort’s life. In the case of literacy rates, assumptions are 
made on access to books, guidance and interaction with the world in general. In the 
case of per capita GDP, it is implicitly assumed that everyone is able to achieve the 
same level of capability with an equal amount of income. The capability measure is 
successful if the conditions described by those assumptions are met in a society where 
the measurement is used. The awareness of such conditions is important in my 
account of successful indexes where an instrument for measurement is supposed to 
have a ‘capacity’ to measure a concept under investigation. As I explained in chapter 
one, Cartwright’s notion of ‘capacity’ indicates that a model or a measurement 
instrument reveals its ability to inform us about facts about the world only when a set 
of conditions are met.
As discussed above, however, it is very difficult for these assumptions to be 
true, especially for the whole population under investigation. The questions, therefore 
becomes whether the assumptions can be seen as good abstractions of the reality 
(which is the case in the life expectancy at birth) or what proportion of the population
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meets the condition described in the assumption (which is the question relevant for 
adult literacy rates). I have shown that the implicit assumption behind the income 
figure is not only a bad abstraction of reality, but is also inconsistent with the main 
goal of the capability approach: that is, to apply a measurement that can take into 
account relative aspects of well-being. For the HDI to be consistent with theory, thus, 
what we expect the income figure to measure has to be modified.
Third, the three indicators all potentially suffer from the fact that they are 
summary measures of a population, that is, they are incapable of revealing relative 
necessities at individual levels. But the three indicators have different ways of solving 
at least part of this problem of summation. The measurement of educational 
attainments, because it sets 100% as the target, solves the problem thus: unless 
everyone in the population is capable of acquiring knowledge, the 100% target will 
not be achieved. The income figure, because of the adjustment for diminishing 
marginal utility, is capable of encouraging international organisations to identify and 
improve the states of countries that are less well-off. In order for this result to be 
achieved for differences within a country, the diminishing marginal utility adjustment 
has to be applied to disaggregated income data for different groups of individuals 
within the country. Regarding the life expectancy figure, because of a correlation 
between this figure and other natural and social phenomena, life expectancy is 
capable of identifying those who possess or suffer from phenomena such as poor 
nutrition, sanitation, health conditions and education.
Finally, a common problem with the three indicators is that they do not 
discriminate among the reasons for achieving particular levels of the capability to live 
a long and healthy life, the capability to acquire knowledge, and the capability to 
maintain a decent standard of living. This is one of the problems inherent in the
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capability measurement, as I have discussed in the previous section of the chapter. If 
the index were to be used for resource allocation, independent criteria for 
discriminating among different reasons for the shortfalls would be necessary.
3-2: The LSI and theory
The principal purpose of this chapter is to discuss the HDI in terms of the 
theory-dependent criteria for a successful index. To provide some useful comparison 
to this analysis, I will briefly examine the relationship of the LSI to the theories 
developed by Jeremy Bentham for measuring pleasures and pains in his book ‘An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation’ first published in 1789.45 
This analysis provides a contrast to the purpose-dependent analysis for the LSI since 
the LSI index-maker was less interested in implementing a particular theory into the 
measurement than were the index-makers of the HDI. As noted above, the HDI’s 
index-makers were rather directly and expressly influenced by Sen’s capability theory 
in developing the HDI. By contrast, the index-maker for the LSI did not have such 
express theoretical purposes. Instead, the LSI index-maker was influenced by a 
number of general theoretical sources, including the ‘utility’ theory developed by 
Bentham.46 Accordingly, the analysis of the LSI in terms of theory-dependent criteria 
is less significant for the LSI.
45 The edition I used is Jeremy Bentham An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 
edited by J. H. Bums and H. L. A. Hart (1996), pp. 11-2.
46 Other general theoretical sources of the LSI include B.W. Heady’s studies on well-being based on an 
integration of theories from psychology and economics and R. Veenhoven’s evaluation of happiness 
based on psychological and sociological understandings of the concept. See, for example, Heady 
(1993) and Veenhoven (1993).
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3-2-1: The general relationship of Bentham’s utility theory to the LSI
Bentham’s utility ideas are of course well known. According to Bentham, the 
principle of utility ‘approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to 
the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the 
party whose interests is in question.’47 By ‘utility’ he means the ‘property in any 
object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness 
(all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same 
thing) to prevent the happiness of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party 
whose interest is considered.’48 An object is said to promote the interest of an 
individual member of a community ‘when it tends to add to the sum total of his 
pleasures; or, what comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains.’49 
Further, for Bentham the interest of the community is ‘the sum of the interests of the 
several members who compose it.’ An action is said to conform to the principle of 
utility for the community ‘when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the 
community is greater than any it has to diminish it.’50 Finally, regarding the
government’s role, Bentham claims that ‘a measure of government may be said to
be conformable to or dictated by the principle of utility, when in like manner the 
tendency which it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any 
which it has to diminish it.’51
One can see from this brief summary that Bentham’s utility theory bears a 
relationship to an underlying premise of the LSI. Specifically, the LSI is premised on 
the view that a good government policy is the one that improves the general level of
47 An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1996), pp. 11-2.
48 Ibid. p. 12.
49 Ibid. p. 12.
50 Ibid. pp. 12-3.
51 Ibid. p. 13.
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satisfaction of a society. As summarised above, the LSI uses a public opinion poll to 
determine the ‘degree of satisfaction level’ (DSL), and the LSI is calculated so as to 
relate various measures to the results of this poll. This view is in harmony with 
Bentham’s idea that the government’s role is to act so that the sum total of happiness 
increases relative to the sum total of pain for all the individuals in a community.
3-2-2: The LSI and Bentham’s method of measuring pleasures and pains
A deeper level of comparison between Bentham’s approach and the LSI can 
be developed by examining the methods of measuring pleasures and pains that 
Bentham provides in the later chapter of his book. According to Bentham, one 
should evaluate the government’s act in terms of its general tendency to promote or to 
diminish the interests of a community by first looking at the degree of satisfaction of 
individuals. According to Bentham, a person’s degree of pleasure or pain is 
determined by the following four factors:
1. The intensity of the pleasure or pain;
2. The duration of the pleasure or pain;
3. The certainty or uncertainty of the pleasure or pain; and
4. The propinquity or remoteness of the pleasure or pain.
Further, according to Bentham, in order to evaluate the effect of a government 
action in terms of pleasures and pains, we need to take into account the following 
three additional factors:
1. The fecundity of the pleasure or pain, or the chance that a pleasure or a 
pain will be followed by sensations of the same kind;
52 Ibid. pp. 38-41. Fukuda (1995) also introduces the method.
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2. The purity of the pleasure or pain, or the chance of a pleasure or a pain 
not being followed by sensations of the same kind; and
3. The extent of the impact of the pleasure or pain, or the number of 
persons to whom a pleasure or a pain extends.
According to Bentham, in order to evaluate a proposed government action 
with respect to its effect on a community as a whole, we begin with any one person 
whose interests seem most immediately to be affected by an act, and evaluate the 
following for this person:
1. Each distinguishable pleasure that appears to be produced by the act in 
the first instance,
2. Each pain that appears to be produced by it in the first instance,
3. Each pleasure that appears to be produced by it after the first, and
4. Each pain that appears to be produced by it after the first.
Bentham would have us sum up the values of all the pleasures on the one side, 
and those of the pains on the other. If the sum balances on the side of pleasure, the 
result indicates the ‘good’ tendency of the act with respect to the interests of the 
particular individual; if the sum balances on the side of pain, the results indicates the 
‘bad’ tendency.
Bentham would then have us repeat the same process for all the individuals in 
the community whose interests are affected by the government’s action. He would 
then count the number of individuals to whom the ‘good’ tendency prevails and the 
number of individuals to whom the ‘bad’ tendency prevails as a result of the action, 
and if the former is larger than the latter, the result indicates the general ‘good’ 
tendency of the act. If, on the other hand, the latter is larger than the former, the result
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indicates the general ‘evil’ tendency of the act with respect to the community in 
question.
There is some degree of similarity between Bentham’s approach and that of 
the LSI. Thus, as with Bentham’s approach, the LSI attempts to determine the overall 
level of satisfaction by cumulating the satisfaction levels of individuals. The LSI uses 
the opinion poll result of the ‘degree of satisfaction level’ (DSL) to measure 
improvement in the LSI. The DSL is the proportion of people within the whole 
population who state that they are satisfied (in general with their lives), and it uses the 
method of counting the number of persons who are satisfied in general and compares 
that with the number of persons who are not satisfied in general.
There are, however, more fundamental differences or questions between 
Bentham’s approach to measuring pleasure and pain and that employed by the LSI. 
An initial difference or question requires some clarification in the precise significance 
of the four factors that Bentham identifies as determining an individual’s degree of 
pleasure or pain -  that is, intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, and propinquity 
or remoteness.53 Specifically, it is not clear whether Bentham means that as a 
normative matter pleasures and pains should be evaluated according to those four 
criteria, or whether he means that as a descriptive matter based upon scientific 
conclusion, sensations of pleasures and pains are determined by those four factors. If 
Bentham’s approach is a normative one, then the people asked the question ‘How 
satisfied you are in your life in general?’ should be informed in advance that they 
should take Bentham’s four criteria into account if the results are to be consistent with 
Bentham’s approach. Since they are not so informed, if this normative approach is
53 Criteria relevant for such evaluations are six if the purpose is to assess government actions. However, 
as I point out shortly, DSL is not designed for the purpose.
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assumed then there would be an inconsistency between the DSL results and 
Bentham’s approach. If, on the other hand, Bentham’s approach is a descriptive one 
based on his understanding of how human sensations of pleasure and pain are 
determined, then it is possible that the DSL’s reliance of subjective judgement of 
individuals will approximate the results of an analysis based on Bentham’s approach. 
That is, if all individuals asked to state whether they are generally satisfied with their 
life do this by implicitly calculating the balance of their pleasures and pains according 
to Bentham’s four criteria, then the results could be consistent with the results of his 
analysis. However, a determination of whether in fact Bentham’s four criteria are 
descriptive as a matter of fact is beyond the scope of this thesis.
A second difference or question relates to the temporal aspects of Bentham’s 
approach. As noted above, each person’s response to a particular act is to be evaluated 
in terms of the pleasures and pains produced in the first instance and also after this 
first instance. However, we also do not know whether the people who answer the 
questionnaire actually calculate their general levels of satisfaction (dissatisfaction) in 
this inter-temporal manner suggested by Bentham, that is, to weigh up pleasures and 
pains arising from the current state as well as its effect on the future pleasures and 
pains.
A third area of difference concerns the extent to which the index focuses on 
specific rather than general actions. As noted above, Bentham’s approach focuses on 
evaluating whether a particular governmental action produces a positive result in 
terms of the balance of individual results. However, the DSL is designed to measure a 
community’s state of satisfaction in general at a particular period in time, not to 
evaluate the impact a certain government action has on the community in terms of 
people’s satisfaction.
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A fourth difference involves the quantitative measurement used in the DSL. 
That is, the DSL provides information not only on whether the general level of 
satisfaction is positive or negative, but also the degree to which it is so. And the 
numerical representations of DSL are necessary to find (using econometric methods) 
important policy variables that improve the satisfaction level in general of a society, 
which in turn constitute the LSI. By contrast, Bentham’s analysis is based upon 
whether on balance the number of individuals whose pleasure is improved by a 
particular action is greater or less than the number whose pleasure is reduced, without 
making rankings or numerical comparisons.
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Chapter four: Condition-dependent criteria for the HDI and the LSI
This chapter examines the HDI and the LSI with respect to their relation to 
concerns involving the real world. The examination derives from my view that a 
successful measurement instrument or index is like a successful model in that it must 
be applied under conditions where relevant causal capacities in the world can display 
themselves. Recall the relationship between causal relationships, models and the real 
world phenomena discussed by Cartwright.1 Causal relationships require not only that 
capacities exist in the world but also that certain conditions be met in order for these 
capacities to be realised. Models are blueprints for nomological laws in that models 
describe specific kinds of situations in which the particular set of capacities will be 
realised in a repeatable way.
Indexes are created in order to measure or quantify concepts. But there is no 
one to one relationship between a number in an index and the concept being 
measured, and numbers can represent concepts only under particular conditions. For 
an index to be successful, therefore, we must determine the conditions under which 
the numbers will convey information that actually measures the concept, and indexes 
have to be used only when such conditions are actually met.
This chapter will discuss the situations in which measurement instruments or 
indexes are and should be used. I divide the discussion into two categories: (1) the 
quality and analytic acceptability of the data and of the aggregation of the data used in 
the index; and (2) the conditions of the countries or societies in which the index is 
used for policy purposes.
1 Cartwright (1989).
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The first category involves not only the ‘practical limits’ to the data used in 
the index but also some ‘analytical limits’ that were not discussed in the previous 
chapter. Practical limits involve difficulties in obtaining reliable data. For example, 
some countries have problems collecting reliable information on adult literacy rates 
because literacy tests are not conducted under proper supervision, and this is a 
practical limit. ‘Analytical limits ’ are problems of a data set that remain even 
assuming that the data can be practically collected. I have already discussed some 
analytic limits. For example, as noted, even if countries have reliable testing 
procedures to evaluate adult literacy rates, there remains an analytical limit in 
measuring a functioning ‘to acquire knowledge;’ just being able to read and write is 
not sufficient to achieve this functioning. However, there are other analytic problems 
in the HDI and in the LSI not discussed previously, particularly the problems of the 
use of a composite index in the HDI and the difficulty in using public opinion polls 
for the LSI.
The second category of discussion examines whether the two indexes are used 
for policy purposes in situations for which they are appropriate. Since the LSI has not 
yet been used for actual policy making in Japan, and the various ways in which the 
HDI may be used are not fully reported, there is a limit to this discussion. I will 
therefore focus on the analytic advantages and disadvantages of the use of these 
indices for policy purposes.
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4-1: Quality of data and analytic problems with the approaches used in the HDI and
the LSI
4-1-1: Quality of data
The HDI is designed to permit international comparisons of more than 170 
countries in the world, including countries whose statistical systems are not yet 
developed. Accordingly, the four sets of data -  life expectancy at birth, adult literacy 
rates, combined first-, second-, and third-level gross school enrolment ratio, and 
adjusted real GDP per capita (PPP$) -  were chosen in part because most countries can 
produce these indicators. Still, even these indicators have data quality problems.
First, as the Report notes, there are sometimes difficulties in controlling the 
standard of the definition of literacy. Because different countries use different 
languages and different ways of writing, the HDI uses the general standard ‘to be able 
to read and write with understanding.’ Because ‘with understanding’ leaves room for 
interpretation, however, literacy tests could be made easier or more difficult for 
people to pass. In addition, a literacy test may be given without proper supervision, 
thus undercutting the reliability of the results.
A second data quality problem involves the use of estimates rather than actual 
data. Thus, even for these basic indicators in the HDI, for some countries it has been 
necessary to use estimates, including estimates produced either by the Human 
Development Report Office or by other organisations such as UNESCO. For example, 
the 1998 Human Development Report indicates that (1) 54 out of the 174 countries 
used figures estimated by UNESCO for their combined school enrolment ratio, and 
(2) 18 out of the 174 countries used ‘provisional’ figures for their real GDP per capita 
(PPP$).
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Yet the success of the HDI in improving the quality of data should also be 
acknowledged. The process of creating and reporting the index has encouraged 
individual countries to produce better data sets. The Report claims that ‘the 
publication of the Human Development Report is beginning to put pressure on all 
countries to improve their data systems and analysis, especially their social 
statistics.’2 Also, as I write this dissertation, improvements have been reported in the 
quality of data, not only for individual countries but also for international 
organisations that collect and analyse data sets from all over the world.3
The LSI, on the other hand, uses data sets that are not available from all over 
the world. Instead, the LSI uses the results of annual opinion polls on the general level 
of satisfaction and the requirements for government action, which not all countries in 
the world produce. The index also relies on a large set of social and economic 
indicators from which only 12 are selected (using regression models) as variables that 
are significant in explaining satisfaction levels of different area of life. The LSI can 
afford to choose such non-basic indicators because the index is designed only to 
measure and analyse circumstances in a single country - Japan. The advantage of 
using data sets that come from one country (and the reasonable assumption that those 
data sets cover all of Japan with equal quality) is that they are more likely to reflect a 
consistent set of definitions and collections compared to data sets from many different 
countries. Application of a definition of literacy, for example, is likely to be more 
consistent within a country because of a shared culture and understanding.
2 UNDP (1992), p. 21.
3 The 1999 Human Development Report explained that ‘this year’s HDI is based on improved life 
expectancy data from the United Nations Population Division and revised data on adult literacy and 
combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment rations from UNESCO. Data on purchasing 
power parities (PPP) have been updated by the World Bank following the more comprehensive 1997-8 
surveys by the International Comparison Programme (ICP).’ (UNDP 1999, pp. 128-9)
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Moreover, the LSI uses data that appear to be generally adequate. We can see 
this from the following facts on the data involved in the LSI:
1. The relevant data sets are available since 1975, and the regression 
analyses are made using data between 1975 and 1993.
2. The sample size of the opinion poll is 10,000.
3. The opinion poll is conducted once a year in May for those who are 20 
and over.
The period for over which the time series analysis is conducted may be 
considered reasonably long (18 years) and the sample size large enough (10,000) with 
reference to normal econometric analysis. However, there is some concern that 
because the entire sample is taken only once a year in May, which is known to be a 
period that a number of people suffer from seasonal depression, the level of DSL may 
be underestimated. Moreover, there is a further concern with the use of subjective 
evaluations, which tend to be volatile and can be easily affected by events in the 
respondent’s life that happened immediately before answering the questionnaire. We 
do not want the data to be affected by such temporary factors when our purpose is to 
find policy variables that improve satisfaction levels in life in general. Accordingly, in 
order to eliminate the possible underestimation of the level of DSL the sampling 
should be done in a time of the year other than May, and to minimise effects from 
temporary factors a larger sample size should be used.
4-1-2: Analytic problems with using the composite approach in the HDI
As I have noted in chapter two, using a composite index rather than vector 
comparisons without combining the three dimensions was critical in making
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multilateral comparisons of human development. This sub-section examines the 
analytic difficulties in using such a composite index.
4-1-2-1: The weighting o f the dimensions
First, in order to construct a composite index with three dimensions, we need 
to decide how to weigh the three dimensions, which involves deciding on their 
relative values. That is, we have to provide answers to questions such as, ‘how many 
years more of life expectancy, how much more proportion of educational attainment 
and how much more income should be treated as equivalent to increasing human 
development by a certain fixed degree?’ Answering this type of question is a problem 
because we often are not certain of the relative values or we do not want to make 
relative evaluations of different aspects of well-being. And yet, if an index is an 
aggregate one, the results require the use of relative weights.
In the case of the HDI, the Report explains that ideally they would like to use 
a ‘meta production function’ of human development to determine the weights. A 
‘meta production function’ of human development would require a measure of human 
development independent from the HDI as an explained variable. The different HDI 
dimensions would be used as explanatory variables, and each would have a 
correlation co-efficient describing the degree to which the variable explains changes 
in human development. The method would solve the problem of weights by 
econometrically deriving the relationship between this measure of human 
development and the HDI dimensions.
The problem is, of course, that such a measure of human development 
independent from the HDI does not exist. Given this situation, the Report assigns 
equal weight to the three dimensions and provides or implies two kinds of
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justifications for doing so, one conceptual and one empirical. The conceptual rationale 
is that these dimensions are equally important in improving human development.4 The 
empirical rationale is that there exists a phenomenon which may be considered as an 
essential aspect of human development, and an econometric method shows that the 
phenomenon is explained well by assigning equal weight to the three variables.5 Both 
justifications, however, have significant weaknesses.
The principal weakness of the conceptual justification involves the fact that in 
order to create an index with variables with different units, the variables have to be 
normalised (to obtain a common unit). Thus, depending on which common unit is 
used, what is implied by ‘equally important’ -  that is, what results in an equal change 
in the HDI -  is different.6 For example, in the 1998 HDI, a 6 year increase in life 
expectancy, a 15% increase in the adult literacy rate, a 30% increase in the combined 
school enrolment ratio and a $3,990 (PPP) increase in income (if the original level of 
income is below $5,990 (PPP)), equally result in a 0.1 increase in the HDI.7 However, 
as I described in chapter two, the units for each dimension were chosen based on fixed
4 Desai (1991) notes that ‘equal weighting is supposed to reflect the equal importance of these three 
variables.’ (p. 355) This conceptual rationale is not expressly stated in the Report. But I regard the 
rationale as one of the justifications for the equal weights used in the HDI because as I understand, 
Lord Desai has been one of the principal designers of the HDI. Desai (1991), however, also adds to the 
claim quoted above that ‘the equal weighting is not strictly true since the income variable is truncated 
and then concavified.’ (p. 355) In the discussion below, I will explain the weakness of the conceptual 
justification of equal weight that is related to the weakness noted by Desai. Specifically, I will focus on 
the fact that sub-indicators are transformed (in order to normalise) before they are aggregated with 
equal weights.
5 See Technical notes to the UNDP (1993).
6 The Report raises this problem in the Technical notes to the UNDP (1993).
7 These figures are derived from the following information about fixed minimum and maximum values 
for each indicator:
Life expectancy at birth: 25years and 85 years 
Adult literacy: 0% and 100%
Combined gross school enrolment ratio: 0% and 100%
Real GDP per capita (PPP$): 100$ and $40,000 (PPP$), where the world average income of 
$5,990 (PPP$) in 1995 is taken as the threshold level beyond which a progressively higher 
discount rate is applied to income levels.
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minimum and maximum values of each variable, not on how many additional years of 
life, how much of an increase in the school enrolment ratio, how much of an increase 
in the literacy rate, and how much of an increase in the per capita income (in 
purchasing power dollars) have an equally important impact on human development. 
So the fact that particular changes in the four variables result in the same change in 
the HDI does not show that the change in human development is equal in any 
meaningful sense.
Both Sen and the Report deal with the conceptual problems raised by the
weighting of the factors in the composite index, albeit in somewhat different ways.
Sen argues that the necessity to weigh the variables should not be an obstacle
to creating a measurement of capabilities and functionings. He claims:
It is certainly clear that some types of capabilities, broadly conceived, 
are of little interest or importance, and even the ones that count have to 
be weighted vis-a-vis each other. But these discriminations constitute 
an integral part of the capability approach, and the need for selection 
and weighting cannot really be, in any sense, an embarrassment.8
Sen’s stance is that because human development is multifaceted, selecting and
weighting is a necessary part of its measurement. He even claims that ‘the need for
selection and discrimination is neither an embarrassment, nor a unique difficulty, for
the conceptulization of functionings and capabilities.’9 Sen justifies his claim by
referring to the method taken to derive an income measure:
The varying importance of different capabilities is as much a part of 
the capability framework as the varying value of different 
commodities is a part of the real-income framework. Equal valuation 
of all constitutive elements is needed for neither. We cannot criticize 
the commodity-centred evaluation on the ground that different
8 Sen (1992), p. 45.
9 Sen (1992), p. 44. Notice that Sen uses the word conceptualization, which indicates his awareness that 
the process of obtaining a measurement for an abstract idea involves refining and restricting the 
definition of the idea that can be expressed as conceptualization.
156
commodities are weighted differently. Exactly the same applies to
functionings and capabilities.10
To some extent Sen’s appeal to the analogy of a commodity-centred 
evaluation is persuasive. It is certainly true that in order to quantify a concept such as 
‘total input’ or ‘total output,’ which we use to obtain national income measures, we 
need to assign relative values to different commodities that constitute the total input 
or output. Using the current valuation of all constitutive elements is a way of 
assigning such relative values. Moreover, in order to obtain real income measures, 
which Sen refers to, we need to know the changes in price levels over time, and for 
this purpose it is customary to calculate price levels by selecting a basket of 
commodities representing the range of products in an economy. This ‘basket’ 
approach is used rather than the tracing of the prices of all the commodities that exist 
in a society both for practical reasons and because not all commodities (and the 
change in their prices) are regarded as relevant for a group of individuals whose 
income levels we are interested in. In addition, there would be multiple counting if the 
price index includes all the commodities. (For example, including both an increase in 
the price of crude oil and an increase in the price of petrol would be such a double 
counting relative to the real income levels of the public in general.)
However, I believe that there is not a precise analogy between a commodity- 
centred index and one measuring capabilities such as the HDI, and for this reason 
Sen’s argument does not appear to be sufficient to defend the relative weighting of the 
sub-dimensions of the HDI. Specifically, the analogy between a real income measure 
based on commodities and capability measures is not adequate for Sen’s argument for 
two reasons.
10 Ibid., p. 46.
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Firstly, in the case of income measures, we have a good idea about what are 
the goods and services produced in an economy, simply because most of them are 
exchanged in the market and we have a record of their market prices.11 On the other 
hand, we have less confidence in our knowledge of what are the functionings that 
constitute ‘human development’ because it is something that someone or some people 
have to decide and there is not yet a consensus on such a decision.
Secondly, in an income measure, the relative values of the commodities are in 
principle determined by market prices.12 ‘Total input’ or ‘total output’ is obtained by 
adding total commodities and services, which are valued in terms of their market 
prices. But for functionings and capabilities we do not have a valuation mechanism 
equivalent to the market. Accordingly, the relative valuations of the dimensions of the 
HDI are not already given as in the case of real income measures.
For these reasons, capability measures in the form of composite indices are 
potentially more problematic than indices of aggregate income, and therefore we need 
more caution in interpreting the results of the former indices.
As indicated above, lacking a ‘meta-production function’ for human 
development, the Report also provides an empirical justification for assigning equal 
weights to the three dimensions of the HDI. Specifically, the Report uses a so-called 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to show that the variables in the HDI can be
11 As is well known, however, not all products are exchanged in the market, and therefore some are 
omitted from the record. Examples are goods that are exchanged in ‘underground’ markets, goods that 
are self-supplied, or goods that are publicly supplied.
12 I say ‘in principle’ because some components of the income measures do not have market prices. For 
example, values for self-administered haircuts and the services of the police force or the government 
bureaucracy have to be determined in alternative ways. Also, some productive activities such as a 
spouse’s household services are simply attached zero value in the current income measures because 
they are not exchanged in the market.
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13most comprehensively explained by assigning equal weights to the three variables. 
Thus, the Technical Notes to the 1993 Report explain that a PC A conducted by 
Tatlidil showed that by assigning approximately equal weight to the three variables 
and also assuming a linear relationship among these three variables, approximately 
88% of the total variance in the HDI could be explained, while the use of other 
weights resulted in a much lower explanation of the variance.14
The problem with the PCA analysis, however, it that it supports the 
reasonableness of weighting the three dimensions of the HDI equally on the 
assumption that these three dimensions are the total measure of human development. 
That is, if in fact there are other dimensions of human development not reflected in 
these three dimensions (and thus not included in the overall data set), then it is 
possible that some other weighting including these other dimensions would be 
preferred under the PCA analysis. As discussed above, there certainly are such 
additional dimensions. On the other hand, if we accept the limitation to these three
13 The PCA primarily seeks to reduce the number of dimensions in a data set with a large number of 
interrelated variables (variables with common causes, variables that are causes of other variables, or 
variables that correlate with one another) by transforming the data set into new data sets called the 
principal components. (In the case of the PCA applied for sub-dimensions of the HDI, there is no 
reduction of the number of dimensions, but the three dimensions are simply transformed into new data 
sets that have a particular character, which the original data sets did not possess.) The characteristics of 
the transformation are 1) that the principal components are uncorrelated with one another, and 2) that 
they are ordered (the first principal component, the second principal component and so on) so that the 
first few components reveal most of the variations present in all the original variables. Each time the 
transformation is conducted to obtain a new principal component, the PCA results indicate 
econometrically 1) how strongly the variables are correlated with the overall variance in the original 
data, and 2) how much each variable accounts for the total variance o f the original data. Each time we 
move to the next stage of the transformation (lower order of principal components), the new data set 
does not contain the variables that were previously accounted for, so that the PCA results for the new 
principal component explain only the remaining sources of variation.
14 Specifically, the 1993 Report included a table showing that when the life expectancy component is 
weighted at 0.969, the adjusted income component is weighted at 0.916 and the educational attainment 
component is weighted at 0.925, 87.769 percent of the variance in the HDI data is explained. (See 
UNDP 1993, p. 109.) See also Tatlidil (1992).
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dimensions, then it does appear from the PCA that the equal weighting of the three 
dimensions is reasonable.
4-1-2-2: The HDI and the policy trade-offs
A further analytic difficulty with using the HDI composite index involves the
fact that although the HDI has a structure HDI = A + B + C, it is misleading to think
that equivalent improvements in the values of A, B or C will necessarily lead to an
equal improvement in human development. This is so principally because the HDI
was not constructed to provide guidance on the trade-offs among the variables in the
index. Instead, the HDI was created to provide a rough measure of the state of human
development as an alternative to a development index based only on income levels, to
encourage individuals and governments to focus on development in a more
comprehensive way. As I have shown in chapter three, the particular dimensions
included in the HDI -  the average life expectancy at birth, an educational attainment
index and the adjusted real GDP per capita in PPP$ - were determined for a variety of
reasons, including universality, comparability, practicality (how easily the
information can be known to policy-makers), and reasons related to capability theory,
but not for the purpose of providing policy trade-offs among the variables in the HDI.
The Report deals with the issue of whether one can or should interpret HDI =
A + B + C as expressing ‘trade-offs’ between the different factors expressed in A, B,
and C that could be used for policy purposes. The Report points out that this is not
possible in the following discussion:
It would be tempting to interpret the relative coefficients as trade-offs, 
but a note of caution should be introduced. Superficially, it would be 
easy to say that one extra year of life expectancy is “worth” $150 of 
income, but these are not choices open to an optimizing economic 
agent. Take a poor country with a per capita income as high as $1500 
(only 17 of the 65 countries with low human development in 1992 had
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income this high). An extra year of life expectancy (above a median 
value of about 50 years) would be the same as 10% growth in real per 
capita income. Neither of these two outcomes is likely in the short run, 
nor are they independent of each other in the real world. Thus, it 
would be wrong to interpret the coefficient as reflecting a “menu of 
policy choices”.15
That is, the Report states that the relative coefficients do not reflect trade-offs 
between different aspect of human development for policy purposes for the following 
reasons: 1) as a matter of fact, neither an increase in life expectancy of a year nor a 
10% growth in income (which would produce an equal increase in the HDI) are likely 
to happen in the short-run among countries with $1500 real per capita income (PPP), 
no matter what policies they take; and 2) as a matter of fact, the three aspects of 
human development measured in the HDI are not independent from one another in the 
real world, so, for example, government actions to improve per capita income may 
also improve the country’s performance in the longevity and educational attainment 
dimensions. For these reasons the Report concludes that governments should not see 
the coefficients as alternative policy choices when they attempt to improve the levels 
of human development.
15 UNDP (1993), p. 110. As was shown above, each variable in the HDI is normalised by taking the 
difference between the minimum and maximum values as a common denominator. Minimum and 
maximum ranges for the four variables are very different from one another, and therefore the actual 
effective weights are not equal as they appear from the formula HDI = A + B + C. The ‘relative 
coefficients,’ which are the actual effective weights, are derived subject to ranges of the following 
scales: 36.6 (= 78.6 -  42) years for life expectancy, 80.8 (= 99 -  18.2) percentage points for literacy,
12.2 (=12.3 -  0.1) years for mean years of schooling and $5,074 dollars for adjusted income for 1992.
Taking these ranges into account, a one-year improvement in life expectancy, a one percentage-point
increase in adult literacy, a one year improvement in mean years of schooling and a $ 1 increase in per
capita income would represent the following changes in the HDI:
One unit change in Changes in HDI
Life expectancy 1/108
Literacy 1/365
Mean years of schooling 1/108 
Income 1/15,222
Note that ‘relative coefficients’ are dependent on which maximum and minimum range we choose in 
order to normalise the variables in the HDI.
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Upon examination, the Report’s first point does not seem very persuasive. It is 
true that in the very short-run, say, within a year, countries with low human 
development are not likely to achieve a 10% growth in income. Based on the income 
data of 1989 and 1990,16 for example, in fact no low human development countries 
with per capita income levels higher than 1500 (PPP$) achieved income growths as 
high as 10%. The maximum growth rate achieved in this period among the 17 such 
countries was by Lesotho, whose per capita income improved by only 5.9% from 
1646 (PPP$) to 1743 (PPP$). However, in the other dimensions, these countries were 
able to obtain improvements equivalent to a 10% growth in income under the HDI -  
that is, a 1 year increase in life expectancy or a 0.08 improvement in educational 
attainment index for a country whose per capita income is about 1500 PPP$ -  even in 
the very short run. Thus, for educational attainment, 14 of these 17 countries (all 
except for Bolivia, Lesotho and Swaziland) achieved more than a 0.08 improvement
• 17in educational attainment between 1990 and 1992. With respect to longevity, three 
countries -  Bolivia, Cameroon and Lesotho -  among the 17 countries improved their 
life expectancy by one year or more over the 2 years between 1990 and 1992.
Accordingly, this first reason the Report gives for not regarding the relative 
coefficients as trade-offs -  that in the short-run the dimensions of human development 
in the HDI do not improve by one year of longevity, or by 150PPP$ of per capita 
income (both of which are equivalent to approximately an increase of 0.027 in the
16 These data are obtained from the 1992 and the 1993 Human Development Reports.
17 The Human Development Reports for 1993 and 1994 which I used for this analysis still used an 
educational attainment index consisting of the adult literacy rate and mean years of schooling, with 
two-third weight on the first and a one-third weight on the second. A 0.08 point increase in educational 
attainment could be achieved, for example, by a 8% improvement in the adult literacy rate and a 2- 
year’s increase in the mean years of schooling.
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HDI) -  is not correct. At least in the case of longevity and of educational attainment 
such improvements can and do occur.
There is another analytic difficulty with this first point in the Report. 
Specifically, even if large improvements in any of the measures were not likely in a 
year, the coefficients could still be useful as ‘a menu of policy choices’ with respect to 
smaller changes. For example, a 5% increase in income, 0.5 additional years of life 
expectancy, and a 0.04 point improvement in educational attainment are equivalent 
under the HDI model, and as I have shown, such improvements do happen in reality. 
Using the same data sets as above, in fact I find that 10 out of the 17 countries noted 
above (countries with low human development but have income levels higher than 
1500 PPP$) achieved more than a 5 % increase in income within two years, 12 among 
17 such countries achieved more than 0.5 years increase in life expectancy within a 
year, and all the 17 countries achieved more than a 0.04 point improvement in 
educational attainment within a year. Policy-makers could use these as reflecting ‘a 
menu of choices’ to set priorities for the short-term policy goals.
The Report’s second reason for rejecting use of the HDI factors in making 
policy choices -  that there are likely interactions between the three aspects of human 
development -  is more persuasive; that is, analytically it seems likely that such 
interactions will occur. For example, investments in the educational sector may not 
only improve literacy but also create more skilled labourers, which should contribute 
to the improvement of the country’s per capita income, which in turn may improve 
the general health conditions of the population. In such cases, the HDI coefficients do 
not provide independent trade-offs for a government aiming to maximise human 
development with a given amount of resources. There also may be cases of negative 
correlations. For example, a government’s attempt to improve per capita income by
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investing more in fast-growing industries may lead to reduced investment in 
education and health sectors. In this case an effort to improve the country’s 
development by improving the income component of the HDI may result in offsetting 
or partially offsetting declines in the other components. For this reason, the Report is 
correct in saying that governments should not regard the relative coefficients implicit 
in the HDI as reflecting a ‘menu of policy choices’ to achieve improved development.
In short, since the three components of the HDI are not independent of one 
another, governments aiming to improve their country’s level of human development 
should not use the coefficients reflected in the HDI to determine their policy 
strategies.
This is not to say that the HDI cannot be useful at all in the area of policy. The 
ways in which the HDI can be useful for policy purposes are discussed in Section 4-2- 
1, below.
4-1-2-3: Limitation in the elements included in the HDI
A further analytic problem with the composite approach of the HDI is that it
plainly does not capture all of the elements that are relevant to a comprehensive
notion of human development. For example, as discussed above in chapter three,
largely for political reasons, the HDI does not include any measure of the political and
civil freedom that citizens in the country enjoy. The significance of this omission was
noted in the recently released Human Development Report 2000,
Even a composite indicator such as the human development index, 
while a broader measure of progress than gross national product, does 
not pretend to measure civil and political rights. Czechoslovakia had 
ranked higher in the human development index than in gross national 
product, indicating a fairer distribution of economic resources than that 
in many other countries at the same income level. But the index does
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not measure the political dimension of rights -  an area in which many 
one-party states were seriously deficient.1
In addition, as discussed in connection with the purpose-dependent criteria, 
notwithstanding the richness of human development, for practical reasons the number 
of dimensions in the HDI has to be limited. Accordingly, policy-makers cannot rely 
simply upon actions to improve the HDI since this would ignore many important 
areas of human development that the HDI does not include. Indeed, the 1991 Human 
Development Report notes this limitation in the HDI, stating as follows:
Last year’s Report went beyond defining human development by proposing a 
way to measure it. The human development index (HDI) combined national 
income with two social indicators -  adult litracy and life expectancy -  to give 
a composite measure of human progress. It was fully recognized then, as now, 
that the concept of human development it much broader than its 
measurement.19
The tension between the advantages of having some human development
index measuring social dimensions and the analytic recognition that the index is
certainly incomplete as a measure of the many aspects of human development was
noted by Sen, one of the designers of the HDI. Thus, in an article included as a special
contribution to the 1999 Report, Sen explained as follows:
The HDI, which is inescapably a crude index, must not be seen as 
anything other than an introductory move in getting people interested 
in the rich collection of information that is present in the Human 
Development Report. Indeed, I must admit I did not initially see much 
merit in the HDI itself, which, as it happens, I was privileged to help
devise. Why give prominence, it was natural to ask, to a crude
summary index that could not begin to capture much o f the rich 
information that makes the Human Development Report so engaging 
and important?
This crudeness had not escaped Mahbub [ul Haq, the originator of the 
Human Development Report] at all. He did not resist the argument that 
the HDI could not be [anything] but a very limited indicator of 
development. But after some initial hesitation, Mahbub persuaded
18 UNDP (2000), p. 63.
19 UNDP (1991), p. 15, emphases by the Report.
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himself that the dominance of GDP (an overused and oversold index 
that he wanted to supplant) would not be broken by any set of tables.
People would look at them respectfully, he argued, but when it came 
to using a summary measure of development, they would still go back 
to the unadorned GDP, because it was crude but convenient. As I 
listened to Mahbub, I heard an echo of T. S. Eliot’s poem “Burnt 
Norton”: “Human kind/Cannot bear very much reality”.
“We need a measure”, Mahbub demanded, “o f the same level o f 
vulgarity as GNP -  just one number -  but a measure that is not as 
blind to social aspects o f human lives as GDP is. ”
 The crude index spoke loud and clear and received intelligent
attention and through that vehicle the complex reality contained in the 
rest o f the Report also found an interested audience?0
As Sen notes, the HDI is ‘a crude summary index’ that cannot ‘capture much 
of the rich information’ relating to human development. However, he and the author 
of the Human Development Report concluded even this ‘crude summary’ serves 
better than the GDP in monitoring whether a society is moving in the right direction 
in terms of its development.
4-1-3: Analytic problems with the LSI
As explained above, the LSI relies in part upon correlations between an 
opinion poll on overall satisfaction levels (DSL) and the respondents’ identification of 
areas in which government improvements can be made. Various objective indicators 
are then developed for each of five basic areas -  leisure, price, education, housing and 
employment -  and correlations are developed between combinations of these 
objective indicators and the DSL. The result of this process is the identification of a 
series of objective indicators that is most closely correlated with the public opinion 
poll data on overall satisfaction levels. There are, however, a number of analytical 
problems with the resulting LSI.
20 Sen’s contribution in UNDP (1999), p. 23, emphases added.
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One analytical problem involves questions of whether in fact a particular 
government has the capacity to improve the areas in which people express strong 
requirements for governmental action (as revealed by the public opinion poll). 
Specifically, in order for this data correlating satisfaction in life with requests for 
government intervention to be effectively used, government authorities have to have 
the credibility and the power to take actions to improve the objective indicators, such 
as the total working hours and unemployment rates in the area of employment. In 
some cases, thus connection is not present, for example, where the government has a 
low credibility among the public, and government intervention is associated with 
worsening, not improving living standards.
A second analytical problem concerns one implicit assumption of the DSL, 
that is, that the satisfaction level of one’s life in general is the aggregation of the 
satisfaction levels of the five different components of leisure, price, education, 
housing and employment. However, the general satisfaction question does not ask the 
respondents to assess their overall satisfaction in terms of only these five areas, and 
there may be many individuals whose overall satisfaction is based largely on areas 
outside these five areas. In response to this problem, the general satisfaction question 
could be restructured as follows: ‘How satisfied are you in your current life in 
general? Please rate your satisfaction in the following different aspects listed and 
base your general answer on those partial assessments.’ This formulation of the 
question would essentially define ‘a degree of satisfaction in general’ based upon the 
satisfaction levels in the different identified aspects of life. But this restructuring of 
the question would create its own difficulty. Specifically, such a question would lose 
the virtue of being an overall subjective measure of happiness, which is the original 
aim of the LSI, and would limit the usefulness of the data from respondents as to
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which different aspects of life were important to their judgements about their 
happiness (assuming the respondents in fact limited their responses by the indicated 
aspects). On balance, therefore, it appears best to avoid this type of criteria for the 
overall question on satisfaction and rely on the statistical correlations to identify the 
separate components such as the five components used in the LSI.
Finally, there is a more fundamental and somewhat complicated analytic
concern with the use of a public opinion poll asking people about their satisfaction
levels of life in general. This concern relates to two different possible uses of the
0 1information revealed in data from such introspective questions. The first use 
involves the evaluation of the individuals ’ attitude toward an object or an idea. The 
second involves the assessment o f the value o f an object or an idea. In the former 
case, the focus of the measurement is to provide information on the state of a person, 
whereas in the latter the focus is on providing information on the conditions in the 
outer world that affect a person. An individual A ’s answers to the questionnaire used 
in the opinion poll can analytically be used for both purposes; the answer reveals 
person A ‘s attitude toward his current life in general, and can also be seen as 
representing the value of the world currently surrounding A 22
What about the poll used for the LSI? If used for the first purpose, the polling 
data tell us that N  number of people answered that they were satisfied in general about 
their life conditions, and M  number of people answered that they were not satisfied, 
etc. In short, the result can be used for the first type of use to categorise and count the
21 See Thurstone (1929).
22 An analogy may be helpful to see the distinction. Assume a group of individuals is asked how much 
satisfaction they receive from eating apples and from eating oranges, and that the overall results show 
that apples are rated as 5 and oranges at 7 out of a possible 10. The first type of information we leam 
from this is that on average individuals are more satisfied eating oranges than apples. The second type 
of information would be that oranges are more important than apples.
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number of people who had the same opinion towards life conditions that surround 
them.
There is, however, a particular problem in using the polling data for the 
second purpose, that is, to assess conditions in the outer world that affect individuals. 
This difficulty relates to the fact that the individuals responding to the poll are facing 
different states of life. It would be misleading to aggregate the results of the polling 
over all individuals and call the sum an evaluation of ‘the value of the current state of 
life in general,’ given that there is no single object of measurement among the 
individual respondents.
Therefore, the aggregate direct results of the opinion poll are most 
appropriately used for the first purpose, that is, as an evaluation of the mental states of 
individuals. This focus on the mental states of individuals does not presuppose the 
existence of a common concept or criterion of ‘satisfaction’ or ‘satisfactory life,* and 
recognises the fact that individuals are evaluating different states of affairs using 
various different criteria for judging their degree of satisfaction. As long as the 
opinion poll results are used to show the proportion of people who answered that they 
were satisfied or unsatisfied in their life in general, there are no assumptions made 
about the conditions of these evaluation that are difficult to meet in reality. The only 
assumptions made may be that people answer the questions honestly.
4-2: Conditions under which the HDI and the LSI can reasonably be used for policy 
purposes
The above discussion allows us to consider the further issue of whether and 
under what conditions the HDI and the LSI can be useful for policy purposes, which 
purposes could include 1) constructing recipes for policy intervention by the
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governmental or international organisations to improve the level of human 
development or satisfaction and 2) framing policies that focus on certain areas of 
development in the hope of improving the level of human development or 
satisfaction.
4-2-1: The HDI
One possible policy use for the HDI would be to use the HDI as a guide to the 
choice of policy by viewing the components of the HDI as ‘trade-offs’ for alternative 
methods of improving human development in a particular country. That is, a 
government or international organisation could target programmes that would 
improve the score that the country would obtain on the HDI in an effort to improve 
the level of human development in the country.
As developed above in Section 4-1-2-2, however, the drafters of the Human 
Development Report have explained that the three components of the HDI should not 
be used as a guide to policy ‘trade-offs’ made to improve human development, and I 
concluded that at least one of their express concerns was reasonable. That is, the 
national governments or international organisations cannot reasonably use the HDI for 
constructing policy recipes to improve the level of human development. The HDI was 
not developed for this purpose, and it appears likely that the three components are 
interrelated either positively or negatively.
This is not to say that the HDI cannot be used by international bodies or 
individual countries in order to improve the level of human development. Although it 
does not appear reasonable to use the HDI as ‘trade-offs’ to develop the detailed 
recipes for policy intervention, the HDI can be helpful in the policy area in at least 
two respects.
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First, the HDI can be useful as a means of policy evaluation, that is, the HDI 
can be used after the fact to provide some measure of whether the policy strategies 
utilised by a government are in fact improving human development. This policy 
evaluation process could allow government planners and international organisations 
to more effectively evaluate not only whether a particular policy programme is 
effective, but to allow for some comparisons of the effectiveness of different policy 
approaches over time or among different countries based upon the HDI results 
(assuming the relevant socio-economic conditions remain stable over time or over the 
countries involved in the comparisons).
Second, the HDI could be effectively used to identify areas of development 
that the government should focus on in order to improve the country’s level of human 
development. This would not involve using the HDI to provide detailed recipes for 
policy intervention, but rather would result in using the HDI in a more general way to 
identify areas of improvement in human development. That is, for example, a country 
could realise that its score on the longevity component of the HDI is weak, and focus 
its development efforts on programmes to improve longevity by reducing infant 
mortality, etc. (keeping in mind the possible impact of these efforts on other areas of 
human development).
Even these last two uses of the HDI for policy purposes, however, are limited 
by some conditions, including the following:
First, the HDI’s policy usefulness is limited by the extent to which the data 
upon which the HDI calculations are made can be reliably collected. As noted above, 
however, some of the factors -  such as the literacy standard of ‘being able to read and 
write with understanding’ -  are subject to varying possible interpretations, and in 
other cases the HDI calculations rely upon estimates provided by the Report or by
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other organisations such as UNESCO rather than actual data for the countries 
involved.
Second, for a variety of reasons -  including political considerations -  the HDI 
does not include factors that are arguably important for human development, such as 
political freedom. The exclusion of such factors limits the usefulness of the HDI as a 
measure of human development, particularly in those situations where these excluded 
factors are significant. For example, in countries with repressive political systems, the 
HDI would provide an overstated calculation of the actual state of human 
development.
Finally, although there is some econometric analysis (that is, the PCA) to 
support the equal weighting of the three dimensions of the HDI, this analysis is 
limited to an explanation of these components and does not, of course, reflect any 
considerations not reflected in these dimensions.
4-2-2: The LSI
The relationship of the LSI to policy development is fundamentally different 
from that of the HDI. Specifically, as explained above in Chapter Two, the LSI, 
unlike the HDI, was expressly developed to provide a recipe for policy intervention to 
improve the satisfaction level in the Japan population. Accordingly, the factors in the 
LSI were designed to allow policy-makers to construct specific policies in this area. 
However, as with the HDI, the LSI’s usefulness for policy purposes is limited by a 
number of conditions, including the following:
First, the LSI’s usefulness is limited by the extent to which the Japanese 
government can take effective actions to improve conditions in the five areas 
identified generally and in the related objective indicators specifically. To the extent
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that the government is incompetent or corrupt and cannot improve these conditions, 
the LSI will not be a very useful tool for policy purposes.
Second, the LSI’s usefulness is limited to the extent that individuals in Japan 
obtain significant degrees of satisfaction in areas other than the five areas identified of 
leisure, price, education, housing and employment. For example, none of these areas 
deals directly with matters of personal freedom, freedom of worship or spiritual 
dimensions of life, and these could be important aspects of overall satisfaction. In his 
recent book Robert William Fogel emphasises the importance of spiritual dimensions 
in constructing policies essentially in America, but his observations would also apply 
to other nations with comparable levels of material well-being such as Japan. Fogel 
writes:
In a world in which all but a small percentage are lacking in adequate 
nutrition and other necessities of life, self-realization may indeed seem 
like mere ornament, but not in a country where even the poor are rich 
by past or Third World Standards. That is the case in America today
since the poverty line is at a level of real income that was attained a
century ago only by those in the top 10 percent of the income 
distribution. —  Failure to recognize the enormous material gains of 
the last century, even for the poor, impedes rather than advances the 
struggle in rich nations against chronic poverty, whose principal 
characteristic is the spiritual estrangement from the mainstream 
society of those so afflicted. Although material assistance is an 
important element in the struggle to overcome spiritual estrangement, 
such assistance will not be properly targeted if one assumes that 
improvement in material conditions naturally leads to spiritual 
improvement.23
A final and most fundamental limitation of the LSI’s usefulness for policy 
purposes involves, firstly, the important distinction between a correlation and a causal 
relationship, and secondly, the nature of causal relationships as ‘capacities’ rather
than ‘necessities.’ As explained above, the LSI was developed through establishing a
correlation between the various objective indicators developed for each of five areas
23 Fogel (2000), p. 3, emphases by Fogel.
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and the general satisfaction levels as measured by opinion polls in Japan. Thus, in the 
area of housing, correlations were found with three objective indicators, ‘budget for 
utilities,’ ‘gini-coefficient for land assets,’ and ‘total areas of parks in cities.’ 
However, a problem in using these correlations for policy purposes is that such 
relationships developed from regression models may only involve correlations but not 
causation.
The second aspect of this fundamental limitation is that even if we know that 
the relationship is a causal one, according to Cartwright, causal relationships are 
‘capacities’ that exist in nature, and because they are capacities rather than necessities, 
the particular causal relationship does not always result. Certain conditions have to be 
met for the relationship to actually result.
For example, we may know that an increase in the total area of parks in cities 
causes an improvement in the satisfaction level because of housing factors, ceteris 
paribus. However, a causal relationship with overall satisfaction may not always 
actually result. Suppose that an increase in the total areas of parks is accompanied by 
an increase in land prices because of a reduction in the supply of residential property 
with no change in demand. If the degree of dissatisfaction caused by the land price 
inflation exceeds the degree of satisfaction caused by an increase in the total areas of 
parks, the positive causal relationship between the total areas of parks and the 
satisfaction in the area of the housing aspect of life will not be useful for policy 
purposes.
In other cases the statistical relationships or correlations between satisfaction 
levels and the objective indicators may reflect only the presence of a common cause. 
For example, in the LSI, the basic indicator for the education area was found to 
correlate with ‘education fees,’ ‘the number of students absent from high schools’ and
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‘the number of youth crimes.’ It seems likely, however, that an increase in the number 
of students absent from high schools does not cause the satisfaction levels in the 
education sector to fall. The two indicators are likely to correlate because they have a 
common cause, such as ‘the number of students per teacher’ or ‘teaching quality.’ 
That is, as the number of students per teacher increases or the quality of teaching 
declines, less personal attention or less effectual teaching to the students causes some 
students to stop attending school. In this case, as a matter of policy the government 
should be seeking to affect the common cause of the two variables that correlate.
The above examples show that in order for the Japanese government to use the 
relationships between objective indicators and satisfaction levels in the LSI, we need 
to know that either of the following circumstances exists:
1. We need to know that there is a direct causal relationship between the 
objective indicators and the satisfaction level, and that all relevant 
conditions are satisfied so that the causality works; or
2. We need to know the common cause for the objective indicators and 
the overall satisfaction level data, or other causal structures that give 
rise to the correlation, and that conditions are satisfied so that a change 
in a cause actually gives rise to an expected effect -  in our case an 
improvement in the satisfaction level of a particular area of life.
Only when the government is confident that either of the two types of 
conditions is met, can it use the objective criteria to improve the satisfaction level of a 
particular area of life.
*  *  *
The chapter examined the ability of the HDI and the LSI to measure their 
respective concepts - human development and the level of satisfaction in life in
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general -  and to use these measurements for policy purposes. There were two aspects 
of this examination, one involving the quality of data currently in use and analytic 
problems and the other involving whether the index is used under appropriate 
conditions. Such appropriate conditions depend on 1) the purposes of the 
measurement, 2) the techniques used in the index (e.g. principal component analysis 
or regression models), and 3) the knowledge frontier (e.g. the availability of an 
independent measure of human development or knowledge about various causal 
relationships in the world). From the discussion of this chapter, I conclude that the 
probability that an index is actually able to measure accurately a particular concept of 
interest and to be useful for policy purposes will be increased by the following 
factors:
1. Collection of better and larger sets of data,
2. Use of the index for purposes that are consistent with the way it is
designed, and
3. Improvement of our knowledge frontier.
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Conclusion
This dissertation developed my views on proposed criteria for successful 
indexes and examined two indexes that measure human values, the HDI’s 
measurement of human development and the LSI’s measurement of satisfaction. A 
philosophical foundation of the dissertation is that there is no one-to-one relationship 
between a concept of human value and an index that quantifies the concept. 
Therefore, no index can be the measure of concepts such as ‘human development’ or 
‘satisfaction level of life in general.’ On the contrary, I conclude that there are a 
variety of indices that are non-trivially different from one another, any one of which, 
if used properly, can successfully measure a human value. The success of an index in 
measuring a human value depends on comparisons to criteria that are relative to the 
purposes for which the index is made.
The view I have developed on the relationship between concepts, indexes and 
the phenomena in the world is analogous to the view on the relationship between 
theories, models and phenomena by Cartwright, Morgan, and Boumans, as well as 
Chang’s views on the relationship between concepts, measurement instruments and 
real world phenomena.1
Cartwright claims that theories are true only in models, which are the 
blueprints for sets of conditions under which ‘capacities’ in the world can display 
themselves in regular behaviours. Each model focuses on a specific set of capacities 
that is assumed to give rise to a particular real world phenomenon, which often is a 
product of a number of capacities operating at the same time. The model describes the 
situation under which the particular arrangement of capacities gives rise to the 
phenomenon in question.
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Morgan finds that early econometricians were not searching for models that 
verify a particular fundamental economic theory, but were looking for models that 
would successfully explain empirical data. Their success was measured by a wide 
range of concerns that included usefulness for policy and the capacity for further 
developments of theories.
Boumans argues that satisfactory models are those that combine various 
factors that include theory and data in ways that meet one or more criteria, such as 
theoretical, mathematical and statistical requirements or usefulness for policy.
Chang’s study on the measurement of temperature proposed a criterion of 
comparability (or stability) in the measurement results, to solve the circularity 
involved in selecting an instrument to measure concepts such as temperature.
A philosophical position shared by these four people is that a theory cannot 
produce the model or the measurement instrument that represents a phenomenon in 
the world. My view on abstract concepts, indexes and the real world was developed 
from this philosophical position: I believe that even where a theory is available to 
define an abstract concept such as human development or satisfaction, there is no 
single corresponding measure for the concept.
So how can we tell good models or good measures from bad ones? I sought 
solutions in the same direction as Cartwright, Morgan, Boumans and Chang did, that 
is, (1) to introduce external criteria and (2) to make the success of an index 
conditional (as Cartwright does in making a success of a model in displaying causal 
relationships conditional). More specifically, I urged that indexes must be examined 
in the light of the detailed background and motivations behind the particular 
measurement project, and that indexes have to be used for the purposes for which they
1 Cartwright (1983), (1989), (1997), forthcoming, Morgan (1988), Boumans (1999a) and Chang (1996).
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are designed. Indeed, for this examination of the HDI and the LSI I have put more 
emphasis on the purposes and motivations of the measurement project than the four 
people who influenced me for the following reasons:
1. Since there are so many different ways in which a concept of human 
development or satisfaction can be quantified even using a theory that 
defines the concept, it is particularly important to identify who makes 
the index and for what reason in order to select a particular measure for 
the concept.
2. The purposes of the project can dictate which particular aspects of a 
relevant theory are important in selecting and examining the index 
(e.g., the importance of examining the index’s ability to reveal the 
relative necessities of individuals in the HDI)
In short, given that purpose-dependent criteria play an important role in the 
creation of the HDI and the LSI, in order to examine and criticise the indexes in a 
constructive manner, we need to take into consideration the backgrounds of each 
particular measurement project that has led to the selection of the specific components 
and structure of the index.
There are several benefits from using criteria of successful indexes that are 
dependent on their purposes. Firstly, we realise that a number representing a human 
value could be a product of conflicting requirements imposed by concept-independent 
concerns. Such conflicts are especially prominent in the case of the HDI: 
considerations of universality required the HDI to use only broad and general 
definitions of human development, but in order for the index to discriminate among 
countries more specific definitions for each dimension of human development were 
needed. Also, in order for the HDI to give a complete ordering of more than 170
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countries we need a composite index, but we do not have strong justifications for 
assigning the relative weights to the three dimensions of the index.
Secondly, by knowing the purpose for which the index is made, we can 
identify the range of applicability of the index. For example, the LSI is deigned to be 
used for making policies to improve the general satisfaction level in Japan, while the 
HDI is created to give a rough indication of countries’ levels of development in a 
more comprehensive sense than the mere growth in income.
Finally, criticisms and discussions about the index will be more specific and 
relevant if we take into consideration who makes the index and for what purposes. 
Examining the HDI, for example, without taking into account that it is made by the 
UN is likely to create criticisms that are not useful, such as the claim that the index is 
too simple to capture the rich concept of human development. More interesting and 
relevant questions arise only after acknowledging why the index is so simple, because 
then we can focus on how to avoid the misuse of the simple index and also how to 
improve the index given the constraints.
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Postscript
In this thesis, I have developed my own account of successful indexes and 
examined two examples -  the Human Development Index and the Life Satisfaction 
Indicator -  according to the criteria. The investigation was based on the view that 
criteria for successful indexes are relative to particular projects of quantification. The 
nature of those projects define many things: the indexes’ relationship to theories, the 
purpose for which the indexes are made, as well as the index-makers’ ideas about 
what are appropriate objectives for individuals and societies. I did not investigate the 
more fundamental question of whether enhancing ‘human' development’ or improving 
‘satisfaction’ are good for humans. This fundamental question is concerned about the 
philosophies of index-makers, which I took as givens in my account. In this section I 
would like to give a cursory summary in response to the crucial question: Are human 
development and increased satisfaction necessarily good for humans? The question 
should be part of any serious treatment of measurements of human development or 
satisfaction, but it is a complex one that needs a detailed treatment. I outline here 
some of the areas to be included in a treatment of this question. (A more complete 
discussion of the question will be one of my future research projects.)
Human development has been defined as enlarging choices. And Amartya 
Sen’s capability approach to well-being discussed in chapter three, which provides the 
theoretical foundation of the HDI, was based on the idea that widening of options is a 
good. So the first question to be asked is about the truth of the claim that choice 
enlargements are good for individuals. I find two problems or questions in this claim:
1. Is any additional choice good for individuals? In other words, are 
having more options to choose from always better than having fewer?
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2. Is having choices sufficient as a human good?
In a simplistic approach to this first question we can respond that having more 
options must be better than having fewer options, because those with more options 
can choose to live with fewer options (assuming that options include ‘cutting 
options’), but those with fewer options have but to live with them. For this reason we 
may say that even choices such as taking drugs, which itself may not be a good, will 
add to the goodness in person’s life because that person has larger options in life to 
choose from. But some may object to the claim by saying that some options simply do 
not add goodness for a person’s life, or could even worsen it. In fact, although Sen 
generally claims that ‘choosing may itself be a valuable part of living, and a life of 
genuine choice with serious options may be seen to be -  for that reason -  richer,’ he 
does not forget to add that ‘this is not to say that every additional choice makes a 
person’s well-being go up — -*1
But by distinguishing freedom o f choice from achieved well-being o f a person, 
we can maintain a positive relationship between freedom and advantage. I use an 
example given by Sen, specifically the case where a person comes across a crime 
scene.2 Here, for the sake of the argument, we assume that the person still has a 
choice of not getting involved in the crime scene and also that the person’s general 
capability to achieve well-being (for example his ability to make rational decisions) is 
not affected by encountering the event.3 By actually opting for the newly added 
choice (of trying to prevent a crime through getting involved in the crime scene), the
1 Sen (1992), p. 41.
2 Sen (1992).
3 If we do not assume these conditions, then a person’s freedom to achieve well-being goes down, as 
Sen points out.
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person’s well-being may well decrease if he gets injured. Still, the person’s freedom o f 
choice increases, in a sense that the person can now choose to prevent a crime.
But there are also cases where having more options is not better than having 
fewer because the very fact of having many options has a negative influence on the 
person. For example an article in the Financial Times July 24th 1999 describes 
difficulties (and sufferings) that today’s highly educated young professionals face in 
making decisions about which course of life to follow. This may be considered as a 
counter example to regarding choice enlargement as necessarily a human good. Sen is 
aware of the possibility ‘that increased freedom might be disadvantageous to the 
person by forcing on the person the necessity to spend time and effort in making lots 
of choices that he or she would rather not have to make.’4 Still, he claims that this is 
not a conflict between freedom and advantage in general, because the freedom to 
achieve the preferred form of life is still enhanced by a loss of options for those who 
would rather have fewer alternatives to choose from.5
Regarding the second question, having choices themselves cannot be sufficient 
as a human good unless humans are capable of making use of the range of choices. In 
order to view choices themselves as good for humans, therefore, we implicitly assume 
that individuals are autonomous beings and are actually capable of making use of 
choices for whatever goals they have in their life.
Another problem we may have in regarding choice enlargement as good in 
itself is that the subject himself may not be aware of all the choices he has in his life. 
Can we say that a person’s well-being is larger than he thinks it is because he has a 
talent which he is not aware of? Fukuda makes this point.6 He is critical of Sen’s idea
4 Sen (1992), p. 62, emphasis by Sen.
5 Sen (1992), p. 63.
6 Fukuda (1995).
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of evaluating well-being in terms of capabilities because people may not be aware of 
all their capabilities, and to evaluate their well-being based on something that the 
subject does not even know of is not appropriate. Such unknown capabilities of a 
person could be brought to the person’s attention by outsiders, but for Fukuda 
outsiders pointing out the person’s capabilities and claiming that the person can do 
better is equally awkward.
Fukuda, on the other hand chooses ‘satisfaction’ as a basic human good and as 
an object of improvement. As the discussion in chapter three has shown, Fukuda’s 
choice is based on his sympathy towards Bentham’s idea of ‘utility’ defined in terms 
of pleasures and pains. If we take satisfaction as human good, neither of the problems 
I raised against the choice enlargement approach to human development arise: any 
negative aspect of having additional options, if there is such an aspect, would be taken 
into account when an individual evaluates his or her satisfaction level; and the 
subjective evaluation of satisfaction comes only after capabilities are used and give 
rise to such mental states.
However, treating satisfaction as a human good has its own problems. Sen
• Qraises some of these problems. Firstly he argues that because of our tendencies to 
learn to adjust our desires to the realistic ones and also to be affected by the 
consideration of practical possibilities, those who have very few resources and little 
prospect of obtaining more may learn to be satisfied with their situation, while those 
who are already affluent and expect to earn more may never be satisfied. Sen’s 
argument against any subjective evaluation of well-being is not so much a criticism of
7 Ibid., pp. 64-5.
8 Sen (1985).
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satisfaction or happiness as a human good but the consequence an evaluation on this 
basis could bring if used for distributive purposes. If satisfaction is used as an 
indicator to equalise well-being of a society, those who are already affluent could end 
up getting more and those who have very little may not receive any because the 
former tend to be less satisfied than the latter. One defence Fukuda may provide is 
that the distributive problem is less severe in Japan, which is known to be a country 
where the variance of the income level is relatively small. If the LSI type of indicator 
is used for policy-making in countries where income distributions are more unequal, 
the criticism Sen makes would be more serious.
Sen also provides an argument directly against treating satisfaction or 
happiness as the main objective of improvement in life. His claim is that happiness or 
satisfaction, even if is it is good in our lives, is only one aspect of goodness in life.9 
Under Sen’s view, a measurement of satisfaction, no matter how good the 
measurement instrument is, cannot identify the whole of human good. This view 
applies even from the point of view of individual well-being, because even for a 
subject himself, satisfaction may not be the only element that makes his life a good 
one. This disagreement on the importance of satisfaction or happiness is a significant 
and highly contested area, and one I look forward to exploring in a future research 
project.
9 See Sen (1985), p. 12.
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Appendix 1: A method of deriving life expectancy
m: age-specific death rates; 
q: mortality rates;
1: the number of persons living at the beginning of an age-interval;
L: the number of person-years that would be lived within an age interval by the cohort 
of 100,000 birth assumed;
T: the total number of person-years that would be lived after the beginning of an age- 
interval by the cohort of 100,000 birth assumed. 
nqx = 1 - e  [-n • „mx-  an3 • nm2J
where n is size of the age interval, nmx is the central death rate of the age 
interval between x and x + n, a is a constant, and e is the base of the system of natural 
logarithms. The constant a used in the Reed and Merrell model is a -  0.008.
I x+n =  (1 -  nqx)l x
Tx = - .20833 1 *.5 + 2.51,+  .20833 1 ^ + 5  Za=il * + 5a 
If the age intervals are 5-year, and 
7^  = 4.16667 1* + .83333 /x+io+ 10 2a=il^ + ioa 
If the age intervals are 10-year.
The life expectancy (ex) is computed as the ratio of Tx to I x.
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